Arab States' U-Turn on Iran Conflict Amid Regional Concerns

The Iran-Israel ceasefire seems to be holding. Arab capitals are relieved about the de-escalation. But they are also alarmed about what the latest flare up means for the Middle East.

When Iran signed the JCPOA nuclear deal with the Obama Administration, its reception in the Arab Gulf was, at best, frosty. The Iranian regime’s role in propping up Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria—one of the most devastating in modern Arab history—combined with its nefarious influence in Iraq and Lebanon, ensured that Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain saw the deal not as a diplomatic breakthrough, but as an endorsement of a destabilizing actor.

So when President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, these same states applauded the move. Others in the region, including Egypt and Jordan, while more muted, also expressed concern about Tehran’s regional agenda. Yet fast forward to the present and the very same states opposed a fight with Iran, and support re-engagement.

This U-Turn is not due to any newfound trust in Tehran. The Arab Gulf states, broadly speaking, remain deeply cynical about the Iranian regime. If the Islamic Republic could be replaced with something more pragmatic and less ideologically driven than Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine, few in the Arab Gulf would mourn. But this cynicism has evolved into a pragmatic rejection of war—especially one at the behest of a belligerent Israel and a complicit Washington.

There are two core reasons for this opposition. First, these strikes are not happening in isolation. Over the past 20 months, Israel has waged a deadly and destructive campaign in Gaza following the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, which has brought about a genocide case at the International Court of Justice. Israel has also expanded its military footprint beyond the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, amid the chaos following the ouster of Assad. And it has struck Beirut and parts of Lebanon repeatedly, including within the past week.

In short, even among states that are highly critical of Iran, there are concerns about an unrestrained Israel. A vision of a new regional order where Israel behaves with impunity while dictating security norms to its neighbors is profoundly unwelcome to Arab states, including traditionally pro-Western Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The second reason is more fundamental. For decades, Arab societies have criticized the West’s selective enforcement of international norms. That includes the 2003 Iraq war, Israel’s ongoing occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, and more recently the U.S. denunciation of the ICJ case and sanctioning of ICC judges after it issued arrest warrants for Israeli leaders. There is a perception that powerful Western states shield Tel Aviv from consequences.

To be sure, the Arab states are hardly models of legality themselves. Various U.N. reports have repeatedly described an undemocratic region rife with issues around corruption, nepotism, and closed civil society spaces. But the powerful Western countries that erected the “rules-based” order should be exemplar pillars of it—otherwise, trust in the project altogether collapses.

That’s why the U.S. bombing of Iran—using the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the heaviest non-nuclear weapon in its arsenal—set a dangerous precedent. Despite the undeniable nature of Iran being a nefarious actor in the region, there was no imminent threat, no U.N. Security Council authorization, and no widespread international consensus to engage in such a military strike.

The war between Iran and Israel is over, at least for now. Whether Iran’s nuclear program has been hobbled is a separate question, one that analysts and intelligence agencies will continue to assess in the weeks and months to come.