Didier Deschamps: From Pragmatist to Attacking Maestro?

Regarding the art of conquering the World Cup, few understand it better than Deschamps. As one of only three people in history (alongside Brazil's Mario Zagallo and West Germany's Franz Beckenbauer) to have touched the golden trophy as both a player and a coach, Deschamps has consistently been labeled with a dull phrase in both roles.

As a player, he was a silent defensive midfielder, often compared to his exceptional former teammate at Juventus and the national team, Zinedine Zidane. Deschamps' qualities were often underestimated. However, match reports from that era always highlighted his influence.

The American newspaper The New York Times once named Deschamps the best player in the 1998 World Cup final victory against Brazil, ranking him above a Zidane who scored twice. Two years later, he was included in the Euro 2000 Team of the Tournament selected by World Soccer magazine. Deschamps' ball control was better than the public perceived, but he was primarily known for his discipline.

Since taking charge of France in 2012, he led the national team to the Euro 2016 final (losing to Portugal in extra time), won the 2018 World Cup, and once again reached the final match in 2022 (losing on penalties to Argentina). Despite this, Deschamps has always been seen as someone who stifles his players' attacking impetus.

He often deployed a wide central midfielder to maintain balance in the midfield. A fluid, dynamic attack was never truly formed. Consequently, the coach, born in 1968, always opted for the safe solution: a towering Olivier Giroud leading the line. It was under Deschamps' tenure that the veteran striker became the greatest goalscorer in French football history.

Statistically speaking, Euro 2024 was perhaps the low point in the career of the "pragmatic coach" Deschamps. That year, France scored only two goals in the group stage, won their first knockout match narrowly against Belgium 1-0, beat Portugal in a penalty shootout in the quarterfinals after a goalless draw in regular time and extra time, and finally exited in the semifinals, losing 1-2 to Spain.

A total of 4 goals in 5 matches. The attacking stars were exhausted, Mbappe was subdued behind his mask due to injury, and the team's collective play was stagnant. In that tournament in Germany, the "Les Bleus" players were actually more impotent in attack than Deschamps' deliberate defensive play suggested. In terms of Deschamps' approach or game plan, pragmatism should have been evident in the 2014 and 2018 World Cups.

And now, in the twilight of his career coaching the French national team, Deschamps is adorning his squad with the brilliance of attacking, artistic football. The deep-rooted prejudices against him now seem to be uprooted.

The formula is always: a flexible 4-2-3-1 structure, the master key handed to a winger playing as a number 10, and crucially, a consistent four-man attack from the group stage to the present.

With a wealth of talent that any team would envy, it would be strange if Deschamps didn't utilize it! Some might say that. However, he himself insists that four years ago in Qatar, "we were playing the same way."

Perhaps that's just a way to disguise, to avoid comparing generations. It's true that France also fielded four attacking players that year: Giroud, Kylian Mbappe, Ousmane Dembele, and Antoine Griezmann. But Deschamps also assigned Griezmann the responsibility of being a "water carrier," doubling as a player ready to drop deep into midfield. The former Atletico Madrid striker was like a "hybrid" machine, durable and versatile, completely different from the flamboyant Olise of today.

The turning point came in France's away win against Croatia in the Nations League quarterfinals in March 2025. Deschamps decided to free up the center for Olise to orchestrate. That match saw the Bayern Munich star play exceptionally well, with one goal and one assist, 5 key passes, and 102 touches. Since then, France has achieved a scoring rate of nearly three goals per game (2.61). This devastating form continues at the World Cup 2026.

After just three group stage matches in this summer's World Cup, France has scored 10 goals against their opponents, with Mbappe scoring four times and officially breaking Giroud's record. To see the difference, look at the group stage goal tally for "Les Bleus" under Deschamps in previous major tournaments: 8, 4, 3, 4, 6, and 2 goals respectively. And after the Round of 16, France has averaged 2.8 goals per game.

The attacking players Deschamps has are all called "artisans." Mbappe explodes with consistent goal-scoring ability from all ranges. Dembele is unpredictable with both feet, "signaling" from the right wing. Olise dances through opponent formations with sharp through balls. Desire Doue and Bradley Barcola alternate in shining at crucial moments from the left wing.

World Cup history has shown that past champions often tend to shift from a pure four-man forward formation to a three-forward formula in the crucial stages as they progress deeper.

For example, Argentina in 1986. In their first four matches, they played with a 4-3-1-2 system, featuring a strike partnership of Jorge Valdano and Claudio Borghi or Pedro Pasculli. Diego Maradona played as a number 10. Jorge Burruchaga – though theoretically starting from a diamond midfield – frequently pushed forward to act as a fourth forward, contributing decisive goals and assists. But just before their historic quarterfinal win against England 2-1, coach Carlos Bilardo dropped Pasculli from the starting lineup (despite him scoring the only goal to help the team beat Uruguay in the previous round) to strengthen the defense. At this point, Maradona played just behind Valdano, and Burruchaga became the third forward instead of the fourth.

