Since the official launch of the central work safety inspection inspections in the second and third quarters, the overt and covert inspections have become stronger and more stringent than before. For the first time, special inspections on regulatory and law enforcement issues have also been carried out. Road transportation of dangerous goods is an industry with high risks. Therefore, the country has formulated strict standards and regulations to prevent major production safety accidents from the source. However, the inspection team found in some places that there are overloading of dangerous goods, falsification of equipment inspection reports, loopholes in the electronic waybill management system and other problems, which require great attention.
Jingbian County Xingda Comprehensive Development Co., Ltd. is located in Yulin City, Shaanxi Province. It is a company mainly transporting crude oil and has more than 60 tank trucks. In mid-June, when the reporter followed the central production safety inspection inspection team here, he initially found no problems. However, after logging into the backend electronic waybill system, I found that the tanker truck's ledger was not reasonable: from January 1, 2024 to June 18, 2026, the tonnage utilization rate was all 68.3%.
Yuan Yulu, legal representative of Jingbian County Xingda Comprehensive Development Co., Ltd.: If it is full, it exceeds the limit. According to the number of cubic meters, it may be 20 tons.
The tonnage utilization rate of 68.3% means that the tanker truck only contains about two-thirds of the crude oil in the tank. It does make sense to load less in order to avoid overloading, but wasting a large amount of transport capacity for a long time is not in line with business logic. So how many do they actually pack? The inspection team asked to see the actual delivery note.
At the request of the inspection team, the person in charge of the company could only produce a few real waybills. The invoice was issued by an oil field, and Xingda transported oil for them. After a comparison, the problem was indeed discovered. Take the tank truck with tail number 3943 as an example. Its factory report states that the approved load capacity is 14 tons, but the bill shows that it has pulled 22.14 tons, which is 58% overloaded. Subsequently, the inspection team inspected tank trucks with license plate numbers ending in 6163, 6782, and 7684, and found that all were overloaded, with the overload range ranging from 42% to 58%.
Oil tank trucks are closed tanks, so why are they so overweight? Taking the tank truck with the tail number 3943 as an example, how can a tank with a load capacity of 14 tons hold 22 tons of crude oil? After many efforts, the reporter found a surveillance video accidentally captured on the day of the inspection on June 18. It was found that the license plate numbers of the two tank trucks were the same, 3943. One was running on the road and the other was under inspection. However, the shape of the two tanks, the length of the reflective strips, and the position of the flammable logo were different. Obviously this is not the same tank at all. Whether this is suspected of illegal replacement of the tank remains to be further investigated by the relevant departments.
Reporter: “Approximately how many tons do you ship every month?”
Yuan Yulu: "A total of more than 20,000 tons per month."
Reporter: "When did you start shipping goods?"
Yuan Yulu: "We are in 2010."
Reporter: "It's been 16 years. Do you know about the overloading issue?"
Yuan Yulu: "Clear."
Reporter: "Then how do you explain this?"
Yuan Yulu: "We will make rectifications immediately."
Experts say that dangerous trucks are much more serious than ordinary trucks. Once they are overloaded, the consequences are much more serious and can easily lead to major safety accidents.
Wang Jinrong, an expert from the Central Production Safety Assessment and Inspection Team: Once the media and cargo inside leak out, causing combustion and explosion, and even highly toxic drugs, it will be very harmful to society. Therefore, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Emergency Management, and the Ministry of Public Security give top priority to the management of dangerous goods transport vehicles.
So why was Xingda's overloading problem not discovered in time? In early September, the Central Production Safety Assessment and Inspection Team returned to Jingbian County for another in-depth investigation. The investigation found that the main reason was the failure of four links. Take the tank truck with the tail number 3943 as an example to see how it passed these four levels.
