On October 8, 2026, Vietnamese Prime Minister Minh Hsing officially visited Laos (Laos) and met with the country’s leaders in the capital, Vientiane (Vientiane).
This visit attracted public attention in Vietnam because it was Lim Hing’s first bilateral visit as a government leader. He is also the first foreign leader received by the new Prime Minister of Laos, Saleumxay Kommasith.
But for international observers, the focus of attention falls on Ban Keun, more than 50 kilometers north of Vientiane, where the aviation and military facilities jointly built by China and Laos have been put into operation for more than a week.
The facility includes the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center and the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy.
Outside attention has further increased because a Reuters report analyzing the latest satellite imagery on October 6 showed that about eight K-8 trainer and light attack aircraft were present at the airport, as well as more than 20 support vehicles.
The K-8 is a two-seat jet trainer aircraft jointly developed by China and Pakistan. It is mainly used to train military pilots and can also perform some light combat missions when necessary.
This is one of the more widely used training aircraft in developing countries and has been exported to the air forces of many countries around the world. The Lao Air Force currently operates four K-8s, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
As construction continues to accelerate at Bangan, defense and diplomatic experts are paying close attention to whether more infrastructure and new capabilities will be added to the facility in the future.
Because any changes to the facility will create a level of concern for neighboring countries, especially Vietnam.
To the southwest, China already has access to the Ream naval base in Cambodia; while to the west, the Bangan facility could create conditions for Beijing to establish a permanent military presence in Laos. To the east, China has also built and militarized facilities in the South China Sea.
Therefore, once a crisis or conflict breaks out with China, Vietnam will be in a situation that many observers call "enemies on all sides."
For this reason, Prime Minister Minh Hsing said in a speech at the National Defense Academy in mid-September that Vietnam must be prepared to deal with unprecedented military and defense situations.
BBC News Vietnamese has contacted the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for comment on this matter.
How might China develop facilities in Laos?
The latest satellite images of the Bangan facility obtained by Reuters show that it currently has a runway about 2,000 meters long, a taxiway, tens of thousands of square meters of apron and an air traffic control tower. Most of the support infrastructure has been completed.
The airport was built on the site of a former airstrip known as Lima Site 44. The airport was part of a runway network during the Vietnam War. The U.S. military and the CIA used these facilities to secretly support the Hmong anti-communist armed forces.
However, satellite images show that the new airport is much larger than the narrow red clay runway built during the war.
The location of Bangan is also considered to have transportation advantages. It is close to the China-Laos railway corridor, which will help to transport personnel, equipment and materials from China to Laos more easily.
Analysts believe that the location is near the capital Vientiane, which is conducive to training work and also convenient for the Lao government to manage and coordinate the operation of facilities.
The surrounding terrain is relatively flat, different from most mountainous terrain in Laos, and is more suitable for building airports and conducting flight training projects.
Some important cities in mainland Southeast Asia, such as Hanoi in Vietnam and Bangkok in Thailand, are located within a radius of about 500 to 700 kilometers from Bangan. Even distant locations are only more than 1,000 kilometers away.
Dr Collin Koh, a security expert at the S. S. Rajaratnam Institute of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, told BBC Vietnamese: "For now, it is more appropriate to regard the facility as a training center."
"However, such facilities are often also a convenient starting point and cover, and may take on more functions in the future than just training purposes."
Chinese military commentators interviewed by the China-Global South Program (CGSP) also believed that the potential of the facility goes far beyond pilot training.
The China-Global South Project quoted China's well-known military commentary blog "Military Weapon Subdimension" as saying that the establishment of the Bangan facility has "paved the way" for the Lao Air Force to fully switch to Chinese-made equipment in the future.
An announcement posted on the website of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense stated that the facility is jointly maintained and operated by both parties and aims to assist Laos in strengthening air force pilot training, emphasizing that it "is not targeting any third party."
However, the announcement did not provide further information on the number of troops stationed and the amount of equipment.
Dr. Xu Ruilin believes that the Bangan facility may serve as a logistics base for the Chinese Air Force, performing publicly announced support functions. In addition, the location may also become a convenient stopover when Chinese troops travel to Thailand to participate in exercises.
Dr. Xu Ruilin emphasized that this facility clearly marks the beginning of China's long-term military presence in Southeast Asia, especially in the context of previous relevant arrangements, such as the agreement allowing the Chinese navy to enter the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia.
Dr Arvid Bell, chief executive of the US geopolitical forecasting company Anadyr Horizon, who holds a similar view, told the BBC that it is still too early to draw conclusions and that the long-term importance of Bangan will depend on how the facility develops and how China uses it in the coming years.
Bell pointed out that Bangen will not lead to a sudden and significant increase in China's military capabilities, but it does provide Beijing with more strategic options in the future.
"The facility may also provide significant strategic benefits to China, including more regular access, deeper institutional ties with the Lao military, and infrastructure that can be further expanded in the future."
The public account of the military sub-dimension also holds the same view, believing that establishing a support base in Bangen will help China "influence the Indo-China Peninsula" in the future.
Vietnam 'has good reasons to be worried'
Observers pointed out that as China's presence in Cambodia and the South China Sea continues to increase, Beijing's influence on Vietnam's strategic access routes is increasing, so Vietnam has "well-founded concerns" about the Bangan facility.
Dr Koh told the BBC: "I think Vietnam has been paying close attention to these developments, from the Ream naval base in Cambodia and the Drexon Funan canal project, to China's massive increase in military presence in the South China Sea, and now Banggan in Laos."
Dr. Xu Ruilin believes that if Bangen is used as an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and logistics support base, it will become a valuable supplement to the Chinese People's Liberation Army, but he also pointed out that its advantages also have limitations.
