The notification submitted against the Lebanese ambassador to Washington, Nada Hamada Moawad, against the backdrop of her communication with the Israeli ambassador to the United States, reopened the file of Lebanese laws regulating the relationship with Israel, at a time when negotiations between the two countries continue amid American pressure to remove what Washington considers “legal obstacles to the peace path” that it is pushing towards.
A US State Department official said that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during his call with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on Thursday, raised the issue of the Israel Boycott Law issued in 1955, saying that it is “repeatedly used in politicized judicial prosecutions that hinder taking steps towards peace,” and stressing that “this law is impractical.”
Likewise, the American ambassador to Beirut, Michel Issa, said that this law “has no meaning in light of direct talks between Lebanon and Israel under American sponsorship.” In response to a question about the possibility of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri agreeing to include the law on the agenda of one of Parliament’s sessions, Issa said: “You always talk about Berri. Is he the only one who decides?” "We must end this case."
Despite American pressure, most Lebanese political forces do not seem ready to open a serious discussion at the present time about amending or abolishing the laws regulating the relationship with Israel, preferring to link any step in this direction to reaching a political understanding that ends the state of war and puts an end to the Israeli occupation of Lebanese lands.
Constitutional expert Dr. Saeed Malik explains that Lebanon’s relationship with Israel is governed by a set of legislation, most notably the Israel Boycott Law issued on June 23, 1955, and Decree No. 12562 issued on April 19, 1963, relating to the organization of the “Israel Boycott Office,” in addition to the Lebanese Penal Code, which stipulates “the punishment of whoever deals with the enemy of Lebanon,” without explicitly naming Israel.
Malek pointed out, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that “the law to boycott Israel prevents any communication with Tel Aviv in any form, but the new circumstances and political developments now require either amending the law or working to abolish it.” This can only be done by issuing a new law stipulating the abolition of the existing law, while linking the necessary reasons to the ongoing negotiations.”
He points out that “this step falls on the government, by adopting a draft law in this regard and referring it to the House of Representatives, or by proposing a law presented by one or more representatives, or by one or more parliamentary blocs, with the aim of abolishing the law, provided that it is presented in an accelerated and repeated form, to be presented to the general assembly in the first parliamentary session, and voted on by the ordinary majority.”
Malek believed that “the current developments and the negotiation process announced by the President of the Republic and the Lebanese government with Israel make moving towards repealing the law a must,” adding that “the circumstances that existed in 1955, and continued until the past two years, are radically different from the current circumstances that tended toward negotiation between Lebanon and Israel.”
On the other hand, the Lebanese political forces, regardless of their orientations, do not seem enthusiastic about taking steps to change the existing legal reality, including the parties strongly opposed to Hezbollah. Despite the “Lebanese Forces” party’s categorical refusal to prosecute Ambassador Nada Hamada Moawad on charges of communicating with Israel, or to prosecute any other figure assigned by the President of the Republic to negotiate, the party does not seem to be willing to submit a proposal to abolish the “Israel Boycott Law” in force. His sources told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The issue is sensitive, and we go with what President Aoun sees, and we will support him and him in it.”
Likewise, the representative of the Lebanese Phalange Party, Dr. Salim Al-Sayegh, believes that “what is most important is what is in the souls and not what is in the texts.” He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We demand peace with Israel and an end to the state of war, but that does not mean that economic normalization will happen immediately and with the push of a button, as removing aggressive intentions is the basis today. When it is time to move to the stage of building confidence on the borders and elsewhere, this issue will be discussed. In light of the ongoing war and the catastrophe that southern Lebanon is experiencing, it is necessary to begin the political-security path, as part of the efforts aimed at ending the state of war, provided that the laws are amended at a later stage.
While Al-Sayegh rules out the availability of a parliamentary majority in support of amending the laws before reaching a political agreement, he stresses that “Ambassador Nada Hamada Moawad has a clear mandate from the Lebanese state, represented by the President of the Republic, to follow up on negotiations in Washington between the three parties, and therefore communication with the negotiators lies at the heart of her mission. Therefore, her movements must be protected, and we do not see the need to reconsider legislation that prohibits communication with the enemy, as long as the ambassador works within the framework of the mandate granted to her.”
While the "Shiite duo", represented by "Hezbollah" and "Amal Movement", refuses to even delve into this issue, and adheres to its categorical rejection, the representative of the "Free Patriotic Movement", Jimmy Jabour, believes that "amending the laws regulating the relationship with Israel cannot be presented as a separate step from the general political path, but rather it should be the result of a long process of negotiations and understandings." Therefore, this amendment is not up for discussion at all in light of the current circumstances and facts.”
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Jabour explained that “the position revolves around the necessity of determining the location of this amendment within the current path, and whether it will come as a result of a clear political agreement, or will be presented in advance in the context of external pressures, and in the context of existing concessions, without specifying any compensation that Israel will offer.”
Likewise, the representative of the “Democratic Meeting Bloc”, representing the “Progressive Socialist Party”, Dr. Bilal Abdullah, believes that research into this issue is “premature,” stressing that “the priority today is to stop the Israeli attacks, withdraw from all Lebanese territory, recover the prisoners, and rebuild what was destroyed by the war, in a way that ensures the restoration of stability in the south.”
