As a global Warring States era begins, China must plan for the future

As global politics shifts from the Spring and Autumn period to the Warring States era, China must present a reliable political vision to shape its future, moving beyond the Thucydides Trap metaphor as US unpredictability challenges the existing world order.

For much of the past decade, the dominant framework for understanding China-US relations has been the Thucydides Trap. Since Graham Allison popularised the term, the relationship has been cast as an inevitable contest between a rising power and an established one.

The idea of inevitable conflict has shaped Washington’s anxiety over China’s rise and hardened Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to contain it. In turn, Washington has raised defence spending, tightened technology exports and strengthened its alliances; Beijing has prioritised industrial security, indigenous innovation and military strength.

Yet from Beijing’s vantage point, that metaphor is losing its explanatory power.

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House, Washington’s posture towards trade, alliances and multilateral institutions has grown more opportunistic and erratic. The interventions in Venezuela and then Iran came as fresh shocks in Beijing, which sees the US as willing to act with little regard for the existing international rules.

In the Middle East, US allies are engaging with Iran regardless of how Washington feels about it. Across Europe and North America, governments are accelerating efforts to rearm and build greater strategic autonomy. Many, including China, now question the stability of the global order established after the second world war.