Two Egyptian army officers were killed in a campaign to combat gold mining on the southern border
The army controls Kazkel and Abu Qaoud in North Kordofan, and the Rapid Support controls Al-Kili in the Blue Nile, amid Ethiopian statements about the dam and the Red Sea and Egyptian rejection.
Quick Look
- The states of Kordofan and Blue Nile in Sudan witnessed simultaneous field developments, as the army took control of Kazkel and Abu Qaud, while the Rapid Support Forces took control of Al-Kili.
- Meanwhile, the Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy demanded that Egypt contribute to building new dams and obtaining a sea port, which Cairo rejected and considered blackmail that affected national security.
AI-generated summary
Why It Matters
The states of Kordofan and Blue Nile in Sudan are witnessing an armed conflict between the army, the Rapid Support Forces, and the Popular Movement, with shifting control over cities and strategic areas. On the other hand, Egypt and Ethiopia face disagreements over the Renaissance Dam and Ethiopia’s demands for a sea port through Somalia, with Egyptian and Sudanese refusal and solidarity with Somalia.
The Kordofan and Blue Nile regions in Sudan witnessed simultaneous field developments, as sources reported that the army and its allied forces took control of the Kazkel and Abu Qoud regions in North Kordofan, in exchange for the Rapid Support Forces’ control of the town of Al-Kili in the Blue Nile region.
Platforms loyal to the army reported that its forces entered the two towns located on the road leading to South Kordofan, after the Rapid Support Forces withdrew from them without clashes, while it was not possible to verify the full scope of the new military deployment or determine the circumstances of the withdrawal.
The announcement by the army and its allies in West Kordofan came a day after it announced its control of the town of Umm Marahik two days ago in northwest Kordofan, which Anadolu Agency attributed to Muhammad Didan, whom it identified as the spokesman for the Special Action Forces in the Kordofan region, and that he confirmed control of the region after battles against the Rapid Support Forces, while fighters from the army and the joint force supporting it published clips that they said documented their entry into the town.
Dedan said, in a testimony circulated on social media platforms, on Wednesday, that the army, the joint force, and the formations supporting it carried out, within 48 hours, combing operations that included more than 35 villages and sites, and they reached the outskirts of the town of Ayal Bakhit. He explained that the operations resulted in the seizure of dozens of vehicles and the capture of a number of members of the Rapid Support Forces.
The city of Al-Obeid
These movements are located within a front extending west and north of the city of El Obeid, towards the western border of the Kordofan region. The army had expanded its control in North Kordofan during the past months, by reclaiming the cities of Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh, Soudari, and Al-Mazroub, in addition to sites on the land roads linking them, most notably the road linking Omdurman, in the capital, Khartoum, and El-Obeid, the largest city in the Kordofan region.
The army maintained its control over the city of Al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, and recovered the cities of Umm Rawaba and Al-Rahad, in addition to cities and sites in the north and east of the state.
The Rapid Support Forces were stationed in locations west and south of the city of El Obeid, including the Kazkel and Abu Qoud axes, before new reports were received about the army’s entry into them.
In West Kordofan State, the Rapid Support Forces are still imposing their control over most of the major cities, including Al-Fula, Al-Nahud, Al-Muglad, Abu Zabd, and Al-Khawi, while the army’s recent military movements are focused on axes extending into the state, starting from North Kordofan.
As for South Kordofan, areas of influence are divided between the army and the “People’s Movement” led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, in addition to groups allied with the “Rapid Support Forces.” While the army controls the cities of Kadugli, Dilling, Abu Jubaiha, Talodi, Habila and surrounding areas, the “SPLM” controls the town of Kauda and large areas of the Nuba Mountains, while the “Rapid Support Forces” control the city of Al-Dabaibat, and are deployed in a number of other locations and areas in the state.
The vicinity of Dilling, the second city of the state, witnessed new operations during the past days, as military sources reported that the army had taken control of Khor Warl, southeast of the city, and military elements published clips that they said documented entering the area, in conjunction with artillery shelling and an exchange of fire around the city.
Blue Nile Region
In the Blue Nile region, the Rapid Support Forces announced the recapture of the Bakori area, and platforms loyal to them said they were advancing towards the town of Dandro, a day after the army announced that it had repelled an attack on the town, which it had regained on October 22, after the Rapid Support Forces and the Popular Movement took control of it last August.
These developments preceded the control of these same forces over the strategic town of Sali on Tuesday, and video clips showed fighters inside the town.
The cities of Kurmuk and Qaisan and the town of Sarkum remained under the control of the Rapid Support Forces and the People's Movement, with the army maintaining positions close to these areas, while the People's Movement maintained its control over the town of Yabus, one of its strongholds near the borders with Ethiopia and the Republic of South Sudan.
In Bao Governorate, reports indicate that the Rapid Support Forces and the Popular Movement control the town of Malkin, while the army and its allies repelled an attack on the towns of the Silk during the past January and February.
The cities of Al-Damazin, Al-Rusairs, Wad Al-Mahi, and Al-Tadamon remain within government control, although Al-Damazin was subjected to intense attacks by drones during Tuesday night and early Wednesday.
Local reports stated that these attacks left civilians dead and wounded, and damaged homes, while Al-Damazin and Al-Rusairs continued to receive thousands of families fleeing the fighting areas in the region.
