Battles renewed between the Sudanese army, supported by the “Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements,” and the “Rapid Support Forces” in the vicinity of the city of Al-Khoi in West Kordofan state. There were conflicting accounts regarding the results of the confrontations that broke out on Friday morning and have continued since then, while it was not possible to independently verify the information circulating regarding the areas of actual control.
The Joint Force said, in a statement published on its official Facebook page, that its forces and the army took control of the town of Sarif Ankush and its surrounding areas, explaining that a field commander for the Rapid Support Forces, whose name was not identified, was killed during the battles.
Platforms loyal to the army attributed to a military source that the army took control of Sarif Ankush, which is about 5 kilometers from Al-Khoei, a matter that was not addressed in the “Joint Force” statement, nor the extent of control over the city itself at the time of writing this news.
For its part, the “Coordination of Resistance Committees” in El Fasher, which are popular committees loyal to the “Joint Force” that became particularly prominent during the fighting around El Fasher, said that the army and the forces supporting it took control of the areas surrounding the city of Al-Khoi, while platforms loyal to the “Rapid Support” said that their forces set up an ambush for the attacking force, and it was not possible to independently verify the account of the ambush, or the toll of recorded losses.
In Al-Nahud locality, the Dar Hamar Emergency Room, a popular group loyal to the army, said that the army destroyed a platform for launching marches near the Fuga area on Friday morning, and claimed that foreigners were operating it.
Friday's battles came after about a week of fighting around Ayal Bakhit, an area belonging to Al-Khawi locality, located near the border between the states of West and North Kordofan. Last week, press reports quoted military sources as saying that the army regained control of the Ayal Bakhit area, while clashes continued around the town and in locations close to it, and media loyal to the army circulated information about the expansion of operations around the cities of Al-Khoei and Al-Nuhd. Al-Khoei, the headquarters of the locality that bears its name, is located in the northeast of West Kordofan state, between Al-Obeid to the east and Al-Nahud to the west. It is located within what is known militarily as the “North Kordofan axis,” while Al-Nahud is located in Dar Hamar. It is considered the historical capital of the homeland of the “Hamr tribes,” and they live there with other population groups. It is famous for raising Hamri sheep and producing gum arabic. In the Blue Nile region bordering Ethiopia; Where fierce battles have been taking place between the army and its allies, the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Forces, for several months, the army said in a statement that its air defenses shot down, on Friday afternoon, an enemy strategic drone, in the Dendro area of Blue Nile State, and that it crossed the border from Ethiopia. On the other hand, at the end of his visit to Sudan, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, Luke Lindbergh, called for an end to the fighting, after he met in the city of Kosti in the White Nile State some families who were displaced by the war and are struggling to feed their children. Lindbergh said in a statement that people who “face acute hunger are today faced with three unfortunate options: rebellion, migration, or death from starvation,” and he urged international, national, and local leaders to work to end the conflict. He added, “We cannot provide people with enough food to cope with a non-stop war.” The program had announced that the lack of funding had forced it to reduce its aid since last September, and that about 900,000 people had lost their food aid in recent months. The Food Program currently reaches a little more than 3 million people in Sudan, and the program said that it urgently needs $520 million to provide food aid to about 5.4 million people until April 2027. The political division in Libya is widening over the feasibility of the United Nations’ move to “expand” the Libyan dialogue, between those who believe that this potential step “will open a door towards resolving the crisis,” and others who consider it “a re-production of a new failure regarding the experiences of dialogues in the country,” and they called for With “international guarantees.” Speculation is increasing about the United Nations mission’s intention to expand the “circle of dialogue” to include different Libyan factions, if the path of the “4+4” committee falters, which includes representatives of the “National Army” in eastern Libya and the “Unity” government in its west, at a time when the same “committee” is preparing to hold a meeting in Tunisia, next Sunday, amid anticipation of what progress it may result in the existing understandings. These speculations came after leaks issued by sources close to the UN mission regarding a trend towards this alternative path, which were reported by local and Arab media. This is the same trend that the UN envoy Hannah Tetteh has always hinted at on several occasions, most recently at the conclusion of a visit to Benghazi, last week. Supporting the expansion of dialogue
