
不同航天体系基于自身条件作出工程取舍,技术合作与规则博弈并存
第七届载人航天学术大会披露,中国载人登月任务将采用“两次发射、环月对接”路线。文章对比了美国、俄罗斯、欧洲及中国的登月方案差异,分析工程取舍、技术合作与“安全区”规则争议,指出登月是长期技术耐力赛。
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第七届载人航天学术大会在北京举办,披露中国载人登月任务将采用“两次发射、环月对接”的实施路线。美国NASA调整阿尔忒弥斯任务序列,首次载人登月顺延至2028年阿尔忒弥斯4号。俄罗斯因预算原因从全面自研退向现有技术整合。欧洲空间局通过提供猎户座飞船服务舱换取参与资格。
近期,在北京举办的第七届载人航天学术大会对外披露,中国载人登月任务将采用“两次发射、环月对接”的实施路线。这一方案的公开,让不同国家登月路径差异更加清晰。
底层思路各不相同
美国国家航空航天局(NASA)自研的太空发射系统(SLS)是现役运力最强的载人级超重型运载火箭,原设计定位为单箭投送载人飞船与登月全载荷,依托超大运力压缩在轨对接环节。2026年NASA调整任务序列:原计划执行载人登月的阿尔忒弥斯3号,改为近地轨道交会对接技术验证,首次载人登月任务顺延至2028年的阿尔忒弥斯4号。
NASA新方案不追求阿波罗式登月的紧凑节奏,而是用三次独立发射、三家供应商、串行放行的方式,把风险拆散。NASA局长贾里德·艾萨克曼承认,“我们今天手里的东西,不足以复刻阿波罗9号”。这一路线调整的本质,是在硬件现实面前主动降速,用多次发射换取任务可控性。
俄罗斯能源火箭航天集团总设计师弗拉基米尔·索洛维约夫则表示,载人绕月的成本远高于无人探测,在预算吃紧的情况下,俄罗斯的选择是从全面自研退向现有技术整合,目标也从独立载人登月收缩为维持绕月能力的存在感。这不是技术判断优先,而是预算判断优先。
欧洲空间局(ESA)局长约瑟夫·阿施巴赫说,欧洲服务舱为猎户座飞船提供动力,是使宇航员飞往月球并返回的关键分系统。欧洲用分系统换入场资格,优点是不必独自承担超重型运载和着陆器的天量成本,代价则是节奏受制于人。
中国公开的“两次发射、环月对接”方案,将登月舱、载人飞船分两次发射送入环月轨道,在轨交会对接后航天员转入登月舱着陆月面。它不同于阿尔忒弥斯“一箭全载荷”,不必一步研制巨型运力火箭;和近地轨道多次组装方案相比,把对接环节放在环月轨道,规避长期近地在轨存放的一系列风险。
由此可见,不同路线没有高下之分,只是不同航天体系基于自身条件作出的选择。
工程取舍没有最优解
工程取舍最尖锐的体现,不在路线本身,而在关键技术的风险判断上。SpaceX“星舰”作为着陆器依赖在轨低温推进剂加注,因此需要多次发射补给飞船。NASA航空航天安全咨询小组成员、前宇航员查理·普雷科特给出的数字是22次发射。SpaceX创始人埃隆·马斯克随即在社交媒体上反驳:“那太高了。实际数字更可能是6—8次。”
普雷科特作为安全顾问的职责是盯住风险边界,马斯克作为承包商负责人的判断则受制于进度和成本压力。两者都有各自的工程理性。NASA在阿尔忒弥斯3号中让蓝色起源的“蓝月”绕开在轨加注、改用多次发射并在太空拼合,不再把阿尔忒弥斯3号当作一次孤立的登月任务来设计,而是当作一套可重复的多发射作业模式的首次演练。代价是任务链条变长、接口增多、组织复杂度上升;收益是每一次发射都可以独立放行或中止,宇航员不必在轨道上等待一个未就绪的着陆器。取舍的天平上,NASA选择的是用复杂度换冗余度。
中国方案则是另一种权衡:任务链条比NASA的多发射架构短,但每一环的容错空间也更窄,对入轨与对接精度、航天器自主控制能力,以及航天员在缺乏外部备份条件下的独立判断与处置能力,要求更高。
载人登月比拼的,不只是技术指标,更是一个航天体系长期稳定投入的能力。
强技术属性合作尚存
俄罗斯航天学院院士瓦连京·乌瓦罗夫在2026年俄罗斯航天论坛期间表示,俄罗斯、中国和美国在太空领域合作拥有巨大潜力。
中俄在ILRS框架下的月球电站合作已有谅解备忘录支撑,俄科学院航天研究所首席科学家列夫·泽廖内表示,俄中研究人员正在合作开展月壤对比研究。ESA的欧洲服务舱在NASA调整“门户”计划后仍然是猎户座飞船不可替代的推进与生命保障分系统。这些合作的技术属性强于战略属性,往往能在治理框架分歧的缝隙中先行推进。
然而,规则博弈并未因技术合作而消解,其中“安全区”争议最具代表性。《阿尔忒弥斯协定》以“避免有害干扰”为由,在着陆点周边划设安全区,拟议排除范围约1—5公里。艾萨克曼2026年9月称,先到方划区将显著提高后来者进入周边站点的难度。月球南极优质站点本就稀缺,安全区叠加可能大幅压缩后来者空间。法律学者批评,这一机制以程序性话语掩盖实质性排他意图,可能造成事实上的据为己有,与《外空条约》不得据为己有原则相冲突。争议核心在于:当划设权掌握在先到者手中、优质站点又高度稀缺时,避碰工具可能异化为准入壁垒,单靠工程合作难以弥合。
各国一边推进自主登月计划、夯实自身深空能力,一边也在试探协商月球治理的相关共识。登月是一场长期的技术耐力赛。不同路线并行探索,也催生了航天领域新的协作与博弈——一部分技术、科学数据可以共享,而重型运载、月面原位资源利用、深空导航等核心技术,仍是各国重点布局的竞争高地。未来数年,不同方案的试飞、验证进度,将决定谁能率先稳定踏上月面,开启月球常态化探测时代。
本报记者 姚易安
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
中国载人登月任务将按“两次发射、环月对接”路线推进,未来数年将进行试飞与验证。
Likely · Within years
月球“安全区”争议将在各国协商月球治理共识的过程中持续存在。
Possible · Within years

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