At a time when the Lebanese are busy awaiting the repercussions of the results of the American and Israeli elections on their internal reality, and whether it will lead to a war in the region that includes Lebanon, or to a major political agreement in which Lebanon will rule, reassurances have recently emerged that have reached a number of Lebanese officials, to the effect that “Hezbollah” does not intend to participate in any future war in support of Iran.
However, these assurances seem to many to be insufficient, based on the experience of the last round of war, when it was said that the party informed the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, at the time, that it would not participate in it, before it reversed its position and opened fire towards Israel on the second of last March. Some of them spoke at the time about a conflict in decisions between the political and military wings, which ultimately led to the decision of the party in control of the field, and its successor, Tehran, prevailing.
Here, big question marks are raised about whether the decision within Hezbollah is still central, taken by a political and organizational leadership that is binding on all its institutions, or has the say now belonged to the field and the military wing? More importantly, does the party still have an independent margin to make its decisions, or is the strategic decision related to the war now being decided in Tehran, according to Iranian interests and calculations?
Readings vary in this area between those who believe that Hezbollah is still governed by a central organizational structure that does not allow for the existence of a conflicting political and military decision, and those who consider that the transformations that the party has witnessed, especially after the recent confrontations and what befell its leadership structure, have made the military decision more linked to Iran, and greatly weakened the margin of movement available to the political leadership.
What is the “Decision Shura”?
In this context, political writer Dr. Qasim Kassir, who is closely familiar with Hezbollah’s position, explains that “the leadership in the party is represented by the (Decision Shura), which is the body that makes decisions and binds all agencies and institutions to it, including the political and jihadist councils.” Kassir denies the existence of a decision taken by the Political Council in exchange for another decision issued by the Jihadist Council, stressing that “there is one central decision taken by the (Resolution Shura) and everyone adheres to it.”
According to Kassir, the “Decision Shura Council” includes the party’s Secretary-General, the head of the Executive Council, the head of the party’s parliamentary bloc, the head of the Political Council, and the political assistant to the Secretary-General.
But what about the reassurances that reached Lebanese officials, to the effect that Hezbollah does not intend to engage in a future war?
Here, Kassir pointed out in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that “there are no serious and final guarantees or promises of this kind,” explaining that “the party determines its position according to developments on the ground, and cannot make prior decisions in isolation from the nature of the events,” considering that “the possibilities of war declined after the American and Israeli elections, as a result of Washington and Tel Aviv’s preoccupation with their internal situation, unless Israel decides to launch a new aggression against Lebanon.”
The decision is made by the Revolutionary Guards
On the other hand, the political writer and editor-in-chief of the Janoubia website, Ali Al-Amin, offers a different reading, based on the consideration that “the word in (Hezbollah) was and still is in the field, and that the military wing is the one that controls this field, and constitutes the direct and actual extension of the (Iranian Revolutionary Guard).”
Al-Amin confirms in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that “the decision to explode the war in Lebanon, whether in the previous round or in any future round, is primarily an Iranian decision, governed by Iranian interests, and (Hezbollah) has no real scope to change it or object to it.”
Al-Amin recalls Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei’s recent statements regarding opening the battle on various fronts and geography, considering that they “reflect the existence of one rhythm controlled by Tehran, and the other parties must adhere to it,” considering that “the margin that was previously available to the political wing, led by former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and prominent leaders, no longer exists today, in light of the transformations that have occurred in the party’s structure and leadership.”
Lebanon is experiencing a state of increasing confusion and anxiety, in light of the information circulating about the possibility of it being part of any future regional confrontation between the United States and Israel on the one hand, and Iran on the other hand. Concerns are not limited to citizens who fear a repeat of the scene of war, destruction, and displacement, but also extend to Lebanese officials who find themselves facing possibilities whose course they do not have the full ability to control, in the absence of clear guarantees regarding Hezbollah’s position in the event of a confrontation, which is what both President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have warned of several times.