At a time when Ethiopia reached an understanding with Egypt regarding the waters of the Nile, on the condition that the latter helps it obtain a sea outlet, an Egyptian official source told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Cairo does not deal with such conversations,” stressing his country’s firm position, which it expressed in the recent quadripartite meeting between the foreign and water ministers of Egypt and Sudan, rejecting “any maritime access for any country that does not border the Red Sea at the expense of the sovereignty of the riparian countries.” And its unity and the integrity of its lands and ports.”
Last Monday, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Irrigation of Egypt and Sudan, Badr Abdel Ati and Hani Sweilem from Egypt, and Mohieldin Salem and Ismat Qureshi from Sudan, held a meeting in Cairo to discuss ways to develop relations in various political, economic, water, cultural, social and humanitarian fields.
The two sides stressed “the interconnectedness of Sudanese and Egyptian water security as one indivisible body,” and agreed on the necessity of defending the water security of the two countries downstream of the Nile River. The two sides also agreed that the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam “has serious consequences and represents a continuing threat to the two states downstream of the Nile River,” and called on Ethiopia to change its unilateral policy and restore cooperation. Regarding the Red Sea, Egypt and Sudan stressed during the quadripartite meeting “the necessity of respecting the principle of freedom of navigation,” and that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of its riparian countries in accordance with the rules of international law. The two countries also stressed their complete rejection of any maritime access for any country not riparian to the Red Sea at the expense of the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of their territories and ports, and the rejection of any attempts to exploit the regional situation to militarize the Red Sea or take unilateral measures that affect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of the region. However, the Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy, Habtamu Etefa, called on Egypt to contribute to the construction of new dams that his country intends to establish on the tributaries of the Nile, calling on Cairo to support Addis Ababa’s efforts to obtain a sea outlet, considering that this may open the door to understandings regarding the Nile’s waters. The minister said, in video statements on Thursday, that “Egypt must contribute positively to achieving our development projects, and also contribute to the construction of the new dams that we are building.” He explained that his country's current priority is no longer focused on dams, after the completion of the construction of the Renaissance Dam, but rather on achieving the goal of obtaining a sea outlet by peaceful means. He added: “Egypt must stop launching media campaigns against Ethiopia,” stressing that these campaigns will not prevent the achievement of his country’s goals. He continued: “Egypt must contribute to Ethiopia obtaining a sea port, then there will be an opportunity to create an understanding regarding the Nile water issue.” Egyptian Parliament member Mustafa Bakri commented on the statements of the Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy, saying: “This is blackmail and a violation of Egyptian national security and the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait,” adding to Asharq Al-Awsat: “There are 15 African countries that have no access to the sea. If the legitimate authority in Somalia rejects that, the matter will become an assault on the Somali authority that rejects the suspicious agreement between Ethiopia and the separatist region of Somaliland.” Regarding Ethiopia’s offer of an understanding regarding the Renaissance Dam and the Nile waters in exchange for Cairo’s assistance in obtaining the sea port, Bakri explained that “Egypt will not accept blackmail, and the Egyptian position is declared and rejects that, and bartering for the waters of the Nile River is inconsistent with historical rights and international agreements that preserve Egypt’s water rights.” He noted that the Ethiopian minister’s statements “reveal to everyone that Egypt is a difficult number in the equation, and nothing can be done without its will, and Egypt has announced its rejectionist position; Because this affects its national security, but this rejectionist position primarily concerns Somalia.” Negotiations took place between Cairo, Khartoum, and Addis Ababa for nearly a decade regarding the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, then they were frozen for 3 years before resuming in 2023. The negotiations were frozen again in 2024, amid Ethiopia’s refusal to conclude an agreement, and its assertion that it would not harm Egypt or Sudan, the two downstream countries. Landlocked Ethiopia also seeks to reach the Red Sea, and concluded an agreement with Somaliland to obtain a port there, which Somalia rejected, describing it as an invalid agreement. Because it was contracted with a secessionist and illegitimate authority, and Egypt and Sudan stood in solidarity with Somalia in that rejection. For his part, Egyptian national security expert Major General Mohamed Abdel Wahed described the statements of the Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy as “provocative,” and said: “It is an unacceptable show of force, as if he is saying we won the Renaissance Dam issue and did what we wanted, and now we move to the issue of access to the Red Sea.” He explained to Asharq Al-Awsat that “access to the Red Sea via Somaliland is an issue that Somalia rejects; Because it is an assault on its sovereignty and land,” noting that “this speech is directed at the Ethiopian interior and the African continent by portraying that Egypt is the one obstructing development, and it also links the issue of the river with the sea, as if he is saying that the Renaissance Dam has become a fait accompli, and Egypt will not be able to change it and must reach an understanding about it with Addis Ababa in exchange for Ethiopian conditions.”
What to Watch
AI outlook — possibilities, not facts
Military confrontations will continue between the army and the Rapid Support Forces in Kordofan and Blue Nile, with each party attempting to expand its control
Very likely · Within weeks
Egypt will continue to reject Ethiopia's demands regarding the sea port and the Renaissance Dam
Very likely · Within months
Open Questions
- What is the full scope of the new military deployment in Kordofan and Blue Nile?
- What are the circumstances of the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces from Kazkel and Abu Qoud?
- Will Egypt respond to Ethiopia's demands regarding the sea port?
- What are the next steps in the negotiations on the Renaissance Dam?