"If Bangan is to truly have a strategic impact on the South China Sea, the Chinese military must be able to obtain the airspace access and use rights of Southeast Asian countries between Laos and the South China Sea."
Thailand may not be as willing to cooperate as outsiders imagine, because it still needs to consider its alliance obligations with the United States.
Vietnam will almost certainly not give Chinese military aircraft passage or allow them to fly through its airspace, especially if Vietnam itself is involved in the conflict.
Once a major conflict breaks out, Laos may even be involved in the war if China plans to use Bangan to carry out missions during wartime.
Dr. Xu Ruilin believes that Vientiane is very aware of its own painful historical lessons during the Cold War, when Laos became a proxy battlefield for confrontation between major powers.
He concluded: "Bangen is likely to have more political and symbolic significance for China than truly having significant combat value."
Laos and Vietnam have deep historical and defense ties, as well as growing economic ties with China.
"These two relationships can absolutely co-exist," Bell told the BBC.
He believes that what needs to be observed is whether China’s deepening involvement in the military field will change the balance of influence among all parties, especially in the security field, where Vietnam has long played an extremely important role.
On the other hand, Euan Graham, a senior researcher at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), told Deutsche Welle (DW) that Vietnam has long regarded Laos and Cambodia as important strategic buffer zones on the west. For decades, Hanoi has struggled to maintain significant political and military influence over both countries.
When talking about Bangan, Graham pointed out that Hanoi is facing the worrying possibility of being strategically surrounded by China.
"The new air base in Laos will definitely complicate Vietnam's defense planning and deployment."
In a 2026 survey by the National Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast Asia in Singapore (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute), Vietnamese people were the highest in Southeast Asia with a proportion of 88.7% being worried about the growth of China’s political and strategic influence.
What’s noteworthy about Bangan?
Dr. Xu Ruilin said: "Judging from Beijing's consistent approach, this process (development into a military base) is likely to be gradual and long-term. Therefore, unless there is a 'black swan' event (that is, an event that is rare but has a huge impact), we probably will not see existing facilities suddenly upgraded to full military bases."
However, he pointed out that if Bangan is viewed within the overall military cooperation framework between China and Laos, it can be predicted that the facility will first become a gathering place for joint training and exercises between the two countries.
This will pave the way for the gradual normalization of China's military presence in Bangan and reduce the doubts of regional countries.
Thereafter, the local presence of the People's Liberation Army Air Force may gradually increase.
This situation will be more likely to occur if the Lao Air Force continues to purchase more advanced equipment from China to replace most of the existing old fleet. By then, the scope and degree of training cooperation between the PLA Air Force and the Lao Air Force may be further expanded, and more advanced Chinese aircraft and equipment will be deployed to Bangan.
Dr. Xu Ruilin also used Yunnan as an example.
In the past few years, Beijing has dispatched two People's Liberation Army Navy Type 056 frigates to Ream Reang to train Cambodian troops in preparation for the country to receive new warships of the same type built by China.
This model may become the "blueprint" for the PLA Air Force to maintain a semi-permanent presence in Bangan in the name of training.
Dr. Bell of Anadyr Horizon believes that if there is a rotation of PLA personnel, an increase in the frequency of military transport aircraft flights, or an expansion of fuel storage facilities, it will be a sign that Beijing is moving towards establishing a long-term logistics presence in Bangan.
It will also be interesting to note whether the announced agreement indicates that China has obtained certain special rights to use the facility.
As for the construction of reinforced aircraft forts, or the frequent deployment of Chinese fighter jets, drones and reconnaissance aircraft, if they occur, it will show that the facility is gradually transforming from a training function into a combat military base.
"If another Southeast Asian country adopts a similar 'Joint Support and Training Center' model, it will reinforce the outside world's perception that China is establishing a broader network of military presence in the region," Bell said.
Bell said that if such signs appeared in other locations in the region, it would be stronger evidence that Bangan is part of Beijing's larger strategy to establish a military presence network, rather than simply a bilateral cooperation project.
He also reminded that caution should be exercised and that Bengen should not be given unproven abilities. Its strategic value does not necessarily lie in what China can do now, but in that it can help Beijing reduce the time and cost required to expand its presence or deploy greater capabilities in the future.
The base's proximity to Vientiane and its proximity to the Thai border also makes its location strategically significant.
"However, any military power projection capabilities extending from Bangan must be evaluated against what China can already achieve from Yunnan Province."
Dependence on Beijing
Laos is a one-party, low-income country led by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and has long-standing and complex relations with its two communist neighbors: China and Vietnam.
Laos has become increasingly dependent on Chinese investment and funding sources. Critics often accuse Beijing of pursuing "debt trap" diplomacy.
Hydroelectric dams on the Mekong River and other Chinese-funded energy projects are expected to turn Laos into the "battery of Southeast Asia."
According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Laos’ public debt last year was equivalent to about 81% of gross domestic product (GDP), and China is its largest bilateral creditor.
In June this year, Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith visited Beijing and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping called on the two countries to establish a strategic dialogue mechanism covering multiple fields such as national defense.
An unnamed Southeast Asian diplomat told Reuters that in the past, Lao soldiers usually had to go to Vietnam, Russia or China to receive advanced training, but now some training activities may be conducted at home.
The person also believes that China is expanding its military presence throughout the region and cited China's cooperation with Indonesia in building ammunition factories as an example.
The bigger question is, as Arvid Bell has argued, whether Southeast Asia can prevent growing great power competition from turning into long-term tensions like those currently facing Europe and the Middle East.
To do this, the region needs more transparency, confidence-building measures, and cooperation mechanisms that are effective enough to manage instability before countries' security decisions trigger wider ripple effects.
Providing clearer information about Bangan's personnel, equipment and related access arrangements would help neighboring countries more accurately assess the true role of the facility.
