In recent weeks, the Persian Gulf Arab states have succeeded in bringing their oil exports back to pre-Iran war levels by increasing oil tanker movements and making greater use of alternative routes.
At the same time, due to the maritime blockade imposed by America, Iran's exports remain almost zero.
This change has come at a time when Iran has tried to make blocking the movement of ships in the Strait of Hormuz one of its main powers since the beginning of the recent war.
Iran had tried to increase its bargaining power with America by creating obstacles in this strategic waterway.
In the current situation, there is a difference between the increased exports of neighboring countries and the threat by Iranian officials that if the export of Iranian crude oil is stopped, the exports of other countries will also stop.
So has Iran lost the ability to implement this threat and has the US succeeded in regaining control of movement in Hormuz, or is the situation more complex than this?
What has changed in Hormuz?
According to a report by tanker tracking firm Kpler, at least 16.5 million barrels of crude oil and condensate were exported from the field every day between September 1 and 28, which is equal to the pre-war average without including Iranian oil.
Of this quantity, about 9.9 million barrels, or 60 percent, passed through Hormuz. 23 percent of the oil was loaded off the coast of Oman and mainly in Fujairah, while 17 percent went out via the Red Sea.
According to Kpler, about 40 percent of the total oil exported from the region in September did not pass through the strait and reached ports in the Red Sea or the Gulf of Oman via land pipelines. Before the war this figure was 17 percent.
Kpler estimates that the movement of Iranian oil through Hormuz was almost zero in September, following the resumption of the blockade in July. Before the war, Iran exported about 1.7 million barrels of oil a day, and including this brings the region's exports in September to about 91 percent of pre-war levels.
Part of this change has been made possible by the use of Saudi Arabia's pipelines to the Red Sea and the UAE's pipeline to Fujairah, but there has also been an increase in oil tanker traffic within the Strait of Hormuz.
Observers consider the role of US air and naval forces as the main reason for the increase in traffic in Hormuz.
But can this increase in exports be considered a failure of Iran's strategy to use the Strait of Hormuz as an instrument of pressure in the war with America?
Assessing the impact of this new situation on Iran's power, Hamidreza Azizi, senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group, emphasizes Tehran's objective of creating insecurity in Hormuz.
He told BBC Persian that what Iranian officials call "smart control" is an attempt to hinder movement, increase danger and influence energy prices.
From this perspective, an attack or the threat of an attack may deter shipowners, insurance companies and buyers from taking risks and thus limit trade.
To create such an impact, it is not necessary for Iran to stop every ship. The companies' decisions regarding travel cost and safety are also part of Iran's assessment.
Meanwhile, American military support has also played an important role in changing the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Martin Kelly, senior intelligence analyst at security company EOS Risk Group, told BBC Verify that US support is mainly in the form of "air support to ships". This includes issuing warnings and intercepting incoming threats such as drones, missiles or boats.
However, ships that pass through the coast of Oman via the US-recommended southern route and do not seek permission from Iran to use the northern route are still targets of attack.
Even in such a situation, there have been reports of these oil tankers being targeted by Iran. The UK Maritime Trade Operations Center (UKMTO) reported an unidentified projectile hitting a visiting oil tanker on 21 September, and a fire on a cargo ship after a projectile hit it on 23 September.
The continuation of these incidents shows that the ships are still at risk, although the attacks do not conclude that Iran's military capabilities have not changed compared to before.
UAE shuttle oil tanker
The introduction of a network of shuttle oil tankers has made it possible to travel between Gulf ports and cargo transfer points outside the sea routes. These ships deliver oil to other oil tankers off the Strait of Hormuz, which travel long distances to consumer markets.
Kepler has identified at least 63 very large oil tankers in this network. Of these, 35 visit regularly, approximately once every 16 days. More than 70 percent of the crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz in August was transferred from one ship to another near Fujairah.
Explaining the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Azizi emphasized the role of the UAE government in accepting some of the risks of business.
Despite the awareness of the existing risks, this support continued and efforts were made to improve the situation of crude oil exports.
Hamidreza Azizi says about this, "The combination of UAE economic initiatives and US military and operational actions has complicated Iran's strategy of creating a barrier in Hormuz."
But given the specific circumstances and the presence of multiple parties facing different types of problems in this situation, new initiatives have not been able to provide solutions for all of them.
