US Expert: US-South Korea Nuclear Submarine Cooperation Needs Patience, Faces Hurdles

JEJU, South Korea, June 26 (Yonhap) -- Nuclear submarine cooperation between South Korea and the United States, while making perfect strategic sense, is a lengthy and politically complicated process that needs "patience," a prominent U.S. nonproliferation expert said Friday.

"This cooperation of nuclear submarine is an absolute no-brainer. I think it's right," said Eliot Kang, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, speaking at a press conference on the sidelines of the Jeju Forum.

While civil nuclear cooperation would strengthen the alliance and deepen energy ties, the path there is strewn with obstacles, he added.

It would require the revision of the existing civil nuclear cooperation agreement, and a separate agreement governing military use of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel would have to be negotiated, Kang noted.

"We need to have changes to fundamental civil nuclear cooperation," the former U.S. official told the press conference.

Further complicating matters is the need for U.S. congressional approval.

"This is not simply a political will of a particular administration that could say, 'make this thing happen,'" he said.

"It will also depend on the makeup of Congress," Kang added, pointing to the upcoming U.S. midterm elections in November. "We will have a new Congress with a potentially very different political makeup. We need to be very careful."

He cautioned against using AUKUS, a security partnership comprising the U.S., Britain and Australia, as a benchmark for what Seoul might expect from Washington. The two cases, he said, are simply not comparable.

AUKUS, announced in 2021 and signed in 2024, has paved the way for Australia to have its own nuclear-powered submarines using U.S. propulsion technology, enabled by a U.S. exemption allowing the transfer of sensitive nuclear material. The pact is often seen as a possible benchmark for Seoul's future agreement with Washington.

Kang disagreed, saying, "Australia had absolutely no experience in any aspect of civil nuclear technology, industry or human capital. So things were transferred in a way ... that made the proliferation concerns relatively simple."

Kang also warned that public calls in South Korea for the country to develop its own nuclear weapons risk complicating the very cooperation Seoul is pursuing.

"When a lot of the Korean public expressed a view that Korea must have nuclear weapons, it makes things complicated," he said. "The messaging, the negotiation has to be careful, precise and patient."

At its core, he said, the submarine initiative must been seen as reinforcing the bilateral alliance and expanding civil nuclear cooperation, something that benefits both countries strategically and commercially, rather than a threat to U.S. suppliers.

It needs to be viewed, instead, to "enhance the larger relationship," as well as "the health and the strategic position of both of our civil nuclear industry," he said.