First, the audit of the source filling process failed. When this vehicle went to the oil station to load oil, the oil station should check its approved load capacity, which was 14 tons, but in fact it was loaded with 22 tons. This obviously violates the provisions of Article 29 of the "Measures for the Safety Management of Road Transport of Dangerous Goods", which states that "the goods loaded shall not exceed the approved load capacity of the transport vehicle." Obviously, the oil production station failed to fulfill its relevant responsibilities.
The second level is that the transportation company did not fill in the waybill truthfully. In our country, if dangerous goods are to be transported on the road, they must first obtain a paper or electronic waybill, and strictly implement the "one vehicle, one trip, one order" system. The waybill for the tanker with tail number 3943 was filled in by the carrier, Xingda Company.
It was clear that 22 tons of cargo had been hauled, but in order to obtain the electronic waybill, only 12 tons were filled in. In this regard, Xingda Company obviously neglected management and lax auditing. In this way, the tank truck with tail number 3943 passed the second level and reached the third level: the electronic waybill system. What is an electronic waybill system?
Chen Yu, Director of the Freight Division of the Shaanxi Provincial Road Transport Development Center: It can mainly reflect the information of people, vehicles and goods of the shipper and carrier, the category information of the transported goods, the transportation route information, and the trajectory display of the vehicle during operation.
The state promotes the construction of electronic waybill systems in various places, with the purpose of dynamically supervising the entire chain of road transportation of dangerous goods. However, the Shaanxi electronic waybill system is not connected to the source weighbridge of the oil production station and cannot obtain real front-end information. Therefore, it can only enter and retain information, but cannot verify the information, and naturally cannot detect overloading.
Chen Yu: We are just a data reporting system and cannot detect over-limit and overloading because the ministry did not have this function when designing the electronic waybill system. Over-limit and overloading can only be revealed through road inspections and source loading.
In some places in my country, in order to plug this loophole, local regulations have been passed to force dangerous goods handling companies to connect electronic weighbridges to the supervision platform, and then automatically compare them with the weight declared by the electronic waybill to form a closed-loop early warning. Shaanxi is missing this key link.
Finally, the fourth level - road inspection. Can the traffic control department responsible for road inspection detect that it is overloaded? The answer is difficult. First of all, there are a lot of dangerous trucks. As of the end of 2025, there were nearly 25,000 road dangerous goods transport vehicles registered in Shaanxi Province, with more than 2,000 in Jingbian alone. Secondly, the traffic control department only conducts spot checks on suspicious vehicles, and Xingda operates mostly in remote areas, so it is able to carry overloaded vehicles for a long time.
It is precisely because the shipper releases the goods, the carrier conceals the report, the waybill system only retains it without verification, and the road surface is only randomly inspected, etc., the overloading problem is difficult to detect.
Chen Yu: Later, we will remedy the shortcomings through upgrading and transformation.
In addition to overloading of dangerous goods transportation, this time the Central Safety Production Assessment Inspection Team also discovered a shocking problem of falsification of dangerous goods inspection reports. According to regulations, the body of a dangerous truck must be inspected every year, and the tank must be inspected every two years. The inspection is completed by a professional agency and an inspection report is issued. This is an important measure to ensure the safety of the vehicle on the road. The inspection of dangerous trucks is much more stringent than that of ordinary trucks. There are dozens of inspection items, and the vehicle technical level must reach Level 1 before it can be operated.
In early April this year, when the inspection team went to Guizhou Qiannan Fengmao Logistics Co., Ltd. to inspect, they found that the inspection reports on the metal atmospheric tanks of two dangerous goods tank trucks provided by this company were suspicious.
Wang Jinrong: During the review, we found that the inspection agency of the tank was a company in Fujian (Shuo Shengyuan). At that time, we asked the person in charge of the company, when did this vehicle go to Fujian? The person in charge of Fengmao Logistics was speechless and couldn't explain clearly. Later, we checked the vehicle's trajectory and found that the vehicle had never been to Fujian from January to April this year. In the end, the main person in charge of the company told the truth. He bought a false report and the vehicle was not inspected.
