In the report, it was stated that the collision took place at 03.13, and that the ALSU ship, where the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship sank rapidly due to the tearing on the port side, did not suffer any major damage that would prevent navigation or cause water intake, except for light abrasions on the starboard side.
According to the statements of Captain Ahmet Erarslan in the report, it was stated that the wind at the time of the accident was 4 Beaufort force from the north and the sea condition was 3 Beaufort force and slightly turbulent. It was noted that the visibility was approximately 6 nautical miles, there was no fog, haze, showers or heavy currents restricting maneuver in the region, and the nature factor that caused the accident could not be detected.
MAIN REASONS LISTED
The report stated that the main reason for the loss disaster was 'Double-Sided Bridge Indiscipline, Complete Abandonment of Shift Standards and Loss of Situational Awareness'. The report stated, "The fact that the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship turned off its AIS device and turned to starboard in the last 0.5 miles, contrary to the radio agreement, is the active trigger factor that physically started the conflict. However, the main root cause behind why this trigger factor ended in a disaster is the bridge vulnerability on the M/T ALSU ship."
'IF A WATCHER HAD BEEN PRESENT, THE SINKING COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED'
In the report, it was stated that Murat Evciman was the only person on duty on the bridge at the time of the conflict, that Evciman joined the ship only one day before the accident, and that his shift at the time of the accident was his first cruising shift on this ship. It was noted that leaving an officer who is not yet familiar with the ship, its maneuverability, personnel and bridge devices alone in a busy traffic lane is a weakness. It was stated that the absence of another lookout, trainee or helmsman on the bridge also reduced situational awareness. It was recorded that Captain Ahmet Erarslan was asleep in his cabin during the accident, woke up with the shock of the conflict, and was able to get to the bridge 7-10 minutes after the accident. While the ship was ordered to sail at "Watch Condition B" level in the official BMM guide, it was stated that the absence of the captain on the bridge and the absence of watchman personnel was an operational management weakness.
IT WAS WRITTEN THAT HE CONTINUED TO TAKE THE ROUTE TO THE PORT INSTEAD OF MAKING AN EARLY MANEUVER.
In the report, it was stated that ALSU's 2nd Officer Murat Evciman established radio contact with the opposing ship, and upon the request of the other party to "escape to the pier", ALSU started to change its course towards the pier. It was noted that when ALSU's course reached 283.9 degrees, with approximately 0.5 miles remaining, Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship momentarily disappeared from the ECDIS screen and returned, and contrary to the radio agreement, it suddenly started to turn to starboard. It was stated that Evciman noticed that the opposing ship was approaching them and turning to starboard at a very close distance of 0.5 miles, and that he continued to change course to port instead of making an early engine stop or reverse maneuver to avoid collision. It was noted that not taking early action to reduce speed or stop the machines may have increased the physical severity of the conflict.
'HE WAS SAILING IN GHOST SHIP MODE'
In the report, it was stated that the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship sailed in 'ghost ship' mode due to the AIS device being turned off/faulty or not working adequately as a result of external intervention, creating a serious navigational hazard for other ships in the region. Although it was understood in the radio conversations to avoid port, it was noted that the ship's sudden swerving to starboard and cutting the bow line of ALSU in the last 0.5 miles left was the operational defect that physically started the accident. The report stated that why the Tuğberk İmamoğlu ship sank so quickly after the conflict can be evaluated with the information and documents to be added to the file, and that it should also be examined whether there is a load shifting or cargo lashing weakness on the ship. (DHA)
CNN Türk correspondent Merve Tokaz conveyed a remarkable detail in the preliminary expert report. Merve Tokaz said that ALSU's captain was asleep at the time of the incident.
“NO METEOROLOGICAL ELEMENTS”
The information provided by Merve Tokaz in the live broadcast is as follows:
Alsu and Tuğberk İmamoğlu ships collided in the Sea of Marmara. Tuğberk İmamoğlu sank and 10 people are still missing. Our eyes were on the preliminary expert report and it was also announced. Divers also examined the bottom point where the ship crashed.
No negative effects were detected in meteorological conditions. No external factors were detected that could have caused the accident.
“CAPTAIN 3 WAS LEFT ALONE ON THE BRIDGE”
Ship shift information and inexperience factors were effective in this accident. The only person on duty on the bridge at the time of the conflict was Murat Evcimen, the 2nd officer, that is, the 3rd captain.
Murat Evcimen joined the ship only 1 day before the accident, and it is noteworthy that his shift at the time of the accident was his first cruising shift on this ship. Leaving the ship in a busy traffic environment to the officer who does not yet know the Alsu ship is a weakness. Attention is drawn to this in the preliminary expert report. Care is taken to ensure that there is no lookout or helmsman and that Murat Evcimen is left completely alone.
It is stated that everyone on the ship is resting in the cabin. This reduced situational awareness on the bridge.
“CAPTAIN IS SLEEPING ON THE SHIP”
The captain leaving the bridge is one of the important details reflected in the preliminary expert report. The report states, 'Captain Ahmet Erarslan was not on the bridge at the time of the accident and was sleeping in his cabin.'
Captain Ahmet Erarslan was awakened by the shock of the conflict, but went on the bridge around 03.20, that is, 7-10 minutes after the accident. Although the captain claims that he has the authority not to have a lookout on the open sea, this is completely against the rules of the ship. This was also attributed as a flaw in the report.
