Lebanon Faces Impossible Choice: Iran or Israel Amidst Escalating Conflict

As representatives of the Lebanese government begin another round of talks with their Israeli counterparts in Washington this week, their country finds itself in an increasingly impossible situation.

In Lebanon, fighting between local militant group Hezbollah and neighboring Israel has displaced over a million people, killed thousands and caused around $1.4 billion (€1.2 billion) worth of damage.

Israel says it plans to stay in what it is calling a "security buffer zone" there so its own citizens in northern Israel are safe from Hezbollah attacks.

Iran, which supports Hezbollah in Lebanon, wants fighting there to stop and has made respect for Lebanese sovereignty a condition of the memorandum of understanding it signed last week with the US. The memorandum halted the Iran-US-Israel war that started in late February.

Neither Israel, Hezbollah nor Lebanon were involved in those negotiations.

This is why the Lebanese government sees Iran's tactic, of bringing it into the peace deal, as an infringement on its own sovereignty. Lebanon has been trying to negotiate an end to the conflict with Israel directly. The two have been discussing how to neutralize Hezbollah. Critics of the talks, another round of which is taking place in Washington between June 23 and 25, say that what Israel wants would leave Lebanon beholden to its neighbor and that if the Lebanese army were forced to confront Hezbollah directly, that could spark a new civil war in Lebanon.

All of which has left Lebanon with a difficult choice: Iran or Israel? Neither option offers much chance of lasting peace or economic recovery for the small Mediterranean nation.

A better alternative

Michael Young, a senior editor at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, believes there might be an alternative. In a June 18 commentary, he wrote about the potential of a solution first presented by Egyptian diplomats late last year. The Egyptian proposal, or framework, has been getting increasing support from other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey as well as Pakistan, in a mediator role.

The countries involved, Young writes, want neither Iran nor Israel to dominate the region.

The Egyptian-backed framework "outlines a three-phase process of 'organized, gradual transition'," for Hezbollah, Young explains.

This includes ending the group's cross-border activities, integrating Hezbollah fighters into Lebanon's army and Hezbollah social services into the Lebanese state. The end result would be the "transformation of Hezbollah into an exclusively political and civilian entity."

At the same time, the framework also requires a shift in the way Lebanese politics work, moving them from a sectarian system based on set roles for certain demographics — for example, Lebanon's prime minister is always a Sunni Muslim, the president a Maronite Christian and the speaker of parliament, a Shiite Muslim — to a more fluid, more equal power-sharing system.

"It makes sense for Lebanon's president and prime minister to embrace this possibility and momentarily abandon their insistence that Iran should have no say in whatever affects Lebanon," Young suggests. As other observers havepointed out, that requires moving beyond black-and-white thinking that requires Lebanon to submit to either Iran or Israel.

Could the plan work?

In the past, similar plans — especially those aimed at changing Lebanese politics — have come to nothing. But thanks to the Iran war, the whole Middle East is changing and that might make such a proposal more plausible, its advocates argue.

With its blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has shown it doesn't necessarily need proxies like Hezbollah for forward defense. So it may be more willing to compromise on that, Young argues.

Reports in local media say that, beyond the headline-making US-Iran talks, there are also parallel efforts at regional diplomacy. That includes attempts to rebuild trust with Iran and talks about a potential non-aggression pact with Iran. This is important because Iran's network of proxies were a kind of regional insurance policy. Better regional relations make them less necessary.

Another change: The US is putting pressure on Israel to help hold up its own agreements with Iran on Lebanon.

Hezbollah was founded in 1982, with Iranian support, to oppose Israeli occupation of Lebanon at the time. Its popularity among Lebanon's Shiite Muslim community is partially based on it being seen as a resistance movement.

Previously, a major issue with recent attempts to push Lebanon into disarming Hezbollah was the fact no "corresponding commitments from Israel" were secured, regional expert Mohanad Hage Ali wrote for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, or ISPI.

And Israel's presence means Hezbollah can continue to present itself as protecting the country and its community. But if Israel withdraws, this impacts Hezbollah's fundamental purpose.

This week Israel insisted it would continue to occupy southern Lebanon. However also this week, the US, Israel's most important ally, backed the creation of a "de-confliction cell" to monitor the end of fighting in Lebanon. The cell includes representatives from Lebanon, the US and Iran, but not Israel. And the New York Times reported that Israeli soldiers in Lebanon have already been given new orders meant to lower tensions.

Hezbollah to give up guns, become political

The Egyptian plan definitely has some positives, says Luigi Toninelli, a research fellow at the ISPI.

It "is essentially the latest attempt to address Lebanon's most critical issues through a form of compromise among the different parties," he told DW. "Iran could ultimately decide to support Hezbollah's disarmament while preserving it as a political party and simultaneously securing greater political influence for the Shiite community within Lebanon. That is, in principle, a positive development."

More challenging would be the integration of Hezbollah's fighters into the Lebanese army and whether Israel accepts this. And at the same time, unless the Lebanese state itself is strengthened, all of that would be difficult, Toninelli continues, because there's a lot of intense competition over the smaller country.

"Arab states seek to disarm Hezbollah, yet they do not want Beirut to engage in dialogue with, or even recognize, Israel," he points out. "Iran aims to preserve its sphere of influence … and Israel seeks to consolidate its regional hegemony, with Lebanon part of that."

Faysal Itani, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Middle East Policy Council, has similar concerns.

In principle, the proposal backed by Egypt and others is fine, Itani says, but its success will ultimately depend on how willing everyone is to play along.

"In theory, [the framework] is sound," Itani told DW. "The problem is the expectations underlying it — namely that Hezbollah will reciprocate. I do not believe it will, unless it is weak and desperate. And we are not there yet."

"And is it pragmatic to assume Iran will reciprocate by standing down Hezbollah?," he continued. "I think it's almost non-existent as a possibility. I don't believe the incentives are really there. This is an optimistic reading of the Iranian take on the situation. I don't believe hegemonic actors, [who are] backed by contracts with the US, willingly give up such strategic assets."

Edited by: Andreas Illmer