The 1998 World Cup champions, France, followed a similar path. Coach Aime Jacquet started the campaign with a 4-2-3-1 formation, using Stephane Guivarc'h as the central striker, Thierry Henry on one wing, and Zidane and Youri Djorkaeff playing freely between the lines. They displayed beautiful football. But from the quarterfinals onwards, despite scoring three goals previously, Henry lost his starting spot. Jacquet switched to a system with only Zidane and Djorkaeff supporting Guivarc'h. The chosen replacement was Christian Karembeu, a true workhorse midfielder, sharing the load with Deschamps and Emmanuel Petit.

Brazil in 2002 had a completely different system: a three-man defense, Cafu and Roberto Carlos covering the flanks, the atomic trio of Ronaldo, Rivaldo, and Ronaldinho leading the attack, with two central midfielders cleaning up the midfield. Initially, coach Luiz Felipe Scolari used a defensive midfielder, Gilberto Silva, alongside attacking midfielder Juninho. "Selecao" easily swept aside opponents to reach the quarterfinals, but Scolari knew that wasn't the formula for winning the title. Facing England in the Round of 8, he immediately dropped Juninho and brought in the steel midfielder Kleberson. Brazil played more cautiously and marched on to the championship.

Argentina in Qatar 2022 is another example. At the start of the tournament, Lionel Scaloni deployed Lionel Messi behind Lautaro Martinez, with Angel Di Maria and Papu Gomez as wing attackers. But the 1-2 loss to Saudi Arabia on the opening day forced the 48-year-old coach to reconsider. Since then, Julian Alvarez has taken Lautaro's starting spot, and Scaloni has consistently fielded a midfield trio of Alexis Mac Allister, Enzo Fernandez, and Rodrigo De Paul. In fact, in the quarterfinal against the Netherlands, Argentina accepted playing with a five-man defense.

There are still other cases. Italy 2006 used an energetic midfielder, Simone Perrotta, on the wing, similar to how Deschamps used Blaise Matuidi or Corentin Tolisso in 2018.

Spain 2010 initially played with five midfielders behind a single center forward, and ended the tournament with a formula of four midfielders and two forwards after struggling in their 0-1 loss to Switzerland on the opening day. Meanwhile, Germany 2014 deployed various options but ultimately remained loyal to the 4-3-3 formation, with Mesut Ozil playing on the wing, even though the 4-2-3-1 formation where he played as a number 10 seemed more appealing.

In other words, it has been a long time since any national team has won the World Cup with four true attacking forwards, as Deschamps is currently operating. We have to go back to Brazil's famous 4-2-4 formation in 1970, the golden generation of Pele, Tostao, Jairzinho, Rivelino, Gerson – true number 10s and considered the greatest World Cup squad of all time.

That year, the yellow and green lined up like abstract steps, with players positioned off-center to create fluid attacking patterns in a diagonal "escadinha" concept. It was truly a gathering of elites, and they had no rivals at the time.

Past generations of the French national team, while their formations and attacking personnel might not have been the same as the current one, and they didn't always reach the highest podium, were not short of teams that played fiery attacking football in major finals.

The benchmark was perhaps the black and white era of legends Just Fontaine and Raymond Kopa in 1958. Although defeated by Brazil in the semifinals, France scored 23 goals in 6 matches, with incredible victories like a 7-3 win over Paraguay or a 6-3 win against West Germany. Fontaine remains the top scorer in a single World Cup to this day, with 13 goals that year.

More recently, there was Michel Platini's golden generation in 1982 and 1984, with the birth of "Le Carré Magique" (the magic square) under Michel Hidalgo, a renowned midfield comprising Platini, Alain Giresse, Jean Tigana, and Luis Fernandez. France's 5-0 demolition of Belgium at Euro 1984 in Nantes was the perfect version.

At that time, "Les Bleus" actually played with a magic pentagon instead of a square. After Manuel Amoros received a red card in the opening match against Denmark, coach Hidalgo decided to switch to a 3-5-2 formation. Fernandez played on the right wing, Bernard Genghini on the left. The midfield had Giresse playing deeper, Tigana slightly off to the side at the number 8 position, while Platini played highest.

Next, in the Euro 2000 final, a 2-1 victory over Italy with Trezeguet's golden goal, coach Roger Lemerre bravely opted for an attacking 4-2-3-1 formation with Djorkaeff, Zidane, and Henry playing around center forward Dugarry. This could be considered a completely different face compared to the pragmatism that led them to the world title in 1998.

Finally, during their runner-up journey in the 2006 World Cup, victories against Spain and Brazil also came from a committed team. A shuttle midfielder constantly pushing forward was Patrick Vieira, along with the attacking quartet of Ribery, Zidane, Malouda, and Henry, forming a structure very close to the 2026 model, although with less efficiency.

Now, will "Les Bleus" go all the way in the 2026 World Cup with Deschamps' "full throttle" approach remaining unchanged? Or will he accept stepping back, reinforcing the midfield with another midfielder when facing challenges of higher difficulty? How will Deschamps complete the final chapter with the national team?