(Deutsche Welle Chinese website) This fall, U.S. President Trump’s administration stepped up its diplomatic efforts in an attempt to restart stalled negotiations aimed at ending the Russia-Ukraine war.
Washington, while increasing pressure on Kyiv and its European partners, has sought to bring Moscow back to the negotiating table with a series of concessions, including a deal covering Russian diesel exports to the United States and a temporary easing of some sanctions.
However, the Kremlin appears to be in no rush to resume meaningful peace talks. On October 21, after US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, the Kremlin stated that Moscow was ready to hold technical-level negotiations with Ukraine next month.
Putin's assistant Yury Ushakov said after the meeting that Putin agreed to resume peace talks brokered by Washington after November 10. He also said the next round of talks could be held in Abu Dhabi and would focus on "building a security system for Russia and Ukraine after the war."
According to Ushakov, Putin also exchanged views with Witkov on a possible trilateral summit that would include U.S. President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ushakov pointed out that Beijing is already preparing for this meeting.
Trilateral summit held in China, Ukraine absent
The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that Moscow proposed holding an additional three-party meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China, on November 18-19. According to the newspaper's sources, Putin hopes to reach an agreement with Trump and Xi Jinping to end the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia.
Moscow proposed a trilateral summit between Russia, the United States and China but excluded Ukraine and the European Union, a sign of the Kremlin's preferred negotiating model. Russia insists that for negotiations to progress, Ukraine must first be prepared to make concessions on territorial issues. Putin has also repeatedly emphasized that he is willing to negotiate only if Russia's interests are taken into consideration.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Putin views the proposed Shenzhen meeting as a possible new "Yalta Conference." In 1945, leaders of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union met in Yalta to discuss defeating Nazi Germany and the postwar European order.
The newspaper also reported that Chinese officials had said through diplomatic channels that Beijing would not object to the tripartite format if Trump agreed to participate. Trump, whose relations with Kyiv have deteriorated significantly in recent weeks, has also expressed a willingness to hold such talks.
During his visit to Oslo on October 20, Ukrainian President Zelensky pointed out that talks on Ukraine’s future are acceptable only if Ukraine can sit at the negotiating table.
What can China gain from the talks?
Temur Umarov, a researcher specializing in Sino-Russian relations at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, was not surprised by the Kremlin's proposal. He told DW that Moscow wants to be respected by Washington and treated as an international power.
Umarov said the previous U.S. administration was unwilling to discuss issues involving Ukraine's sovereignty with Russia without Kyiv's participation. Now, the Kremlin believes such negotiations may be possible.
Moscow clearly hopes that any agreement reached at the proposed meeting will prompt the White House to pressure Ukraine and the European Union to accept Russian terms. But what role will China play?
Umarov believes that Beijing participates mainly as a symbolic partner rather than an active mediator responsible for the results. "Beijing has no intention of taking responsibility for Ukraine's future," he said.
Simply attending the summit will not bring any additional obligations to China. Umarov explained: "It is not surprising that the Kremlin insists on this format. Russia wants to show that it is an equal not only with the United States, but also with China. But objectively speaking, Moscow is not the dominant party in this relationship."
Umarov believes that China has little direct interest in such negotiations. He said that even if several leaders issued a joint statement, Beijing would try to make the wording as vague as possible and make no commitments. In this way, no matter how the war develops thereafter, China can almost say that it is consistent with the consensus reached at the summit. According to Umarov, maintaining this kind of room for maneuver is a key prerequisite for Beijing to participate in the meeting.
However, Yurii Poita, senior associate researcher at the Mercator Center for China Studies (MERICS), has a different view. He believes that China and Russia have overlapping strategic interests, especially in promoting the establishment of an alternative security architecture covering the entire Eurasian continent.
Poita believes that the reduction of Western military presence in Europe and Asia and the weakening of NATO's influence will be beneficial to both countries. "If Russia and China can convince the United States to reduce its military presence in Europe and military assistance to Ukraine, Russia will gain more advantages on the battlefield," he told DW.
He added that the situation would also further erode the EU's trust in the United States, its NATO ally. Poita believes that is exactly what Moscow and Beijing are pursuing in any negotiations with Washington.
Is Putin’s political survival vital to China?
Michael Kimmage, director of the Kennan Institute in the United States, also doubts that Beijing will be prepared to play a more active diplomatic role in ending the war.
Kimechi told DW that China may believe the conflict will cause instability and would prefer to maintain trade relations with Ukraine and other countries in the region. But he believes a greater priority outweighs those concerns. "For China, what is more important is Putin's political survival," he said.
Kimechi believes that Russia brings several geopolitical benefits to China, including cheap energy and a diplomatic partner that rarely gets in the way of Beijing.
He believes that China will continue to indirectly support Russia’s military operations to prevent Russia from defeating the war. He said an outright victory for Russia was not necessarily Beijing's goal, but it was crucial to ensure Putin did not lose the war. Because of this, Kimechi does not believe that China will put pressure on Putin if he is unwilling to end the war.
Does excluding Europe expose the weakness of the EU?
Neither Ukraine nor the EU will participate in the proposed talks in China.
Kateryna Krasina, a junior researcher at the Kiev-based think tank New Geopolitics Network, believes that excluding Ukraine and the EU may shed light on how Beijing actually views their international influence.
She believes that it can be seen from China's approach that China does not regard Ukraine as an independent party in negotiations and believes that Europe is relatively weak.
Kimechi believes that excluding Europe from the summit will not necessarily weaken Europe's influence on the negotiation process.
He acknowledged that European governments may not be able to prevent Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping from meeting. But he mentioned that when Trump and Putin held a summit in Alaska in 2025, Europe was actively running. He believes these efforts helped avoid an outcome that would have been unfavorable to Europe.
Kimech said that Europe has expanded its influence through financial assistance to Ukraine and extensive defense industry cooperation, especially cooperation involving Germany and other European countries.
He believes that European support played an important role in Ukraine's resistance to the Russian military advance. "And this support is leverage," Kimechi said.
He believes that Russia, China and the United States may all intend to portray Europe as a secondary power, but this portrayal ignores Europe's actual influence.
“What you see on the surface is not exactly the same as what is actually happening,” he said. He used this to distinguish two things: on the one hand, great power diplomacy that looks like the Yalta Conference, and on the other hand, Europe's role in supporting Ukraine.
Umarov offered another angle.
He believes that any diplomatic agreement reached between the United States, Russia and China will face the realities on the battlefield.
"China understands that whatever the outcome of negotiations with the United States and Russia, the reality on the battlefield will be very different and will depend first and foremost on Ukraine," he said.
"Whether the Kremlin likes it or not, Ukraine has its own initiative. Neither the United States nor Western countries can completely determine what happens on the battlefield based on diplomatic pressure alone."