In a direction in favor of expanding the dialogue, member of the Supreme Council of State, Abu al-Qasim Qazit, believes that this step “seems to be the option available to the UN mission at the current stage, in light of the faltering paths in place and the failure to reach consensus on resolving the crisis.” In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Qazit said that the chances of the success of the expanded path depend on the presence of real international support and ensuring broad representation of the various Libyan parties, so that participation is not limited to the forces that possess the tools of influence and power on the ground. He stresses the importance of the participation of parties with military and political weight in eastern and western Libya, but warns against their dominance in the dialogue, considering that “the forces that are managing the current scene alone in formulating the settlement would empty the political process of its content, given their responsibility for part of the existing crisis.” This proposal intersects with the position of the Libyan lawyer, Wassim Aburawila, who supports expanding the dialogue, as an entry point to ensuring broader participation of the various spectrums of Libyan society, and the involvement of forces and components that are not limited to the parties involved in the current understandings. However, Aburouila, in statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, stipulates that any expansion be accompanied by “international guarantees, preventing a repeat of the failures of the Skhirat 2015 and Geneva 2020 experiences,” calling for “imposing severe sanctions on political parties that obstruct consensus, including a travel ban to Western countries and the freezing of bank accounts.” At the end of last August, after months of consultations, the “4+4” committee reached understandings regarding the electoral process, which were supported by Libyan and international parties. However, their implementation still faces challenges, related to the positions of political institutions, and disagreements regarding the rules governing the elections and the formation of a unified government. On the other hand, the head of the Libyan Organization for Political Development, Jamal Al-Falah, has reservations about the feasibility of expanding the dialogue, based on previous experiences in the Moroccan city of Skhirat in 2015 and Geneva in Switzerland in 2020. He believes that they contributed to prolonging the transitional period and kept the country inside a “vicious circle” of unimplemented understandings. Al-Falah doubts the willingness of the de facto authorities to participate in a dialogue that leads to power-sharing, saying in statements to Asharq Al-Awsat that the positions of these authorities make reaching a settlement that ends the existing division extremely difficult. Al-Falah proposes an alternative based on launching a comprehensive political dialogue under UN sponsorship, which goes beyond the de facto authorities and includes political forces, civil society institutions, parties and tribal leaders, with the aim of agreeing to form a technocratic government that will lead the country towards elections. According to this vision, the proposed government will work to restore legitimacy, unify state institutions, and create the necessary conditions for holding elections, thus putting an end to the successive transitional stages. Expanding the circle of representation
But the disagreement is not limited to the position on expanding or rejecting participation, but rather extends to the nature of the formula that the dialogue can adopt, the criteria for selecting its members, and the limits of the role of the current “4+4” committee in nominating new participants or consulting on them, according to observers. In this context, political analyst Hossam Fneish believes that “expanding the dialogue should not be reduced to adding new members,” recalling the experience of the structured dialogue in which about 120 members participated, without the broadening of the participation base leading to decisive political consensuses. Fneish points out to Asharq Al-Awsat that Tetteh had previously addressed the limited feasibility of large-scale formulas during meetings with representatives of organizations and political parties, which raises questions about the nature of the possible expansion: Is it limited to adding representatives to the mini-frame, or is it moving towards a different political formula that goes beyond the current dialogue mechanisms?
