Author, Ilya Abishev*
Place of work, BBC Military Commentator
Published an hour ago
Reading time: 11 min
More and more publications are appearing in Western media that Vladimir Putin has taken a course towards escalating hostilities against Ukraine. In particular, they write about plans to recruit several hundred thousand more people for the war - they cite figures from 300 thousand to half a million.
At the same time, both the authors of these publications and Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky claim that the Russian authorities want to do this without announcing mobilization - or this mobilization will be different in form from the fall of 2022.
Be that as it may, we are talking about a one-time attraction of very significant reinforcements to the warring army.
Does Russia need this at this stage of the war? If so, how many new soldiers does it need? Could a massive influx of reinforcements change the situation at the front? What problems might Russia face?
What is the situation at the front?
As of early September 2026, Russia retains the initiative in most sectors of the front and continues offensive operations, primarily in the Pokrovsky, Konstantinovsky and Limansky directions in the Donetsk region and in the Kupyansk region in the Kharkov region.
Fighting continues, albeit with less intensity, in many other areas - in particular, in the Gulyai-Polye region and in the west of the Zaporozhye region, at the junction of the Donetsk, Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk regions, in the border area of the Sumy and Kharkov regions.
Ukraine holds the main defensive lines and actively uses drones, artillery and counterattacks with small mechanized and assault groups to contain Russian advances.
In recent months, the front line has changed slightly: on both sides we are talking mainly about tactical successes and losses of individual settlements or positions.
Given the absence of major operational breakthroughs, both warring sides are intensifying attacks on close and strategic rear areas. And while Ukraine has been living under conditions of constant air raids for five years now, the majority of residents of the European and central parts of Russia relatively recently began to fully feel the consequences of Ukrainian air strikes on enterprises, warehouses and logistics.
What are they saying about the possible replenishment of the Russian army?
It is the concern of the Russian authorities about the decline in the level of tacit support for the war in Russian society and the growing discontent of the elites that the British magazine Economist calls the main reasons why the Kremlin is ready to raise the stakes. He cites a recent Levada Center poll (labeled a “foreign agent” in Russia) showing that 57% of Russians consider the political situation in the country tense, and another 13% critical.
According to the publication's sources in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, after several weeks of deliberation, made a choice in favor of escalation, considering it the only non-losing option in the war with Ukraine. At the same time, he believes that ending the war without achieving at least minimal goals, for example, the capture of Donbass, poses a danger to him personally.
“No one can say what’s in Putin’s head. But it is clear that the reasons for the escalation of the conflict, as well as for the decision to start, should be looked for there. His main goal has always been the preservation of personal power and, ultimately, life,” writes the Economist (subscription required).
In this situation, the logical step seems to be to attract another 300-400 thousand people into the Russian army, most likely without announcing a new mobilization, and to intensify repression against internal enemies, the British publication believes.
Sources of the American newspaper Wall Street Journal also report about recent exercises in a number of Russian regions, during which issues of accommodation, food and armament of the mobilized were worked out.
Russian authorities deny plans for a new mobilization. "Bullshit. This is an information attack on Russia,” Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday, answering questions from journalists after the SCO summit in Bishkek.
“There is no scenario today that would require mobilization. This is an information attack by the enemy on the eve of the State Duma elections with an attempt to influence the result,” he repeated his thought on Thursday at the Eastern Economic Forum.
Nevertheless, Russian conscripts and their loved ones are becoming increasingly anxious; social networks are distributing advice on how to escape the war and not end up at the front.
Why does the Russian army need a large and, preferably, rapid replenishment of numbers?
At first glance, the answer is simple: any army waging a long, grueling war needs recruits, at least to make up for losses.
But in this case, everything is somewhat more complicated. Since the beginning of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine, which were initially conceived as a short-term military special operation, the Russian army has only once faced an acute shortage of personnel.
This happened at the end of the summer - beginning of the fall of 2022, when a full-fledged front line stretching over thousands of kilometers was formed, and it became clear that the Russian invasion force was too small to operate along its entire length. It was during this period that a series of severe defeats for the Russian army occurred and, as a consequence, the Kremlin’s decision on the so-called partial mobilization.
During its first wave, about 300 thousand people were sent to the active army, according to official statements from Moscow. This allowed the Russian command to close the gaps, stabilize the front and seize the initiative.
At the same time, the recruitment of volunteers for a military contract continued all these years, and the number of Russian groups in Ukraine grew. Vladimir Putin said in June 2026 that there were over 700 thousand people at the front, and the Ukrainian command gave approximately the same estimates - about 730 thousand people.
Despite the rather heavy losses, the constant influx of recruits has so far allowed Russia to maintain the strength of the group and form new units without conducting a new large-scale mobilization.
Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev said that in the first six months of 2026 alone, about 200 thousand people signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense, that is, approximately 33 thousand people per month. Analysts who study budget spending on one-time payments to contract workers believe that these figures may be inflated, but not by much.
Why are they now increasingly talking about the inevitability of a new mobilization? Apparently, this is due to a combination of several factors.
According to the Ukrainian military, the losses of the Russian army have now grown so much that the influx of new soldiers can no longer make up for them. Statements by representatives of the warring parties should be treated with caution, but independent analysts also give similar assessments. In particular, the International Institute for Strategic Studies claims that Russian losses have exceeded replacements since December 2025.
“It was clear that their system of recruiting for large sums of money could not be continued in the long term,” says Anders Nielsen, a military analyst at the Royal Danish Defense College. “At the same time, Putin was afraid to announce a new open wave of mobilization; in addition, he was clearly confident that time was on his side, and the military and bureaucrats would come up with a less dangerous and costly solution.”