The Lebanese state faces the dilemma of the absence of guarantees
Although the Lebanese government has taken unprecedented decisions as part of an attempt to limit the decision of war and peace to its own hands, which receives broad support from Western and Arab countries, the first point of confusion lies in the difficulty of ensuring Hezbollah’s commitment to the state’s decision to neutralize Lebanon from any regional confrontation. Despite the officials’ assertion that the decision must be exclusively in the hands of legitimate institutions, the party’s continued preservation of its independent military decision, and the connection of its strategic calculations with Iranian developments, leave the state facing a complex reality.
In this context, a ministerial source confirms that internal communications have not stopped, and are still ongoing between the various parties, but they have not yet been translated into concrete steps, except for talk that Hezbollah will not enter into any future battle. However, the source indicates that these reassurances were not accompanied by serious data that allows for reassurance, which makes caution necessary at this stage.
The source stresses that the state is not weak, but rather its position is solid, and it has taken clear decisions in this direction, but the problem is that the team directly concerned with the war decision does not cooperate with the state, and does not respond to its directions, based on calculations and starting points that differ from those of the official institutions. He adds that the state does not want war or destruction, but the calculations of the other team, namely Hezbollah, are different.
With the anticipation prevailing in the region after the Israeli and American elections, the source believes that the essence of the problem also lies in the nature of the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran, as Tehran does not deal with the Lebanese state as an official authority in this file, but rather communicates with the team it supports, without providing clear guarantees that it will not interfere in any future confrontation. In this context, he draws attention to what was recently reported by Mojtaba Khamenei regarding the unity of the arenas, as an indicator that cannot be ignored in reading the possibilities of the next stage.
Israeli threats and American warnings raise the level of concern
On the other hand, developments on the ground do not help dispel fears, in light of the continuing Israeli attacks on the south, in conjunction with repeated threats. Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz had threatened to expand military operations and target additional Lebanese regions if Hezbollah joined any Iranian confrontation, at a time when Israeli media are talking about possible military scenarios that extend beyond the south of the Litani.
In this context, Maariv newspaper published information about possible Israeli plans that include advancing towards Tire, Sidon, and Nabatieh, and imposing a naval blockade on the ports of Beirut and Tripoli in the event of an expansion of the confrontation. These are media scenarios for which there has been no official confirmation of their implementation.
The warnings are not limited to the Israeli side, as the ministerial source reiterates that clear American warnings were conveyed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to President Joseph Aoun, to the effect that Hezbollah’s entry into any future war will lead to the collapse of previous guarantees, which means that Lebanon may face wide repercussions that cannot be contained.
As for the cessation of the Lebanese-Israeli discussions, the source expresses his hope that they will be resumed and results will be reached, but he points out that their cessation during this stage was not surprising, as it had been clear for some time that the discussions would not be held during the period of the American and Israeli elections.
Lebanon is in real trouble
The head of the Department of Political Science at the Lebanese University, Dr. Rodrigue Abi Khalil, points out that the confusion that the Lebanese state is experiencing at the current stage is due, in essence, to the fact that it does not possess the tools to implement commitments, despite the unprecedented decisions taken by the government in an attempt to consolidate its authority and extend state sovereignty. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that these decisions, despite their importance, collide with the fact that Hezbollah's decision is still linked to Iran, which prevents the state from being able to control the course of the confrontation, or prevent Lebanon from sliding into it.
He stresses: “Government decisions, despite their importance, are not sufficient alone for the international community unless they are translated into practical, field steps, especially since Hezbollah will not give up this superiority without a political price.”
Abi Khalil believes that Lebanon - due to its internal political reality being linked to regional transformations - finds itself in a real dilemma, especially as the region is heading towards a pivotal stage that may witness the renewal of the war in a more violent manner, in light of the American and Israeli efforts to bring about strategic changes in the region.
Abi Khalil believed that this reality explains the state of anticipation and confusion among the Lebanese state, given that an essential aspect of the decision regarding the fate of Lebanon is linked to what this confrontation will lead to, noting that “this connection was clearly reflected in the course of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, which have not yet reached decisive results.”
Hence, Abi Khalil considers that “Lebanon is close to a moment of new confrontation, without preparing itself as it should, and in light of a state that awaits what the outside will decide more than it controls the course of events.”