Who was paying the expenses of this movement?
Transferring cargo to other ships, arranging oil tankers and providing military support have increased the costs of regional trade. Some part of this is being paid by governments and exporting companies.
To assess the sustainability of these systems, it is also important to know how much income is being saved despite these costs.
To increase exports to Iraq, heavy discounts have been given to buyers who take delivery of Iraqi oil in the Gulf. Iraq's state oil marketing company has offered Basrah Medium for October cargo at $34.5 and Basrah Heavy at $37 below market benchmarks, according to documents seen by Bloomberg.
According to Kpler data, Iraq's exports reached at least 2.6 million barrels per day in September. Therefore, the heavy discounting given has been accompanied by increased sales and shows that maintaining export volumes does not necessarily mean maintaining earnings per barrel.
"The costs that are paid in the form of rebates or to cover the risk in the case of the UAE are difficult to sustain in the long run. The cost of military support is an issue for the US as well," Azizi says, referring to the cost of maintaining exports.
Martin Kelly also emphasizes that the question remains how long these shuttles will remain operational, especially as they continue to be attacked.
It is not yet clear at what point financial and operational pressures will make it difficult for the respective governments to continue these arrangements.
When can we say that normalcy will return?
However, the increase in traffic in September has been notable.
Kepler's estimates show that the movement of ships carrying LNG, LPG, petrochemical products and petroleum products has also reduced significantly compared to before the war.
In a seven-day average ending September 28, Kepler recorded approximately 13.5 million barrels of crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz per day, roughly equal to pre-war levels.
During the same period, the volume of the petroleum products group was about 81 percent below that level.
The difference in the status of crude oil and other cargo further complicates assessment of the situation in Hormuz.
On September 28, news agency Reuters reported an increase in the movement of ships bound to Qatar, but the situation of imports of gas, fertilizers and regional countries is not reflected in the crude oil data.
Apart from the situation of gas and chemicals, the issue of imports from regional countries has also not been resolved and at least at the moment there does not seem to be any mechanism to solve this problem.
The supply of goods via sea route is also important for the regional countries and the increase in crude oil exports does not give a complete picture of the situation of the ships that have to enter the Gulf.
Assessing the current balance, Simon Henderson, a researcher at the Washington Institute and an analyst of Gulf affairs, told BBC Persian, "The United States currently has the largest military power in the Gulf and is facing the threat from Iran very well."
"It has been successful in taking a large amount of oil out of the Gulf through the Southern Corridor, which is close to Oman. So it is right to think that Iran is in a weak position and the US is in a strong position. But as we have learned from experience, no one knows how long this situation will last."
With the increase in crude oil exports and the ongoing sanctions on Iran's exports, Iran faces serious trouble in implementing its threat to stop exports to other countries.
The US and regional countries have been successful in maintaining a portion of trade despite insecurity.
However, the gap between exports of petroleum products and pre-war levels and uncertainty over the status of imports show that this improvement has not extended to all trading activities in Hormuz.
To conclude about the weakening of Iran's means of pressure, it has to be seen how long this movement continues at what cost and with what kind of support.
Continuing these movements is dependent on military support and acceptance of additional costs.
Available data cannot give an accurate estimate of how long or to what extent these costs can be borne.
Moreover, even the increase in crude oil exports is not enough to declare the end of Iran's capacity to exert pressure.
A part of this pressure may remain in the costs that the governments of the other side are paying to continue trade. But there is no clear answer to the question of whether this cost will ultimately influence their political decisions.
Why has the price of oil not fallen yet?
Although according to Kpler data, crude oil exports have returned to pre-war levels, this does not mean that the market has also returned to normalcy.
The second reason is the huge decline in reserves. Since the start of the war, more than 500 million barrels of oil have been used from the world's oil reserves and during this period China's purchases have also increased again. Due to this, the margin of safety in the market has reduced.
Third, exports of petroleum products like diesel and jet fuel are still well below normal levels. That is, mere return of crude oil exports does not mean normalization of the entire supply chain.
And fourth, this export continues to involve greater cost and complexity. This includes high fares on oil tankers, transfer of oil from one ship to another, alternative routes and security measures.
Therefore, increasing the movement of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz alone is not enough to reduce the price of oil. The market is still pricing in the risk of another supply disruption, dwindling reserves and higher costs of transporting oil.
