On May 27 this year, the Japanese Parliament passed the relevant bill to establish the "National Intelligence Council" and the "National Intelligence Agency", and the two agencies were officially launched on July 31.
The "National Intelligence Council" is a cabinet-level intelligence decision-making mechanism chaired by the Prime Minister of Japan. Its members include the Chief Cabinet Secretary, as well as relevant cabinet ministers such as diplomacy, defense, public security, legal affairs, finance, and economics. It is responsible for discussing the basic policies of intelligence work and responding to major matters such as foreign intelligence activities. The "National Intelligence Agency" serves as its practical support agency, responsible for compiling and analyzing the intelligence held by various government departments, and coordinating cross-departmental intelligence work. However, Japanese media pointed out that the National Intelligence Agency itself is not a foreign intelligence agency similar to the CIA.
Strengthening Japan's intelligence system is a long-term policy advocated by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi; during her campaign for the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party in October last year, she once again proposed the establishment of a National Intelligence Agency as a "command tower" to coordinate various intelligence-related departments.
Before the establishment of the National Intelligence Agency, the core intelligence agency of the Japanese Prime Minister's official residence was the "Cabinet Intelligence Investigation Office". This agency is responsible for collecting and analyzing domestic and foreign intelligence, and integrating the intelligence held by the National Police Agency, Public Security Investigation Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, etc., and then reporting it to the Prime Minister and other senior officials in the official residence.
During World War II, Germany and Italy, which were both Axis powers with Japan, established agencies responsible for foreign intelligence work after the war—the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Italian National Military Intelligence Service (SIFAR). In contrast, Japan's pre-war intelligence and espionage functions were scattered among different departments such as the Army, Navy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Internal Affairs. After the war, although an intelligence system with the Cabinet Intelligence Investigation Office as the core was established, there was no dedicated foreign intelligence agency.
Why is Japan further reforming its government intelligence system at this time?
Takami Oyama, an associate professor at Kyushu Institute of Technology who specializes in international relations, told DW: "One of the important significances of this reform is that Japan has institutionalized 'intelligence' more clearly than before, making it an important policy resource that supports foreign and defense policies."
He pointed out: "The National Intelligence Council will discuss the overall government's basic policies and situation judgments in response to 'important intelligence activities' related to security, terrorism and emergencies, as well as 'foreign intelligence activities' including attempts by foreign forces to obtain important information about Japan, and analyze and evaluate major cases; the National Intelligence Agency will be reorganized from the original Cabinet Intelligence Investigation Office and will be responsible for coordinating the intelligence activities of various provinces and agencies, as well as compiling and analyzing intelligence."
Ken Otani, a professor at the Department of Crisis Management at Nihon University, told DW: "The National Intelligence Council can be led by the prime minister to discuss intelligence strategies, and the National Intelligence Agency is responsible for compiling and analyzing intelligence from various provinces and departments. Its functions are similar to the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) or the Australian Office of National Intelligence (ONI). This reform focuses on the military threats from China, North Korea and Russia, and will help Japan deal with 'gray zone' activities such as cyber, electromagnetic waves and intelligence."
Kotani further pointed out that Japan's development of long-range "stand-off missiles" requires intelligence to support target locking, including disabling enemy radars and confirming target locations. In terms of strengthening the defense of the Southwest Islands (Ryukyu Islands), in response to possible cyber attacks and disinformation operations launched by China, strengthening signal intelligence (SIGINT) and satellite image analysis capabilities may also become a topic at the National Intelligence Conference.
Masatoshi Murakami, a former Japanese member of the House of Representatives, a former diplomat, and currently an associate professor at Kyo Gakukan University, told Deutsche Welle that Japan hopes to make up for the long-term lack of coordinating functions in post-war security policy by establishing an intelligence "command tower." He pointed out that Japan established the National Security Agency in 2013 during the Shinzo Abe administration, and this reform can be seen as a continuation of it; for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who considers himself the successor of Abe’s political line, it may also become one of his political legacies.
Worry that personal rights may be infringed
However, some Japanese media are worried that intelligence reforms may infringe on individual rights. "Asahi Shimbun" pointed out that although Prime Minister Takaichi said that the government "will not infringe on citizens' privacy for no reason," the "Foreign Intelligence Collection Law" discussed by the government may allow monitoring of communications without a court warrant based on national security. The newspaper warned that this move may involve communication confidentiality and personal privacy guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, and its necessity still needs to be fully discussed.
Some foreign media describe the National Intelligence Agency as the "Japanese version of the CIA," as South Korea's Dong-A Ilbo once called it. Ken Otani pointed out: "The National Intelligence Agency is mainly the 'command tower' of intelligence work and has completely different functions from the CIA. However, this reform may be the 'first step' for Japan to formulate counterintelligence laws and establish foreign intelligence agencies in the future. He expects that relevant reforms may be further advanced in the next few years."