The possible exhaustion of the current model of recruiting for large sums of money by Russian standards is also indicated by the increasing frequency of reports of forced coercion to sign a military contract.
Russian military officers also write a lot about the decrease in the flow of volunteers and the lack of people at the front, especially in combat units. There are more and more complaints about the quality of replenishment. The Russian military complains that people with serious illnesses, including mental illnesses, alcohol and drug addiction, are increasingly arriving at the front line.
The massive use of high-precision weapons—attack drones—on the front lines, as well as enormous difficulties in evacuating the wounded, lead to an increase in irrevocable losses. According to some estimates, they already exceed 60-70% of the total.
In addition, Russia faces new challenges associated with the quantitative and qualitative growth of the military-technical potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This year, the Ukrainian army has sharply increased the number of strikes to operational depth and against important Russian targets at a great distance from the front line.
Passive measures to protect against attacks on rear structures - camouflage, dispersal, construction of fortifications - are no longer sufficient, and in many cases it is simply impossible to do this. To defend the airspace, additional human resources are required - at a minimum, numerous paramilitary formations, and, in an amicable way, combat units within the air defense forces.
What is Russia’s mobilization resource on paper and in reality?
In theory, Russia has a multimillion-dollar reserve of military personnel. In September 2022, then Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that Russia's mobilization resource was about 25 million people.
Of course, these are general numbers. Organized military reserve - people who have ever served in the military and are in the reserve - less.
Taking into account the recent increase to 55 years of the age limit for being in the reserve for privates, sergeants and foremen, the majority of Russians who have served in military service from 1991 to the present fall under the category of those liable for military service.
According to published statistics of spring and autumn conscription, since the collapse of the USSR, about 12.5–13 million people have passed through the Russian conscription system - that is, approximately half of Russia’s mobilization resource declared by Shoigu. The data varies slightly due to the lack of exact recruitment figures for 1991–1993 in open sources.
This is not the entire mobresource - the rest of it is formed by people who served in the Soviet army, graduates of military departments, reserve officers, people who did not serve for various reasons but were enlisted in the reserve, as well as other categories of those liable for military service, for example, doctors.
But there is an important caveat: not all of them can join the ranks of the army.
Some have already reached the age limit for being in reserve;
some died;
some were declared unfit for health reasons;
some left the country;
some are already serving in the active army or in other law enforcement agencies;
some have an unclaimed military specialty;
some are serving prison sentences (although since the beginning of the war with Ukraine, this circumstance often does not prevent enlistment for military service).
And still, the number of Russians who are, to one degree or another, fit for military service looks impressive.
How many people can you quickly put under arms?
But the ability to quickly call up millions of people is not limited by the number of reservists.
Firstly, the modern soldier is expensive. According to the analytical project Re: Russia, the annual maintenance of one serviceman in a combat zone costs the state at least 7-8 million rubles (80-90 thousand dollars) per year.
This is an average. It includes:
— one-time federal payments in the amount of 400 thousand rubles and regional “lifting” payments, which can reach 3-4 million rubles or more;
— monthly allowance in the amount of 220–250 thousand rubles per month or 2.5–3 million rubles per year per person;
— contract bonuses, payments for injuries, compensation to the families of the victims, pensions, insurance, etc.
With a group of about 700 thousand military personnel, direct payments and social expenses alone amount to 5-5.5 trillion rubles per year, which is more than 2% of Russian GDP.
But other costs must be taken into account - equipment, weapons, transportation, accommodation, supplies, personnel training, treatment and much more. It is impossible to make an exact calculation, but it is obvious that the actual state costs per soldier are even higher.
The Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates the annual salary of one Russian soldier at approximately 9.5–10 million rubles.
Secondly, almost everyone mobilized is not only a soldier, but also a worker who needs to be removed from the economy.
During the Second World War, according to official data, more than 30 million people passed through the armed forces of the Soviet Union. This is a colossal figure, achieved at the cost of completely subordinating the economy to military purposes. The men who went to the front were replaced in enterprises by women and teenagers, consumption and the social sphere were reduced to a minimum, and the standard of living dropped sharply.
Modern Russia, with its market economy and lack of free labor, cannot afford this. Many analysts believe that an additional draft of even several hundred thousand people will increase personnel shortages, inflation and the burden on the budget. And a larger-scale mobilization will require a transfer of the economy to military priorities with a reduction in civilian production, social spending and the massive replacement of workers with migrants.
In practice, the possibility of mass conscription into the army is limited by other factors: the availability of officers and sergeants to form new units; quantity of equipment and weapons; possibilities of training centers.
How many new soldiers does the Russian army need?
The greatest losses are suffered by units operating in the kill zone and in close proximity to it. These are, first of all, the assault infantry and those who supply the assault units - bringing them ammunition, food, water, consumables, and also ensuring the operation of equipment and communications on the front line.
In the rear structures, losses in war are not so high, so a large influx of recruits is not required there. And anyone who decides to enter into a military contract should understand this, even if they promise him that he will go to serve “not in the assault.”
Based on the total number of the Russian group in Ukraine at 700-730 thousand people and taking into account that in modern armies, first-line combat units make up approximately 20-30% of the personnel, we can give a rough estimate of the forces that regularly carry out the tasks of conducting assaults and supporting them - this is about 150-200 thousand military personnel.
It is logical to assume that the Russian command needs a large combat-ready reserve on hand to quickly make up for losses. This would allow us not to depend on the monthly influx of volunteers.
