For the first time, since the formation of the first Iraqi government after 2003, the current government headed by businessman and financier Ali Al-Zaidi opened files that were either kept quiet or feared to be dealt with loudly. Within the “100 days” that the government recently completed, its program included the two most important items that the Prime Minister placed among his top priorities: restricting weapons to the state, and fighting the financial and administrative corruption that is rampant in the country. In fact, this situation threatens the state's very existence, putting it on the verge of bankruptcy. On the other hand, while the anti-corruption file appears to be an internal matter, the arms control file, as much as it is an internal matter represented by the tense relationship between the government and the forces of unruly arms, has two dimensions. The first is regional, related to the nature of the relationship between Iraq and Iran. The second is international, represented by the relationship between Iraq and the United States. Of course, there remains a common denominator between the weapons issue and the nature of the complex Iraqi-American-Iranian relationship.
Ali al-Zaidi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, appears to be in a comfortable position in terms of fulfilling his promise to begin implementing the anti-corruption and arms control sections of his government program. However, after his government exceeded the “100-day” period, he is still suffering from the siege of political appointments. The main issue here is that the government is still missing 9 ministerial portfolios that are currently managed by proxy due to disagreements between the political blocs over their shares of these ministries.
Although Al-Zaidi does not seem responsible for completing the government “cabinet” (formation), which requires political consensus between the forces that won the elections and won parliamentary seats that qualify them to obtain portfolios, the problem lies in the fact that the delay in completing the “cabinet” keeps the government on the edge. The resignation of any two of its ministers, under any circumstances, makes it lose its legitimacy to remain, and leaves the Prime Minister besieged by political forces, some of which refuse to complete the remaining portfolios, so that Al-Zaidi remains a hostage to his pressure.
Then there remain the two issues related to the corruption and weapons sections.
Fight corruption
Anti-corruption measures began four months ago through what was called the “dawn raid,” during which a large number of deputies and senior officials were arrested, and ministers, deputies, and other senior officials fled. However, with the delay in opening the file of those currently detained, or referring them to the courts, their remaining behind bars without trial has made some people feel that there is a “project” for a financial settlement with them.
In fact, this situation coincides with the start of government measures to arrest low-level officials and refer them to the judiciary. It gives the impression that the anti-corruption campaign has shifted from fighting corruption as an “integrated system,” to fighting bribery, which is one aspect of corruption and nothing more.
Weapon confinement
As for the issue of confining weapons to the state, it has turned into a thorny issue after Iran and its Shiite “coordinating framework” forces were able to contain the matter by extending the deadline for dealing with the weapons file, instead of restricting it completely by September 30 until after this date.
The stick and the wheel
Amid these facts, the political parties are seeking to put more sticks in the wheel of the Prime Minister who is searching for an achievement to be achieved amid strong popular support from a large number of political and public forces. Among the most prominent steps aimed at containing Al-Zaidi’s steps are attempts to find pretexts to disrupt the anti-corruption campaign, so that it is limited to the middle circles of the state.
On the other hand, the strong Iranian involvement in the issue of restricting weapons to the state, and making it a regional issue linked to the conflict between the United States and Iran, led to the extension of the deadline for restricting weapons. This is an attempt to empty Al-Zaidi’s steps of their true content. As a reminder, the Iraqi government had announced that the date for confiscating weapons to the state would be September 30 (current), which is the scheduled date for the withdrawal of the international coalition. But Iran has taken a position on the factions that refuse to hand over their weapons, most notably the “Hezbollah Brigades,” the “Al-Nujaba Movement,” and the “Loyal Ansar Allah Movement,” which had previously announced that it “has an ideological connection” with Iran. Therefore, its weapons transcend the geographical borders of countries, as they are a “resistance” weapon, according to the narrative it adopts in its political discourse.
Secret and announced visits
This Iranian entry in favor of these factions, and ignoring the date of September 30, was first embodied in a secret visit - as is usual - by the commander of the “Quds Force” in the Iranian “Revolutionary Guard” Ismail Qaani, followed less than a week later by an announced visit to the head of the Iranian Shura Council, Muhammad Bagher Qalibaf, that extended for days. Then it was followed by another secret visit to the representative of the Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, during which the nature of the relationship between Iraq and Iran was determined, by pressuring the forces of the “coordination framework” to adopt another policy, different from the policy drawn up by the Zaidi Prime Minister to get rid of foreign influence in Iraq.
Qalibaf’s visit, according to informed Iraqi sources, did not achieve all of its goals, especially in terms of “softening the Zaidi position on the issue of restricting weapons to the state.” According to what was revealed behind the scenes of the meetings and conferences that Qalibaf held, whether with the Iraqi Prime Minister or with the leaders of the “coordination framework,” in the presence of Al-Zaidi, the latter remained committed to the September 30 date because; Being committed to the American side in this regard.
According to circulating estimates, Al-Zaidi, during private meetings with representatives and officials, did not intend to waive that deadline. On the contrary, he could go beyond what the political forces that are pressuring him for appeasement imagine. Moreover, it is not possible for him to submit his resignation, contrary to what some forces involved in corruption hope to “shuffle the cards” again. Rather, observers are likely that the Prime Minister will resort to the people in a frank speech, hoping to weaken the position of these forces, especially if Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the “Shiite National Movement,” the largest Shiite bloc in the country, joins his line of support.
