The ongoing Israeli operations in southern Lebanon, and the expansion of their scope in some areas to greater distances than the border strip, raise questions about the limits of actual military deployment and the nature of the areas that have become subject to surveillance or targeting from advanced Israeli positions. This discussion gains an additional dimension with the Israeli Defense Minister, Yisrael Katz, speaking more than once about an area approximately 700 square kilometers, while field data show that control over the land is not at a single level, but rather ranges between direct deployment in specific points, mobile incursions, and fire control over broader areas.
This area, according to military readings, does not appear to be a belt of equal depth extending in a fixed line from the coast to Mount Hermon, as the nature of the land, the heights, and the axes of movement impose a clear disparity between the sectors. In areas there are Israeli forces and vehicles directly, while other areas remain outside fixed deployment, but are located under air surveillance or within range of fire, allowing operations to be carried out there without the need to keep permanent forces inside them.
Dr. Riyad Kahwaji, an expert in security and defense affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israel views, from both geographical and military angles, the Golan and Lebanon as “one front,” extending from Mount Hermon all the way to the Mediterranean coast at Naqoura and Bayada, even though it passes through the territories of two countries.
Qahwaji explained that “Israel is establishing, from its point of view, a security belt along its northern borders,” pointing out that field developments mean that this belt “is no longer confined to the south of the Litani River, but rather has extended in some areas to its north.”
He said: “In practice, the geographical map expanded and was no longer limited to the south of the Litani, and it extended towards its north, specifically from the side of Metulla, because the distance between Metulla and the Litani River is short, and is about 7 kilometers, while the distance between Naqoura and the Litani is about 30 kilometers.” He added that this difference in distances explains, from a geographical standpoint, the belt’s reach at some points to the north of the Litani.
Thus, according to this reading, the Litani does not constitute a single line that identically separates the two areas of operations, north and south, as the distance to it varies from one region to another, and geography imposes a different depth of deployment or firepower.
Qahwaji distinguishes between direct military deployment and control over wider areas through surveillance and fire. In his explanation of the concept of “control by fire,” Qahwaji said that Israel relies on about 20 points where small military concentrations are deployed, explaining: “At each point, a force of the size of a company could be placed, while in the depth there are drones that are constantly working to monitor movements.”
He added: “Whenever the drones detect any movement, it is targeted, either with artillery or an air strike, or a patrol can be launched from one of these points towards the place where the movement was detected within the scope of the so-called Yellow Belt.”
Qahwaji concluded, “This is the meaning of control by fire: it is not necessary for there to be an actual and heavy military deployment throughout the entire area of the belt, but rather specific military points, with permanent monitoring by fire and drones, and the ability to target any movement or send a patrol to it.”
This distinction explains how the area of movement or military control can be wider than the area of actual deployment. The force located in a high location or a fortified point can monitor nearby roads and towns and target them or send a patrol to them when needed without establishing a permanent site in each area.
This pattern is evident in a number of sectors of the South. In the west, the scope of operations begins from Naqoura and the coastal sector, and extends to areas that have recently been subjected to repeated incursions, bombings, and bombings, including Al-Mansouri and its environs.
In the central sector, towns such as Beit Yahoun, Hadada, Haris and Ayta al-Jabal witnessed varying Israeli movements or attacks, without the level of military presence there being the same.
The depth of operations increases towards Shaqif and Ali Al-Taher Heights, as the nature of the land and heights give it the ability to supervise wider areas extending towards Nabatieh, Iqlim al-Tuffah, and the surrounding movement axes. Here the shape of the scope of control becomes more complex than just a strip extending along the border.
Retired Brigadier General Fadi Dawoud proposes a broader interpretation of a possible path of expansion, based on controlling the heights and their ability to control fire in the areas below them. Daoud told Asharq Al-Awsat, “It is clear in southern Lebanon that the expansion limits may reach the Awali River, and if they do not reach the Awali, the concentration will remain in the highlands that govern the Awali River,” noting that this expansion also includes “Al-Rayhan and the surroundings of Jezzine, specifically Kfarhouna.”
Daoud explained that “the borders will be, from the west, at the Awali River,” considering that the main factor in charting the course of movements is “geographic control,” especially control of the heights that allow control of the areas below them without the need for direct deployment there.
He said: “Geographic control will enable him to control the Western Bekaa from the right, because it is mainly located in Mount Hermon, and the Western Bekaa has become an enclave between Mount Hermon and Rayhan,” adding: “He will be stationed there to control the Bekaa.”
Daoud indicated that this path could extend from Jabal al-Rayhan towards the highlands of Iqlim al-Tuffah, saying: “It will move from Jabal al-Rayhan to the highlands of Iqlim al-Tuffah, including Jabal Safi, where it imposes its control over the party’s stronghold in Iqlim al-Tuffah, and controls Sidon, eastern Sidon, and the Awali River.”
He stressed that the nature of the land is what determines the course of military movements, saying: “Geography is fixed, and geography will follow,” considering that controlling the heights gives the ability to control fire in the areas below them without the necessity of full military deployment there.
He added: “His control over Mount Hermon makes the Western Bekaa region fall (militarily) up to Qaraoun,” pointing out that Mount Hermon overlooks two main areas, as “on the western side of Mount Hermon is the Western Bekaa, and on the eastern side is Daraa in Syria,” adding that the two regions “will form two enclaves” on both sides of Mount Hermon.
The two readings show that the discussion about the area of 700 square kilometers is not limited to the number of towns in which there are forces on the ground, but is also related to the heights, observation points, the field of fire, and the ability of the forces to move from them to neighboring areas, while the size of the actual deployment remains different from one sector to another.
On the ground, on Friday morning, an Israeli drone launched a raid targeting the roundabout of the town of Kafr Tibnit in the Nabatieh district, amid preliminary information about casualties, coinciding with the Israeli army carrying out two bombings on the outskirts of the town and in Al-Mansouri in the Tyre district.
The Israeli army burned forests in the town of Qantara, and carried out a sweep with machine guns towards Wadi Al-Hujair, while an Israeli drone dropped a sound bomb near Kfar Shuba, and a low flight of drones was recorded over the southern suburb of Beirut and the city of Tire and its environs.