Abdullah asserts, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that “discussion of this file cannot take place before these conditions are met,” noting that “after the Israeli withdrawal and the signing of a non-aggression agreement similar to the armistice agreement, the issue can be put on the discussion table in the Council of Ministers and Representatives.”
For his part, MP Waddah Al-Sadiq said in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat: “There is no doubt that the laws need clarification and amendment, in light of the ongoing negotiations with Israel, but we are still in a state of war and occupation of Lebanese lands. Therefore, the representatives will not currently have the intention to engage in a discussion that might cause a major internal crisis, even though a large number of them are convinced that this issue requires a broad and in-depth discussion.
A prominent leader in the Hamas movement revealed that Ali Al-Amoudi, head of the movement’s political bureau in the Gaza Strip, was injured in the Israeli attack that targeted him in a residential apartment in the Al-Mina area, west of Gaza City, on October 3, during which five Palestinians were killed.
The leader, who preferred to remain anonymous, said during an interview late on Friday evening with Asharq Al-Awsat that Al-Amoudi was moderately injured and had broken limbs as a result of the raid that targeted him, stressing that he was inside the residential apartment when it was targeted, and fortunately he was in a side place in the apartment, which led to his survival.
The leader did not disclose any other details about the incident, only confirming that Al-Amoudi was in good health after the attack, and that he was receiving treatment in a safe place.
This is the first acknowledgment from a Hamas official confirming that Al-Amoudi was in the apartment at the time of the attack, as several sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat in recent days denied his presence, confirming that he survived.
Three sources from the movement said, a few days ago, that an urgent intelligence report reached Al-Amoudi, about 3 hours before the attack, prompting him to leave the place where he was located, but this report did not contain confirmation that there was an operation that would directly target him personally.
The sources explained at the time in separate, identical statements that Al-Amoudi was in the targeted residential apartment, and that he took what was stated in the intelligence report seriously. So he left the place to another safe place.
The sources indicated at the time that two members of the “Air Force” of the “Al-Qassam Brigades,” the armed wing of “Hamas,” monitored an intense flight of two Israeli intelligence drones known for their dangerous techniques by the Palestinian security authorities during the day of October 2nd, and that they were circling in the vicinity of the building and the port area west of Gaza City.
According to the sources, the drones that were flying in the region’s airspace carried dangerous intelligence techniques, relying on artificial intelligence, and other techniques that help in identifying targets accurately, indicating that the two elements who were able to monitor them clearly and over the course of hours expected an assassination of a major figure present in the region. Therefore, they went to higher security authorities to inform them of the urgent report, which reached the authorities responsible for protecting senior figures in Hamas, including Al-Amoudi.
The sources explained that when the only person responsible for Al-Amoudi’s security, who knew the location, received the report, he immediately went to him and informed him of what was happening, and the Hamas leader took an immediate decision to leave the residential apartment without delay or postponement, suggesting that he was the target himself. This was later revealed after about an hour or more by targeting the apartment with dangerous guided missiles, as well as with one or two suicide planes.
The prominent leader who revealed Al-Amoudi's injury refused to confirm or deny this information, but merely confirmed that there are intelligence reports constantly transmitted to leaders at various levels by field activists who follow the movements of Israeli drones in the skies of the Gaza Strip, which may indicate the possibility of assassinations occurring, or specific operations in certain places over which the planes fly.
Asharq Al-Awsat tried to communicate with its sources about confirmations of Al-Amoudi’s injury, and that he did not leave the apartment before it was bombed, without obtaining a response from two of the sources, while a third said that his information was obtained through an internal report, without providing further clarifications.
Hamas may have tried to hide information about Al-Amoudi’s injury, even from its leaders, factional figures, and others, as part of the intelligence war it is leading to demonstrate Israel’s failure in any attacks, and to impose a state of confusion among the Israeli security authorities, which some Hebrew reports confirm are investigating the reasons for the failure of the operation at the time.
It is known within Hamas that Al-Amoudi is one of the security figures with strategic thinking, and this is what brought him to the leadership of the movement in recent times, and that he has assumed many responsibilities since his release from Israeli prisons.
Al-Amoudi was very close to the former Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, inside and outside Israeli prisons, where they were detained together, before they were released. He was freed in the deal with the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, which the movement called “Loyalty of the Free.”
Al-Amoudi is a member of a political bureau in Hamas, and was responsible for the movement’s media department before the war. In December 2025, he became head of the work of its political office in the Gaza Strip, after he and a number of people close to Yahya Al-Sinwar were assigned to manage the movement in the Strip, the majority of whom lived in Khan Yunis in the south of the Strip, before some of the movement’s leaders rejected this assignment and recommendation, as they were a way to circumvent the movement’s internal laws.
Days and weeks before the assassination attempt, Al-Amoudi ran in a round of internal elections for the presidency of Hamas in Gaza, and did not win the election against his rival, Nizar Awadallah, so a run-off round was held, which was stopped due to the challenge.
Al-Amoudi is considered a central figure within the movement in the Gaza Strip and outside it, and has influence in many of the decisions taken in the movement.
