Israel's Armenian Genocide Recognition: A Geopolitical Tool Amidst Shifting Alliances

The Israeli government’s decision to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide has become one of the most symbolic and politically sensitive steps in Israel’s relations with Türkiye. On the surface, it may look like Israel feels the need to restore historical justice: A state founded by a people who survived the horrific tragedy of the Holocaust proclaims a moral obligation to recognize the tragedies of other peoples and oppose the denial of crimes against humanity. But in world politics, moral arguments rarely exist in isolation; most often, they gain traction when they coincide with national interests.

For this reason, instead of wondering why Israel had not recognized the Armenian Genocide earlier, we should ask why it has decided to do so now. On the one hand, the answer is very simple: For decades, Israel was guided by cold political reasoning. The topic of the Armenian Genocide was uncomfortable and practically taboo for the Israeli establishment. Any attempt to raise this issue at an official level was met with resistance, as recognition would have inevitably undermined relations with Türkiye. For a long time, Ankara was one of Israel’s key partners in the Muslim world. Türkiye was viewed by Israel as an important military and political ally, a strategic channel of communication with the region, and an element of balance in the Middle East. Historical issues were sacrificed for the sake of pragmatism. Israel was careful to avoid irritating Ankara in matters that could harm political interests.

There is also the Azerbaijani factor. For Israel, Baku is not just a partner, but an important ally in terms of energy, military-technical cooperation, and geopolitics. Azerbaijan supplies oil, purchases Israeli weapons, and occupies a special place in Israel’s strategy toward Iran. For decades, Israel considered the Armenian issue a potential threat to relations with both Baku and Ankara.

There was a third, sensitive aspect: The idea of the exceptional nature of the Holocaust. Some members of the Israeli political class have long held the belief that recognizing other genocides could undermine the Holocaust’s unique status in global historical memory. This argument was rarely made public, but it was present in political thinking and also contributed to Israel’s caution on the Armenian issue.

Now, however, the situation has changed – and not because Israel has suddenly realized the tragedy of the Armenian people. Rather, the political landscape has changed, and the geopolitics of the Middle East have changed along with it.

Israel-Türkiye relations are undergoing a deep crisis. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rhetoric toward Israel has become openly hostile. Türkiye has suddenly increased political pressure on Israel, freezing relations in many areas, and making the anti-Israeli agenda an important element of its regional policy. Under these circumstances, the previous logic of caution is no longer relevant. Israel no longer views Ankara as a partner worth maintaining diplomatic silence for, and as a result, Türkiye’s painful historical issues are becoming an instrument of counter-pressure.

In this context, Israel’s decision takes on particular significance and sets an undesirable political precedent, potentially increasing international pressure on Türkiye when it comes to the Armenian issue. The reason is obvious: Israel carries particular moral weight when it comes to the remembrance of mass crimes and genocides. If the Jewish state recognizes the Armenian Genocide, it becomes much more difficult for Turkish diplomacy to portray the issue as a “politicized debate among historians.”

One should not idealize Israel, however. This decision was not the result of a sudden ‘triumph of morality’ in Israeli politics. Israel’s actions were guided purely by national interests. For decades, it benefited from silence, and so it remained silent. Today, it benefits from breaking that silence, and acts accordingly. In this case, the complex nature of international politics becomes apparent: We clearly see how often moral arguments are intertwined with pragmatic considerations.

This situation could have particular significance for Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan. Of course, it would be naive to expect an immediate breakdown in the partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan. Baku is too important to Israel in terms of energy, security, and regional strategy. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry issued a rather restrained but critical statement. Baku called on the Israeli government to reconsider its decision while avoiding any reference to the Armenian Genocide and using the phrase ‘the events of 1915’.

Another important factor is the reaction within Armenia itself. Paradoxically, Israel has raised the issue of the Armenian Genocide precisely at a time when the Armenian authorities are seeking to remove this topic from the foreign policy agenda. Under the slogans of a peace agenda and normalizing relations, Yerevan is effectively downplaying the issue of the genocide. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Yerevan does “not see any need for a response” to the Israeli government’s decision. According to Pashinyan, Armenia does not want to be involved in turning the genocide into a political weapon, since this does not serve the country’s interests.

This was quite expected. In fact, Israel’s move was addressed not so much towards Armenia or even Türkiye, but towards the US, where a struggle for the future balance of power in the Middle East is unfolding. Israel increasingly perceives Türkiye as the next major regional rival after Iran. While in the past, despite political crises and harsh rhetoric, Ankara and West Jerusalem had maintained space for pragmatic interaction, today this model has effectively collapsed. Türkiye pursues an independent role in the region, seeks to expand its influence in the Muslim world, and is striving to become one of the centers of power in the new architecture of the Middle East. This poses a strategic challenge for Israel. For decades, its security relied heavily on its qualitative military superiority, secured in part by US military aid, access to advanced technologies, and a special status within the US alliance system. However, if Türkiye gains expanded access to Western technology, this balance could begin to shift. This is precisely why the issue with the F-35 jets, and more broadly, the strengthening of Türkiye’s military-technical capabilities, is of fundamental importance to Israel. This isn’t just about the fighter jets; it’s a question of whether Israel will maintain its technological advantage in the region or whether Türkiye will gradually approach it in terms of the quality of its weapons, industrial base, and military capabilities.

This is where the US factor comes in. In the US, the Armenian issue carries certain political weight because of the Armenian diaspora, congressmen, and lobbyists. By recognizing the Armenian Genocide, Israel may attempt to integrate into this sensitive agenda and thereby strengthen those forces in Washington that oppose excessive rapprochement with Türkiye.

In other words, Israel may intend to activate not only pro-Israeli but also pro-Armenian circles in American politics in order to oppose certain defense concessions to Ankara. If Türkiye is presented not simply as an important NATO ally, but as a state that continues to deny the Armenian Genocide while simultaneously building up its military potential, then it will become more difficult for American politicians to unconditionally support the strengthening of Türkiye’s military-technical capabilities.

Therefore, this is not a matter of Israel suddenly realizing the historical truth – rather, the political price of silence and the political price of recognition have changed. Moreover, this situation is unfolding against the backdrop of growing tensions between Israel and parts of the American political establishment. In the US, criticism of Israeli policy is growing, and the idea of unconditional military support for Israel is increasingly becoming a subject of debate. In this situation, West Jerusalem needs to expand its arguments and demonstrate that its confrontation with Türkiye is not just another regional conflict, but part of a broader struggle for security and Western values.

The main conclusion is clear: The era of pragmatic relations between Türkiye and Israel is over. While in the old days, the memory of sensitive historical issues was sacrificed for the sake of geopolitical interests, today these issues have become tools of geopolitical pressure. This constitutes the political significance of the current events.