Corporate Bitcoin Holdings Face Forced Sales Due to Debt Maturities and Shareholder Demands

The convertible notes, preferred shares, and credit facilities that financed a large share of corporate Bitcoin holdings carry maturities, redemption windows, and dividend dates that determine when a company might need to sell.

Matthew Sigel, VanEck's head of digital assets research, shared a list of corporate Bitcoin treasuries that maps who ranks above the coins inside each company's capital structure.

Once Bitcoin sits inside a public company's balance sheet, it stands beneath a stack of claims: creditors expecting repayment, preferred shareholders expecting distributions, lenders holding pledged coins, common shareholders wanting buybacks, and an operating business that needs cash to run.

A payment, redemption, or maturity can force a company to sell Bitcoin on a fixed date, regardless of whether it still believes in the asset's long-term price.

One entry on Sigel's list flags Bitdeer, which had fully emptied its Bitcoin treasury as of Feb. 20 to fund a pivot into AI data centers, a move later confirmed when the treasury fell to zero once the company sold 189.8 newly mined BTC and pulled 943.1 BTC from reserves.

Once Bitcoin is on a public company's balance sheet, it is subject to various claims. Creditors, holding instruments like convertible notes and senior debt, can force BTC sales due to maturities, repayment demands, or refinancing failures, even if management remains bullish. Preferred shareholders, particularly those with STRC-style preferred stock, create recurring cash obligations through dividend dates, yield ratchets, and par support, turning BTC into liquidity. Secured lenders, whose credit facilities are backed by pledged BTC, can trigger sales through collateral ratios, margin pressure, or loan repayment requirements, meaning coins may already be encumbered. Common shareholders can exert pressure for buybacks or when the stock trades below net asset value (mNAV), making selling BTC more rational than issuing equity. Finally, the operating business itself may need cash for capital expenditures, payroll, or strategic pivots, turning BTC into working capital, as demonstrated by Bitdeer.

Reading Strategy's balance sheet

Strategy's own 10-K states its Bitcoin holdings function as a core component of its balance sheet and capital structure, providing the economic backing for its equity and fixed-income securities. The same filing ties that strategy to continued access to equity and debt financing.

As of May 25, Strategy reported 843,738 BTC alongside $6.7 billion in convertible notes, $15.5 billion in preferred stock, and an $871 million cash reserve.

That access came under real strain through STRC, Strategy's variable-rate perpetual preferred stock. The stock held near par through mid-May 2026, then traded below it for 30 straight sessions as Bitcoin fell from an October high near $126,000 toward $58,000 in late June.

In late May, Strategy sold 32 BTC for about $2.5 million to fund STRC distributions, its first Bitcoin sale since it began accumulating the asset in 2022. STRC kept falling, closing at $89 on June 18 and $83 two days later.

Strategy paused the at-the-market program it uses to issue new shares and buy Bitcoin, since issuing stock below par would dilute existing holders.

On June 29, Strategy answered with what it called a Digital Credit Capital Framework. The plan raised STRC's dividend to 12% and added a ratchet that lifts the rate another 0.5 percentage points each time the stock closes below $95, adding roughly $53 million in annual obligations per trigger.

The same announcement authorized a BTC Monetization Program permitting sales to fund the cash reserve, preferred dividends and interest, and buybacks of its own securities. It disclosed a reserve of about $2.55 billion at that point, enough to cover roughly 17.4 months of preferred dividends and interest, which it put at about $1.76 billion a year.

Michael Saylor addressed the decline directly, saying that “volatility tests every capital structure” on June 26.

STRC still traded near $85 as of July 23, about 15% below par, with an effective yield above 13%. JPMorgan flagged the new sales policy as a source of two-way risk for Bitcoin markets, and Onramp Institutional estimated retail investors hold about $8.8 billion of STRC, roughly 83% of the buyer base.

The same mechanics beyond Strategy

MARA sold 15,133 BTC in March to repurchase about $1 billion of convertible notes due 2030 and 2031.

Its first-quarter filing said it sold roughly 20,880 BTC during the quarter, held 35,303 BTC at quarter's end, and had loaned or pledged 9,995 BTC, including 4,253 BTC against a $150 million credit line.

KULR's 2026 filing shows the same mechanic at a smaller scale: a May drawdown carried a first-priority security interest in Bitcoin collateral, and the company pledged 300 BTC against the $15 million loan, above the minimum required.

The treasury trade worked best when three conditions lined up: Bitcoin rose, shares traded above net asset value, and capital markets stayed open to new equity, converts, and preferred issuance.

Issuing new shares to buy Bitcoin adds Bitcoin per share and keeps the machine accumulating as long as the stock trades above that line.

Once it falls below, new equity dilutes existing holders, and preferred and convertible issuance gets harder to place. The same machine can run in reverse: selling Bitcoin to fund buybacks, dividends or debt becomes the more rational move.

Treasury companies pitched Bitcoin as reserve capital strong enough to anchor a balance sheet, financing the purchases with convertible debt and preferred stock that tied that same balance sheet to conditions outside any single company's control: Bitcoin's price, the mNAV premium, open capital markets, refinancing windows and serviceable preferred distributions.

When those conditions weaken, a company may sell its most liquid asset to defend the financial structure it built around that Bitcoin.

The calendar ahead

The sector has accumulated billions in debt and preferred financing, with maturities concentrated in 2027 and 2028.

In the bull case, equity and preferred markets reopen, mNAV premiums return, and Bitcoin's climb makes new issuance accretive again.

Companies roll debt and preferred obligations without touching their core holdings, and calendar-driven selling stays close to 0.5% to 1.0% of the 1.285 million BTC public companies hold today, or roughly 6,400 to 12,900 coins over the next two years.

In the bear case, refinancing gets difficult, mNAV discounts persist, and convertibles stay out of the money as Bitcoin weakens.

Collateral haircuts widen, preferred distributions strain cash reserves, and calendar-driven selling climbs to 6% to 10% of public-company holdings, or roughly 77,100 to 128,500 BTC, arriving on a fixed schedule of maturities and payment dates.

The market anticipates various scenarios for corporate Bitcoin holdings and their impact on supply over the next two years. In a bull case, where Bitcoin rises, mNAV premiums return, and capital markets reopen, companies would refinance, roll obligations, and issue accretively, leading to an estimated 6,400–12,900 BTC being sold. This scenario suggests selling remains tactical and limited. A base case, with Bitcoin trading sideways and funding available but costly, would see companies selectively selling BTC for reserves, dividends, or buybacks, contributing an estimated 25,700–51,400 BTC to the market. Here, BTC becomes a treasury-management tool, not just a reserve asset. In a bear case, where Bitcoin weakens, mNAV discounts persist, and convertibles stay out of the money, companies would sell to meet maturities, preferred distributions, and collateral pressure, resulting in an estimated 77,100–128,500 BTC being sold. This indicates selling becomes calendar-driven supply. A stress case, where one large treasury company loses refinancing access, could accelerate BTC sales, restructuring, or collateral enforcement, potentially adding 192,800+ BTC to the market, repricing corporate-held BTC as contingent supply.

The figure worth tracking for each company is how much of its Bitcoin sits free of debt, preferred claims and pledge agreements, and how much already has a creditor, a dividend or a maturity date in line before it.

That breakdown will decide how much of the industry's Bitcoin behaves like reserve capital, and how much behaves like collateral waiting on a due date.