On the day of the inspection, the Guizhou Transportation Department launched an investigation into Fengmao Logistics based on the clues provided by the inspection inspection team. The investigation found that none of the 84 inspection reports submitted by Fengmao Logistics had been actually inspected, but the authenticity of the reports issued was difficult to distinguish.
Wang Jinrong: The contents of the QR code, anti-counterfeiting code, and seal are all authentic, but there is no actual inspection, so the authenticity cannot be checked from the report.
The State Council Safety Committee Office handed over this issue to the Fujian Provincial People's Government for further verification. On May 6, the Fujian Provincial Market Supervision and Administration Department launched an investigation into Fujian Shuoshengyuan Inspection Technology Service Co., Ltd., which provides tank inspection and testing services, and verified a total of 91 problematic inspection reports.
Zhou Yanfang, Chief of the Policy and Regulation Section of the Market Supervision and Administration Bureau of Fujian Minhou County: Our investigation found three points. First, the inspection personnel of Shuo Shengyuan Company did not actually arrive at the site and did not actually carry out the inspection; second, the inspection equipment required by Shuo Shengyuan Company was not used during the inspection project; third, the original inspection records of Shuo Shengyuan Company were fabricated and forged afterwards.
So, how did these 91 false reports get into the hands of Guizhou Fengmao Logistics? The investigation found that on January 9, 2025, Fujian Shuoshengyuan Testing Technology Service Co., Ltd. signed a power of attorney with Zhang, an unqualified external person. Zhang helped Shuo Shengyuan recruit vehicle inspection business, and Shuo Shengyuan issued an inspection report for Zhang and paid a certain fee. The regular tank inspection business of Guizhou Fengmao Logistics was completed by Zhang and Shuo Shengyuan.
Zhou Yanfang: Between January 2025 and April 2026, the party involved (Shuo Shengyuan Company) did not send personnel to the site or conduct an on-site inspection. It directly received the data provided by Zhang and provided 91 periodic inspection reports for the tanks of 74 dangerous goods transport vehicles of Guizhou Fengmao Logistics.
Experts say that tank trucks containing dangerous goods that have been on the road for a long time based on false reports are extremely harmful.
Wang Jinrong: If you issue an unqualified report, first of all, you cannot guarantee that the tank meets the quality and safety requirements. In fact, it is a false report. Inflammable and explosive leaks may occur during operation, and if not handled in time, it may lead to major accidents.
In the end, the Fujian market supervision department determined that Fujian Shuo Shengyuan’s actions not only constituted an illegal act of issuing false inspection reports for dangerous trucks, but were also suspected of violating criminal law.
Zhou Yanfang: After investigation, the illegal gains totaled 151,200 yuan, which was suspected of constituting the crime of providing false certification documents. On June 15, 2026, our bureau transferred the case to the public security organs in accordance with the law, achieving an effective connection between administrative law enforcement and criminal justice.
In addition to Guizhou and Fujian, the inspection and inspection team also discovered the issuance of false inspection reports in Shandong, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Heilongjiang and other places, which deserves high vigilance.
Wang Jinrong: "It is necessary to attract the attention of relevant national departments, because dangerous goods transport vehicle accidents are prone to occur frequently. First of all, we must further make up for the shortcomings in policy, especially to form a comprehensive management. For example, transportation, market supervision, emergency management, and public security departments must join forces to strengthen the joint construction of law enforcement mechanisms."
The problems reflected in the program are not unique in this central safety production assessment inspection. The transportation of dangerous goods is a matter of public safety and cannot be left to chance. Whether companies take advantage of system vulnerabilities to falsely fill in reports, are overloaded on the road for a long time, or testing agencies issue false inspection reports, they are all touching the red line of public safety. Failure in any link of dangerous goods transportation may lead to vicious accidents. In response to the various safety hazards identified, relevant departments have required all localities to strictly investigate and deal with them, supervise the completion of regulatory shortcomings, consolidate the safety responsibilities of all parties, and firmly maintain the bottom line of safe production in the transportation of dangerous goods.
