The housing crisis in Egypt and the Houthi military escalation on the western coast of Yemen

Thirty-year-old Egyptian Omar Tariq postpones the decision to get engaged until he can obtain an apartment, even by rent, in light of his economic circumstances that do not allow him to own one. However, even the monthly rent is not easy in light of the high rents that are not commensurate with wages.

Tareq, who currently lives with his parents and siblings in the Maadi neighborhood (south of Cairo), works as an employee in a private company, and his monthly salary does not exceed the minimum wage, which amounts to 8,000 pounds (about 157 dollars), while the rent for “the lowest apartment is 3,000 pounds, in average areas such as Hadayek El Maadi, Tora, or Helwan,” indicating that he does not dare to look for apartments in the Maadi neighborhood in which he grew up; Rents double in this distinctive area.

The housing crisis in Egypt does not revolve around a lack of supply in general. On the contrary, “there is abundance compared to the size of demand,” according to Alaa Fekry, a member of the “Real Estate Investment Division” in the “Cairo Chamber of Commerce,” explaining to Asharq Al-Awsat that the crisis “sums up in the concentration of this abundance in the quality of units directed to the upper classes, while the middle class and below suffer from finding units that match their financial capabilities.”

Fikri pointed out that “with the rise in housing unit prices, middle and lower class people tended to rent, and the increase in demand led to prices rising in a way that was disproportionate to incomes.” More than 212,000 housing units were launched, whether by real estate developers or the state, during 2024/2025, with investments amounting to 245.3 billion pounds, according to the Statistics Center.

Observers link the rise in rental prices to the increased demand for them by expatriates of different nationalities, which has led to jumps in prices in some areas, but what is striking is that despite the decline in the number of expatriates stationed in the “Faisal area,” for example, rental prices are still high. Aside from expatriates, urban researcher and director of the Urban Observatory, Yahya Shawkat, believes that the housing crisis is essentially a crisis in purchasing power. Due to the rise in real estate prices relative to income levels, especially for the poor and middle-income people, over decades.

The founder of the “Umran Observatory” adds, “The majority of Egyptians who own a home own it through self-construction and not purchase, whether by building in the countryside or new cities. Construction takes place over years according to the ability and savings of the owners.” However, ownership through purchasing from the market is relatively limited, and did not exceed a third according to the 2017 census, and this is the result of weak purchasing power.” Another aspect of the housing crisis in Egypt lies in “a large sector of Egyptians resorting to working abroad and transferring their savings to buy real estate, which created two real estate markets and an unfair competition between two purchasing powers,” according to Shawkat, who added: “This is in addition to the government’s policy of encouraging the internationalization of the Egyptian real estate market to bring in hard currency, which has increased the negative impact on local purchasing power.”

Forty-year-old Rabab Muhammad has not known the meaning of stability and reassurance in a residence since her marriage about 10 years ago. She told Asharq Al-Awsat that during this period she moved between 4 different apartments, all in the “Ard Al-Liwa area” in Giza Governorate. Rabab works in one of the gyms in the Haram area, and her husband was a waiter in a restaurant before he fell ill, so that the income of the family that does not include children is limited to the wife’s salary. She says: “My salary is 4,000 pounds, I pay 3,500 pounds, and we live on loans,” noting that 3 years ago, rent was approximately a third of her income, but now it swallows up her entire salary.

Economist Atef William considers the housing crisis to be one of the deepest crises in Egypt, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that “given rental values, unit prices, and costs of living, the minimum that provides dignity for the citizen must not be less than 20 thousand pounds.” The “Social Housing” project in Egypt, which is based on providing support to young people and families to obtain a housing unit through installments over long periods, began in 2014, and despite launching more than 600,000 units for low-income people, this did not solve the housing crisis for many, including Omar Tariq and Rabab Muhammad, who cannot afford the cost of the reservation advance, which has now reached 50,000 pounds.

Recently, the state announced the offering of apartments on a rental basis, with the opportunity to own ownership later, and the state will soon offer 30,000 units as a first tranche. Shawkat welcomes this government proposal, considering it “a step that improves access to units.” Because the units sold with real estate financing are actually considered for middle-income people; “Given that a minimum amount of income, wealth or savings is required to meet the deposit.” But a member of the Real Estate Investment Division, Alaa Fikri, believes that “this is not an effective solution given the large scale of the crisis and the small numbers presented,” doubting that the state will be able to repeat this experiment periodically, given that the money for these apartments is considered unrecoverable, at least in the short term, which will create a financing crisis. On the other hand, he saw that the solution was “granting facilities to developers to build and offer units for rent that suit the capabilities of the lowest segments,” and commented, saying: “The government is required to think about solutions to put an end to the crisis.”

The massive Houthi attack on the fronts of the western coast of Yemen does not appear to be just a new attempt to test the lines of contact, in light of the expansion of the scope of operations between south of Hodeidah and southwest of Taiz, and the group’s simultaneous use of ground attacks, ballistic missiles, drones, and booby-trapped boats. After years of relative calm that followed the 2022 truce, the Iran-backed Houthis chose a geographically and militarily highly sensitive area to launch one of their most violent attacks since then, targeting government forces’ positions in Al-Barh, Al-Kadha, Maqbanah, Al-Ahtoub, and Jabal Ghubari, in conjunction with the bombing of Al-Mokha, Al-Khawkhah, Al-Waziyah, and other areas on the West Coast.

The nature of the movement and the distribution of attacks indicate that the group wants to achieve more than one field goal at the same time. At the forefront is the pressure on the city of Taiz from the west, cutting off or threatening the road linking it to the port of Mokha, and pushing government forces to distribute their capabilities on a wide front extending from the Taiz countryside to southern Hodeidah, while keeping the sea lanes under threat. On Friday, the Yemeni Armed Forces regained Khazan Hill in Jabal Habashi District, west of Taiz Governorate, a strategic location during violent confrontations with the Houthi group, coinciding with the intensification of battles on the Maqbana and Al-Kadha fronts, and the arrival of military reinforcements to government forces, at a time when the Houthis escalated their bombing of civilian areas in the vicinity of Al-Mokha overlooking the Red Sea.

Official military sources said that the armed forces continue to engage in violent confrontations with the Houthis on the Maqbana and Al-Kadha fronts, as part of operations aimed at confronting the group’s attacks and movements on the fronts west of the governorate. Official sources reported that the missile hit the restaurant frequented by civilians in the Mokha Junction area, causing casualties and damage to the place and surrounding facilities, while the specialized teams began procedures to treat the injured and assess the damage resulting from the bombing. Sources from both sides reported on Friday, citing Agence France-Presse, that more than 80 people had been killed in the clashes since Thursday, while no unified official toll was issued by the Yemeni government or the Houthis. A Yemeni military official said that 24 government forces were killed, while another military official spoke of the killing of 15 Taiz axis forces, while medical sources in areas controlled by the Houthis said that hospitals received 42 dead. The focus comes on southwest Taiz, in an area that represents a link between the city and the coast. Therefore, controlling advanced positions in Al-Kadha, Al-Barah, and Maqbanah does not mean, in the military calculation, the acquisition of additional lands only, but also getting close to one of the most important lines of movement and supply between Taiz and Al-Mokha.