China rejects “baseless” allegations that it spied on Nvidia CEO

On Monday, China rejected allegations that it spied on Jensen Huang, CEO of the American chip giant NVIDIA, describing those allegations as “baseless.”

“We have responded to this matter previously,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiaqun said in a regular press briefing, after the company’s board of directors announced that it had opened an investigation into media reports alleging the existence of a “foreign intelligence effort.” “The story of the so-called Chinese spy is a distortion and slander that has absolutely no basis,” according to Agence France-Presse.

On Sunday, Nvidia announced the opening of an investigation into its CEO and one of its founders, Jensen Huang, after he admitted, before the company’s board of directors, to having an intimate relationship with an executive who US intelligence services concluded was a spy working for China, according to the New York Times.

Huang's relationship with the woman, named Alice Huang, became a matter of concern to the US government, after surveillance operations revealed that she was transmitting information directly to Beijing.

This revelation raised disturbing questions. Given that Huang is considered one of the most prominent figures influential in the artificial intelligence revolution, in addition to being an influential ally of US President Donald Trump.

In a letter to the company, Huang apologized, saying: “I cheated on my wife. My actions hurt her and our children. “There is no excuse for what I did, and I am deeply sorry.”

Nvidia's board of directors said that "there is no reason to believe that national security or Nvidia's secrets have been compromised," but stressed that "the board's investigation will examine all available information." He added that Huang “fully supports the review and has pledged to cooperate with it.”

The board of directors explained that Huang, 63, will continue to lead the company during the investigation period.

As one of the founders of NVIDIA, Huang established a unique management structure within the company, allowing him to control all aspects of its business, with his direct supervision of about 60 officials who report to him.

John Rizzo, a company spokesman, said: “Today’s news will not slow down Nvidia’s business.” Jensen is committed to continuing to lead the company as CEO without interruption.”

The New York Times reported last month that US intelligence services discovered that Huang had established a close relationship with a Chinese citizen who works in buying electronic chips, and US officials concluded that she was collecting intelligence information for Beijing.

This official is known as Alice Huang, or Huang Li, and her biography indicates that she worked as a television reporter in China before becoming a senior executive at a data center company based in Singapore, which turned into one of Nvidia's largest clients in Southeast Asia.

The company purchased electronic chips worth more than $4.8 billion over the past two years.

NVIDIA continued its business dealings with Huang's company, Megaspeed, even after the New York Times revealed last year that the US Commerce Department was investigating the company's possible assistance to China in smuggling artificial intelligence chips subject to export restrictions.

Jensen Huang and Alice Huang are not related to each other.

Nvidia and Huang had initially confirmed that there was nothing disturbing or unusual in his relationship with the Chinese official.

In an interview with Bloomberg last month, Huang said that his communication with Alice Huang was “related to Megaspeed, was completely normal and did not involve anything unusual.”

Threats to the global economy are no longer limited to slow growth, rising prices, or the accumulation of debt; Rather, it lies in the interaction of these crises, the most dangerous of which is debt, in an international environment in which conflicts are escalating, alliances are changing, and competition for energy, resources, and capital is intensifying.

It must be emphasized that the debt crisis does not start with wars, even if these are capable of accelerating it. Its roots go back to years of increased borrowing, rising financing costs, and increasing public liabilities. What makes the current stage more dangerous is that countries need to borrow to confront the repercussions of crises, while the shocks themselves raise the cost of borrowing and weaken the ability to repay.

The public debt (both internal and external) of developing countries reached about $35 trillion in 2025, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), while the interest burden has risen to alarming levels. The United Nations Development Program reports that the average developing country spends about 9.5 percent of its government revenues on interest, the highest percentage in a quarter century.

However, the problem does not lie in the size of the debt alone; But also in the cost of its service and the conditions for refinancing it. Countries that borrowed when interest rates were low now find themselves facing new entitlements with harsher terms, while their revenues are not growing fast enough to keep up with the burdens. A country with the ability to repay in the long term may face a severe liquidity crisis if it is unable to renew or reschedule its debts.

This issue acquires a geopolitical dimension when the need for financing becomes a factor influencing countries' foreign choices. The narrower the financial alternatives, the more important relations with creditors, international institutions, and countries capable of providing loans and investments become. Thus, debt is no longer just a financial obligation; Rather, it may be called a factor that limits the margin of political and economic maneuvering, especially in countries that rely on limited external sources of financing. In contrast, the political influence of financially capable countries increases.

