Post-Iran War Order: Overlapping Visions for the Middle East

While the US, China and regional players have distinct plans, their visions for a post-Iran war order overlap more than might be expected

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Hao Nan is a Susan Strange Associate Fellow with the Helsinki Geoeconomics Society, and a Nuclear Futures Fellow with Ploughshares Fund & Horizon 2045.

Published: 5:30am, 8 Jul 2026

The Iran battlefield might be quieter and diplomacy might have resumed, but the main contest has shifted to the architecture of the Middle East. The question is no longer whether Iran can be contained, the Strait of Hormuz can remain open or another round of escalation can be avoided. The larger issue is who will write the rules after the shock.

Three tracks are taking shape. The first is led by the United States and built around the expansion of the Abraham Accords, the integration of Israel into the regional order and the external restraint of Iran. The second is a regional autonomy track centred on the quartet of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan. The third is a China-supported de-escalation track based in Saudi-Iranian rapprochement.

They overlap more than they might appear. All three want to prevent a wider war, keep the strait open and protect energy markets, maritime insurance and supply chains. All three see value in a US-Iran understanding, even if they disagree over who should interpret and enforce it. Nevertheless, their divergence lies deeper: where Iran should sit in the regional order, how far Israel can be normalised, whether Palestine remains central and who provides security when the crisis returns.

The US track remains the strongest in terms of hard security. Washington has military presence, sanctions architecture, intelligence networks and defence relationships that no other external actor can match. Its preferred regional design links a managed Iran file to renewed Gulf security commitments and a wider Abraham Accords framework.

Israel would become a more accepted regional security and economic actor. Iran would be constrained through inspections, reversible sanctions relief, pressure on missiles, drones and proxies, and freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Strait.

This track has advantages. Gulf states still need US air defence, intelligence and military reassurance. Israel and several Arab governments share concerns about Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and regional networks. Economic normalisation, technology cooperation and infrastructure corridors remain attractive.