In this context, another question arises regarding who will be responsible for selecting the participants. It is still unclear whether the members of the “4+4” committee will play a role in nominating new parties or consulting on them, or whether the UN mission will set selection criteria in coordination with the parties concerned. The upcoming Tunis meeting may constitute an opportunity to clarify some of these issues. Fneish does not believe that expanding the circle of representation should be the only goal, calling for the establishment of a technical and advisory track parallel, or integrated with the work of the mini-committee, that includes independent Libyan experts in the economic, financial, oil, legal, constitutional, and governance fields, to prepare practical visions regarding unifying sovereign institutions, restructuring them, and ensuring their independence. An American presidential warning about the “danger” of the Muslim Brotherhood organization came after a series of decisions taken by the Egyptian authorities to include the group on “terrorist lists,” and then to pursue entities and personalities associated with it in Europe. This warning issued by US President Donald Trump “will enhance Cairo’s chances of besieging the organization internally and externally,” according to researchers in the affairs of extremist groups who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat. Trump said, on Thursday evening, in a telephone interview on Salem News Channel, that “the Brotherhood’s threats extend to America and Europe,” and that “the Brotherhood may be more dangerous than the communists at the present time,” considering that “both of them pose a major threat,” in response to a question about which of the two parties is more dangerous. Mounir Adeeb, a researcher on extremist movements and international terrorism, believes that Trump’s warnings “reflect the growing Western awareness of the nature of the threat posed by cross-border organizational networks,” stressing that “the importance of the statements does not lie only in their political intensity, but in their timing and context. It comes in conjunction with American measures targeting specific branches of the organization, which reflects a gradual transition from the warning stage to using legal and financial tools to confront its activities.” Adeeb pointed out that “this development strengthens the Egyptian position, which has long warned of the organization’s cross-border nature and its attempts to employ various institutions and facades to serve its organizational and political goals.” Researcher on “jihadi groups” affairs, Hisham Al-Najjar, said that Trump’s warnings “represent a practical acknowledgment of the validity and accuracy of the proactive vision that the Egyptian state has adopted since 2013,” stressing at the same time that current Western measures are still “partial and limited,” and do not rise to the level of the real threat posed by the cross-border organization. Al-Najjar explained, “The Egyptian movement since 2013, to confront the organization that began dismantling its structure at home and persecuting its entities abroad, was met in its beginnings with Western resistance and unacceptance as a result of previous bets on political Islam movements, before the data changed, and the research and intellectual elites in Europe and the United States, and even from the radical left movements, began to realize the magnitude of the danger threatening Western societies from within.” The first American steps during the Trump era were on November 24, 2025, when the US President signed an executive order in which he directed the Departments of State and the Treasury to study the classification of specific branches of the “Brotherhood” in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, as foreign terrorist organizations or specially designated global terrorists. Indeed, last January, Washington classified the Brotherhood in Egypt, and its branches in Jordan and Lebanon, as “terrorist organizations.” Last March, it was decided to place its branch in Sudan on the same list. Last May, the Trump administration spoke of a “national strategy” to combat terrorism, which focused in essence on the “Brotherhood” organization as the intellectual source of modern “jihadist terrorism.” This American approach was also accompanied by supportive Western decisions, and Argentina decided, at the beginning of this year, to include the Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon on its list of terrorist organizations. On October 8, the European Parliament approved a resolution calling on the member states of the Union to develop a joint strategy to combat the “Brotherhood” networks. Adeeb believes that “Western warnings and movements give the Egyptian movements a wider space to present their vision regarding the necessity of besieging financing networks and external extensions, but they also impose the importance of building international cooperation based on information, evidence and legal procedures, and not on political descriptions alone.” While Al-Najjar stresses that “any Western move, even if partial, contributes to tightening the noose on the organization and strengthens Egyptian efforts.” Trump's statements came days after the Egyptian authorities permanently included the Muslim Brotherhood on the "terrorist list" - based on a final ruling - according to what was published by the "Official Gazette", last Monday, after years of temporary inclusion, in addition to the continued presence of the organization's leaders, led by General Guide Mohamed Badie, inside Egyptian prisons in "cases of violence, terrorism, and murder." The next day, a decision was issued by the Cairo Criminal Court (first instance) to include 35 entities and 36 individuals in Europe on the lists of terrorist entities and terrorists for a period of 5 years. Here, Adeeb believes that “the next stage may witness greater coordination between the United States and European countries in exchanging information, monitoring financial flows, and reviewing entities proven to be linked to prohibited activities, which may narrow the scope of the organization’s movement and increase the cost of its presence and activity in the West.” Al-Najjar warns that achieving an effective international blockade “requires Washington and European capitals moving from partial solutions to comprehensive confrontation, and activating intelligence and security coordination and information exchange, on the basis that the threat (of the Brotherhood) is no longer a regional issue that concerns only the Arab region, but has become a direct threat to global security and stability.”