It goes without saying that incapable countries face great risks, especially if they are located in tense regions or witnessing conflicts, especially since restructuring debts with private sector creditors may take years, prolonging the period of uncertainty and delaying the return of investment and growth.

The dangers multiply when financing crises coincide with turmoil in energy markets, which constitute the backbone of the global economy. Any sustained increase in energy prices leads to higher production, transportation and food costs. Importing countries find themselves facing a larger external bill, pressure on their currencies, and an additional need for financing.

As for central banks, they face a very difficult equation. If interest rates are kept high to combat inflation, the cost of borrowing for governments, companies, and households increases; If you lower them quickly, you could face a new wave of inflationary pressures caused by an imbalance between supply and demand, as well as the possibility of a decline in the value of the currency.

Thus, any geopolitical shock is transmitted from energy markets to monetary policy, and from there to bond markets and public budgets.

This “trap” is not limited to developing countries; Rising financing needs in major economies and increased defense spending are forcing governments to compete for global savings. For example, the public debt of Ukraine, which is mired in war, is more than $212 billion, while the debt of its rival, Russia, is more than $491 billion. The 27 European Union countries will spend about 454 billion euros (or 2.4 percent of GDP) in 2026, according to the European Defense Agency.

If we add to this that giant technology companies, especially those working in the field of artificial intelligence, resort to debt markets to finance huge investments in data centers and digital infrastructure, the cost of financing for smaller and more fragile borrowers may rise.

Thus, the arms race and technological investment, which are tools for enhancing strategic power, may narrow the financial space available to countries that need to finance development, basic services, and infrastructure.

It should be noted that the international community is not starting from scratch in confronting these challenges. The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which was held in the Spanish city of Seville in 2025, made it possible to advance initiatives aimed at improving debt management and expanding the ability of debtor countries to confront shocks. These initiatives include suspending payments in the event of disasters or crises, debt swaps for development financing, and facilitating debt restructuring.

These tools gain great importance in a world where climate, military, and financial risks intersect. Suspending payments may give a country affected by an exceptional shock an opportunity to direct its resources towards responding to the emergency, rather than depleting them in debt service. Debt swaps can also link burden relief to financing development projects. Such as developing renewable energy, improving education and health, and modernizing infrastructure.

However, the effectiveness of these initiatives depends on the speed of their implementation and the willingness of creditors to participate in them. Countries facing severe pressures cannot wait years for reforms to turn into practical mechanisms. Therefore, there is a need to expand the scope of concessional financing provided by development banks, strengthen financial guarantees, and establish mechanisms for rapid response to crises.

In this context, in September 2026, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank agreed on reforms within the framework of assessing debt sustainability in poor countries. Include improved analysis of local and long-term risks. It is expected that the amended framework will be implemented in the second half of 2027.

Governments may resort to spending cuts to contain deficits, but austerity alone does not guarantee debt sustainability. Reducing investment in infrastructure, education, and health may relieve financial pressure temporarily, but it weakens productivity, growth, and future revenues. The decline in services and the decline in job opportunities may exacerbate social tensions and deepen political instability that even elections cannot end.

Thus, what is required is a combination of financial discipline and productive investment, improving the management of domestic and external debts, and reducing the risks of exchange rate fluctuations and refinancing that may keep countries in a continuous cycle of debt (Argentina is a clear example). At the international level, the most fragile countries should be given the opportunity to finance development without falling back into the debt trap.

Ultimately, the global debt crisis cannot be separated from the geopolitical shifts that are redrawing the map of international interests. Wars raise the cost of energy, strategic competition increases military spending, and rising interest rates narrow financial options, while governments and companies compete for sources of financing.

The real danger does not lie in the failure of one country; Rather, there are simultaneous financing crises in a large number of countries, transforming financial pressures into a crisis of development and stability. When the cost of servicing debt rises to levels that hinder investment, the issue goes beyond the limits of budgets and numbers, becoming a test of the ability of the global economic system to reconcile the interests of the major powers with the right of the less wealthy countries to grow, stabilize, and live in peace.