◎ Yang Congrong
The Legislative Yuan passed the "Regulations on Strengthening National Defense Independence and Development of the Unmanned Vehicle Industry" on the third reading on August 27. The "Special Regulations on the Procurement of National Defense Autonomous Vehicles" originally proposed by the Executive Yuan did not receive support. The third reading version stipulates that overall industrial policy will be in charge of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and when it comes to defense and military procurement, it will be in charge of the Ministry of National Defense. The central government must allocate 240 billion yuan within six years through annual budget procedures, in principle 40 billion yuan per year. If the budget is insufficient, it can be increased based on actual needs. At present, the bill is still waiting for the Legislative Yuan to complete the proofreading of the bill and then send it to the President for promulgation.
National defense needs and industrial policies must be managed at different levels
On the surface, the Legislative Yuan adopts a compromise design, with the Ministry of Economic Affairs responsible for industrial development and the Ministry of National Defense responsible for military procurement, and some of the principles adhered to by Zhuo Rongtai are also incorporated. The real dispute has not been fully resolved. Whether unmanned vehicles are used to build national defense capabilities or as a general industrial revitalization policy will directly determine who makes the demand, who sets the specifications, how the budget is compiled, and who is responsible for the effectiveness of the procurement.
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The entry of drones and unmanned boats into the military system cannot be evaluated solely based on output value, number of subsidized companies, and factory production capacity. Military unmanned vehicles must meet conditions such as reconnaissance range, anti-interference capability, data link security, target identification, weapon integration, maintenance and battlefield survivability. The Ministry of Economic Affairs can assist in expanding production capacity, but it cannot replace the Ministry of National Defense in determining combat situations and combat capability gaps. If military needs are not the starting point of the overall plan, the industry may produce a large number of equipment that can fly but cannot be integrated into the national military command, communication and combat systems.
The Ministry of National Defense taking the lead does not mean that the Ministry of Economic Affairs is excluded. A more reasonable governance method is for the Ministry of National Defense to propose operational requirements, capability indicators, procurement rhythm and troop training plans, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for supply chain inventory, technology upgrades, financing assistance, mass production capabilities and international market layout. The National Unmanned Vehicle Industry Development Strategy Special Committee established by the Executive Yuan should be responsible for handling inter-ministerial coordination and cannot become another layer of administrative structure that adds meetings and documents.
Special budget and annual budget systems should not be simplified
The opposition parties argue that the annual budget can strengthen supervision, and this consideration is legitimate. If the annual budget is repeatedly delayed, the military will be unable to sign long-term procurement contracts, and manufacturers will not dare to invest in factories, equipment and manpower in advance. Unmanned vehicle technology updates at an extremely fast pace. Once the procurement schedule is delayed by political deadlock, the model planned six years ago may be behind before delivery.
Nor does a special budget equal a blank mandate. The Executive Yuan can propose a six-year overall plan, while the Legislative Yuan can require phased approval, year-by-year reporting, disclosure and audit tracking of major procurement projects. The third reading article stipulates that if a single procurement case exceeds 100 million yuan, the competent authority shall submit a written report within 30 days after the bid is awarded, and this type of supervision mechanism can be retained. More important supervision should focus on whether combat capabilities are formed, whether the proportion of localization is increased, and whether key components are eliminated from high-risk sources, rather than just comparing annual execution rates.
The 240 billion yuan is higher than the 210 billion yuan proposed by the Executive Yuan, but the Legislative Yuan first decides the total amount and the principle of 40 billion yuan per year, which also leaves questions about constitutional responsibility. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 264 and Interpretation No. 391 both pointed out that the Legislative Yuan shall not increase expenditures on the Executive Yuan budget to avoid separation of policy plans and political responsibilities. This time, future budget obligations are set through a legal bill. Whether it completely falls within the prohibition of Article 70 of the Constitution may still cause legal disputes. At least it is certain that if the Legislative Yuan determines the amount and implementation framework, but the Executive Yuan is responsible for the procurement results, there will be an imbalance in power and responsibility.
The Ministry of National Defense pointed out that the model, quantity and schedule of the Executive Yuan version were evaluated based on enemy threats, operational needs and coordination with allies, and expressed regret that the original proposal was not approved. The government should not just focus on offense and defense between the ruling and opposition parties. The Executive Yuan should publish a six-year capability building roadmap as soon as possible, explaining the tasks, quantities, delivery schedules, localization requirements and acceptance standards of various types of unmanned vehicles. The Legislative Yuan should establish a fixed review schedule to prevent the annual budget from becoming a political tool to delay the establishment of the army.
What Taiwan needs is not to simply expand the production value of drones, but to establish a trustworthy supply chain that can quickly replenish, continuously improve, and exclude Chinese high-risk components during wartime. The Ministry of National Defense must grasp military needs, the Ministry of Economy must build industrial capacity, and the Legislative Yuan must ensure effective oversight of the budget. Only when a clear chain of responsibility is formed among the three links can the 240 billion yuan be transformed into real defense capabilities, rather than another large-scale policy project with vague responsibilities.
(The author is a current affairs commentator, a review member of the Public Governance Alliance, chairman of the ESG Carbon Reduction Alliance, and teaches at National Taiwan Normal University)