Masatoshi Murakami also believes that rather than calling the National Intelligence Agency the "Japanese version of the CIA," it is closer to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). "The director of national intelligence should act as a 'hub' between the prime minister and the various intelligence agencies," he said.
As for the impact on intelligence cooperation with friendly countries, Ken Otani believes that Japan, the United States and South Korea already have intelligence sharing mechanisms such as GSOMIA, so the impact of this reform will be limited in the short term. However, he said: "I have exchanged views with relevant diplomatic personnel in the United States and South Korea, and both sides seem to have expectations for Japan's reforms."
As for Taiwan, Takamono Oyama pointed out, "The situation is also different; currently, Japan-Taiwan relations still maintain under the framework of 'non-governmental substantive relations', so it is not conceivable to establish the same form of inter-state intelligence sharing mechanism as between Japan, South Korea and the United States. However, around issues such as the situation in the Taiwan Strait, economic security, network security and disinformation, the importance of substantive-level intelligence exchanges between Japan and Taiwan may further increase in the future."
Oyama also said: "Just because Japan is reforming its intelligence organization this time, it cannot be considered that Japan's formal participation in arrangements such as the Five Eyes alliance is a foregone conclusion."
"China may describe this reform as part of Japan's 'remilitarization'"
Masatoshi Murakami predicted that, “In addition to its ally the United States, intelligence cooperation between Japan and European partners such as Germany, Britain and France will also be strengthened to jointly respond to security threats posed by China, Russia and North Korea.”
As for the reactions of China, Russia and North Korea, Oyama pointed out: "The Chinese government has officially responded to Japan's establishment of the National Intelligence Agency. On May 28, when talking about the passage of the relevant bill, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning linked the history of Japan's intelligence agencies to militarism and asked the Japanese government to act with caution. After the National Intelligence Agency was officially established on July 31, China once again criticized it, calling it 'another negative trend in Japan's internal and external security policy.'"
Oyama believes that China is likely not to view this reform simply as a reform of the Japanese government's administrative organization, but to link it with Japan's policies to increase its defense budget, deploy long-range missiles, promote the transfer of defense equipment, and strengthen the defense of the southwest region, and describe it as part of Japan's "remilitarization." However, he emphasized that a distinction should be made between the Chinese government's political discourse and the actual legal authority of Japan's National Intelligence Agency.
In contrast, Oyama pointed out: "Russia continues to criticize Japan's overall security policy as 'remilitarization,' but so far the Russian government has not seen a clear official response to the National Intelligence Agency itself like the Chinese government. The situation in North Korea is roughly the same. Therefore, it is not yet possible to think that China, Russia, and North Korea have unanimously begun to take countermeasures against Japan's National Intelligence Service, nor can it be concluded that this intelligence reform has immediately triggered a regional arms race."
Ken Otani said: "Japan was even called a 'spy paradise' in the past, and China, Russia and North Korea were able to conduct espionage activities relatively freely in Japan. He believes that if Japan enacts a counterespionage law in the next step, it may trigger a backlash from the three countries and even lead to a deterioration in diplomatic relations."
Kotani took the changes in Australia-China relations around 2018 as an example and pointed out: "If Japan-China relations deteriorate as a result, the security environment may also deteriorate, and even lead to further military expansion by both parties. However, he believes that North Korea's response is currently difficult to predict; Russia is deeply involved in the Ukrainian war and is unlikely to deliberately further confront Japan."
As for whether Japan's intelligence reform may further exacerbate tensions in East Asia, Oyama Takamino analyzed: "The impact needs to be viewed from two aspects. On the one hand, it is to improve deterrence and crisis management. If Japan can grasp military activities, cyber attacks and influence operations in its surroundings earlier, and make more accurate assessments of these intelligence, it is possible to reduce misjudgments and take more appropriate response measures."
On the other hand, there is the "security dilemma". Oyama pointed out: "Even if Japan itself interprets this reform as 'strengthening intelligence capabilities,' if other countries regard it as a measure to complement Japan's deployment of long-range missiles and enhancement of military power, these countries may further strengthen intelligence activities, counterintelligence measures, and cyber activities against Japan."
However, Oyama emphasized that “it has only been a short time since the National Intelligence Agency was established, and whether the ‘security dilemma’ will actually occur can only remain at the level of prediction. Similarly, it is currently impossible to confirm the actual causal relationship between the establishment of the National Intelligence Agency and the intensified arms race or intelligence competition in East Asia.”
Masatoshi Murakami reminded: "The National Intelligence Agency is not a 'panacea.' I once served in the intelligence department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; the most important thing in intelligence work is talent. However, talent cultivation cannot be achieved overnight, and the Japanese government still needs to formulate a long-term intelligence strategy including talent cultivation."
