Expert Assesses U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal and Its Risks

MICHEL MARTIN, HOST:

Let's get an assessment of the U.S.-Saudi deal from someone with a deep knowledge of the region. Daniel Benaim is a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state who specialized in the Arabian Peninsula during the Biden administration. He's now with the Middle East Institute. Good morning. Thanks for joining us.

DANIEL BENAIM: Good morning.

MARTIN: So we just heard NPR's Emily Feng say Saudi Arabia has sought nuclear cooperation with the U.S. for at least a decade. Now, why is that?

BENAIM: Well, you know, I understand why someone would look at this from the outside and be very quizzical that - and say that Saudi Arabia needs energy like a drowning man needs oil - needs water. But I think actually, if you look closely, what they're trying to do is transform their economy to look past the moment when the world looks to their oil. They want to build huge energy-intensive industries, data centers, desalination. And they're actually burning their own crude oil up to 1.4 million barrels a day at the height of the summer to do that, and they want to use their crude oil for exports to make revenue and then find other energy sources to fuel their own economic transformation domestically.

MARTIN: OK. So the U.S. signed a deal with the United Arab Emirates in 2009 that allowed that country to develop nuclear energy using U.S. technology. From what you know right now about the Saudi deal, how does it compare with that one?

BENAIM: Yeah. It's actually quite different, I think. This deal with Saudi Arabia creates a kind of two-year study to consider whether it's economically feasible to have American companies enriching uranium inside Saudi Arabia, while the UAE deal from 2009 really closed off that kind of enrichment. And that's a big difference. I think the UAE deal is sort of tethered to big international safeguards, while the safeguards in the Saudi deal - which we really don't know yet 'cause we haven't seen the deal - are kind of bilateral U.S.-Saudi safeguards. And I think another difference is that this one seems to be very focused on locking in U.S. nuclear industry as the key partner, whereas the UAE deal didn't do that.

MARTIN: One concern I think that some have here, from what we know now, is that the Saudi deal does not seem to foreclose them getting enriched uranium from other sources other than the U.S., whereas the UAE does. How does that strike you?

BENAIM: Yeah. Look, I think what we don't know is everything that's in the deal, including what kind of restrictions it places on Saudi Arabia's enrichment with other countries. There were reports of some restrictions. I think what it's trying to do is set up the U.S. as the nuclear partner and to put in place an appealing enough offer that really kind of locks that in.

MARTIN: So Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the agreement advances both U.S. and Saudi security. What do you think about that?

BENAIM: Look, I think there are big upsides and there are big and significant risks. I think what's good is that it locks in the U.S. as the partner of choice, and that gives us a lot more visibility and oversight and leverage, frankly, in shaping the program. And it locks out Russia and China as nuclear partners where we would have very little. You know, this in the past has been tied to major diplomatic breakthroughs.

This is something that Saudi wants very badly, and we previously thought it would be tied to Saudi-Israel normalization. Trump, I think, is treating it as a purely economic and strategic transaction with Saudi Arabia. So you want to make sure that the terms of the deal are airtight, and I think that's going to be the key as to whether this manages the risks to achieve the benefits.

And I think there are real downsides. If the details aren't right, it's a problem. Others could want the same deal. I think it's possible that this could undercut our negotiating position in demanding that Iran wants no enrichment. And I think just to return to this point, the details, the details, the details, you know, this is an agreement that needs to last for decades, and it's put forward by an administration that recently signed a ceasefire with Iran that didn't last two weeks. So I think we're going to have to ask some tough questions and make sure that the details, the safeguards, the restrictions, the inspections, all of those things are as rigorous as they can be.

MARTIN: So as we heard, Israel is alarmed about this deal. Officials there are saying it could pull the Middle East into another - into a nuclear arms race. There are American lawmakers in both parties raising similar concerns. What do you think about that?

BENAIM: Look, I think that the actual terms of this deal, at least as they've been reported, are kind of very unique in which a U.S. company might be operating inside Saudi Arabia without actually sharing sensitive nuclear technology. Those seem like terms that other countries wouldn't particularly want, but I think it is a real concern that other countries will say, this is the new baseline, and we can follow it. And it will require a lot of very careful and assertive diplomacy by the United States to make sure that this doesn't become the new normal for every country in the region, which I don't think would be in our interest.

MARTIN: Well, you've pointed out how this benefits the U.S. commercially. I mean, it benefits potentially U.S. companies commercially. I do want to ask, you know, President Trump has numerous business interests in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis gave his son-in-law Jared Kushner's investment firm some $2 billion at the end of the first Trump administration. Does the administration have a conflict of interest here, at least the appearance of one? Is that something that just voters should be concerned about?

BENAIM: Look, I think that there's a reason that presidents historically have avoided this kind of activity because it does create a kind of well of mistrust. This is the kind of thing that is hard enough to do this kind of sensitive, difficult diplomacy without that kind of mistrust. And this is a deal that needs to last across U.S. administrations. And so these kinds of appearances of conflict make that harder. Hopefully, what's inside the four corners of this deal is compelling enough to manage against that liability. But these kinds of side dealings make everything more difficult.

MARTIN: That is Daniel Benaim. He's a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state covering the Gulf. He's now at the Middle East Institute. Mr. Benaim, thank you so much for sharing these insights with us.

BENAIM: Thank you.