Al-Zaidi has no intention of compromising on the time limit for restricting weapons... and he is not thinking of submitting his resignation
High in status
Iran, for its part, intensified its pressure on the “coordination framework,” and on Al-Zaidi together, especially after the “coordination framework” was rearranged by adding a new member to its leadership, Shibl Al-Zaidi, leader of the “Imam Ali” faction and head of the “Services” bloc in the Iraqi parliament, following the escape of Ahmed Al-Asadi, the former Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and a leader in the “framework,” after he was accused of corruption files, and the resignation of Abu Al-Wala’ Al-Wala’i, the Secretary-General. For the “Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades.”
In this context, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei personally entered the line, when he sent his special representative, Mohsen Qomi, with the aim of containing the repercussions of restricting weapons to the state, which the Iraqi Prime Minister insists on. At the same time, Khamenei's envoy urged the "coordinating framework" forces to avoid any clash between the "coordinating framework" forces and the armed factions that refuse to hand over their weapons to the state by the end of the specified deadline.
Iran does not want pretexts for a collision
The goal that Iran aims to achieve by following this new policy is not to give the government any excuse to clash with the factions, by forming committees, starting discussions, and establishing mechanisms for the purpose of handing over weapons, and determining which weapon, and what is the return.
This means manipulating the deadline, but in a way that does not lead to angering the government that has an understanding with Washington, nor does it lead to provoking Washington, as no one knows the limits of its reaction if the Iraqi government does not meet the arms control deadline.
... Concerns regarding the “coordination framework”
In this context, Dr. Ghaleb Al-Daami, professor of media at Al-Mustansiriya University, told Asharq Al-Awsat, “(The coordination framework) feels the dangers resulting from the arms restriction, and also knows how serious Washington is in this file, which made it try as much as possible to search for an outlet or some way to refrain from implementing the arms restriction 100 percent, but at the same time achieve American satisfaction with Iraq.”
Al-Daami added, “The forces of the (coordination framework) also know very well that confining weapons to the state and combating corruption are ultimately in the interest of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, while the (coordination framework) does not want any prime minister to achieve great success. Thus he is allowed to achieve limited success; So that they do not branch out...but rather remain under their control.”
Then he explained that “(the framework), in this case, as much as it wants to avoid inflaming the situation with America, at the same time it does not want the prime minister to appear as a popular hero in front of the people,” stressing that “this behavior pursued by the Shiite forces is not limited to the treatment of Al-Zaidi only, but rather it is a consistent policy that I followed with all previous prime ministers, although the opportunity now is different... as the balance is now tilted in favor of Al-Zaidi as he enjoys great popular support that is difficult to resist, and despite this, attempts are being made to circumvent it.”
No to overthrowing the government
For his part, Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the “State of Law” coalition, warned one day after the visit of the high-level Iranian envoy, of attempts to ignite “fires” in the political scene and confuse the Iraqi reality.
Al-Maliki affirmed, in press statements, his support for the “coordination framework” for the continuation of the government and his refusal to change or overthrow it. He said, according to a statement issued by his office last Wednesday, that Iraq “is going through a sensitive phase that requires a high degree of wisdom and responsibility,” noting that there are attempts to confuse the political scene, at a time when the “coordination framework” continues to support the government out of concern for the country’s stability and its highest interests.
Then the former Prime Minister stressed the need to address the issue of restricting weapons to the state, “away from escalation or confrontation,” warning that “this file will turn into a clash between the state and the factions that will be extremely dangerous, and may threaten the stability of Iraq and open the door to differing political positions.”
Al-Maliki stressed that any internal confrontation would be “a loss for all of Iraq,” and not for a specific party or component. Anyone who imagines that any potential conflict will be “Shiite-Shiite” is delusional. Because its repercussions will affect the state, society and all components.
He continued that the government and the “coordination framework” will not allow the country to slide into internal fighting, calling for “the crystallization of a clear national and regional vision that prevents Iraq from being exposed to risks, and prevents it from turning into an arena for settling conflicts or conflicting regional and international interests, in a way that preserves its security, sovereignty, and stability.”
A Shiite “leadership council.”
Meanwhile, in the context of the new arrangements “engineered” by Iran, Hammam Hamoudi, a prominent leader in the “Coordinating Framework” and the leader of the “Supreme Islamic Council” - whom Iran made the link between it and the rest of the leadership of the “Framework” - announced the formation of a Shiite “leadership council” to avoid the outbreak of a Shiite-Shiite war.
Hamoudi warned of what he called an effort to ignite a “Shiite-Shiite” war, saying that “its apparent goal is to protect public interests, while its hidden purpose - according to his description - lies in destabilizing Shiite political and social influence and removing influential forces from their positions.”
Hamoudi added, during his participation in a discussion session within the activities of the “Eighth Baghdad Dialogue” conference organized by the Iraqi Institute for Dialogue, that “the presence of the supreme authority, religious commitment, and the awareness of the Iraqi people of the reality of the malicious conspiracy (according to his description) - will prevent the success of any bet on a Shiite-Shiite war... and they will not succeed.”
