Expanding ports, thousands of trucks crossing the Hajar Mountains, new pipelines and a train network linking the Arabian/Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. This is how the UAE is trying to transform its geographical location into an alternative plan for the Strait of Hormuz. As risks continue to threaten navigation in one of the world's most important energy corridors, Fujairah and Khor Fakkan have become more important than ever. However, building a road around Hormuz is one thing, and completely dispensing with it is another.
Dubai, Abu Dhabi and most major ports are located within the Gulf, meaning ships need to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach global markets. But on the other side of the Hajar Mountains are Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, directly overlooking the Gulf of Oman and beyond the strait. This geographical advantage has turned into a strategic card in recent months.
For the UAE, the search for an alternative to Hormuz did not begin with the recent crisis. Investments in roads, railways and pipelines began years ago, but the war has accelerated them significantly.
A report by the German newspaper "Die Zeit" indicates that the ports of the East Coast quickly became an essential part of the UAE's plan to bypass the Strait, in parallel with the construction of new roads, an additional oil line, and the expansion of the railway network.
Since the beginning of the war, crude oil exports through Fujairah have increased by 38 percent, reaching about 1.62 million barrels per day in late March, according to data reported by Reuters.
As for Khor Fakkan, it witnessed a more noticeable transformation. Gulftainer, the company that operates the container terminal, says that the number of imported and exported containers it deals with weekly has increased from about two thousand containers to 50 thousand.
The biggest jump is seen on the roads. Before the war, truck traffic linked to the port was estimated at about 100 trucks per day. Then the number rose to about seven thousand trucks per day.
This means that Khor Fakkan is no longer just a station for transferring containers from one ship to another, but rather has become an important entry point for goods heading to the UAE market, and even to other Gulf countries.
The importance of this plan stems from a simple fact: not all Gulf states are able to circumvent Hormuz. Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain do not have sea ports outside the Gulf. Iraq has limited alternatives, while Saudi Arabia can transport part of its exports via a long pipeline to the Red Sea coast. As for the UAE, it has two large ports on the Gulf of Oman, in addition to a pipeline linking the fields of Abu Dhabi to Fujairah. That is why its eastern ports have also become part of supply routes used by other countries in the region.
But transporting trade to the East Coast does not end with the ship's arrival. Containers arriving in Khor Fakkan must be cleared through customs and then transported to Dubai and Abu Dhabi or to other destinations. With the huge increase in traffic, developing the infrastructure behind the ports has become as important as expanding the ports themselves.
This is why new logistics centres, warehouses and roads are being developed. Gulftainer is working on a logistics center in Al Dhaid, about fifty kilometers from Khor Fakkan, to be connected to the port by land and railway in the future.
The railway network has also become part of this transformation. On June 30, the UAE began operating the first phase of passenger trains between Abu Dhabi and Fujairah, and then on September 30, it opened the Dubai and Al Dhaid stations, practically linking the network to areas of the eastern and western coasts.
As for the freight network, which preceded passenger trains, it is the most important for the logistical plan, because it allows in the future to reduce part of the pressure caused by thousands of trucks.
But the network is not complete yet. Die Zeit's report indicates that the freight line reaches Fujairah, but it does not yet provide the full connectivity required with Khor Fakkan station, which is one of the reasons for continued congestion on the roads.
If containers can be transported by truck and train, oil presents an even greater challenge.
A pipeline runs from the Abu Dhabi fields to Fujairah, and can transport between 1.5 and 1.8 million barrels per day away from Hormuz. This line is what allowed the UAE to continue exporting a large portion of its oil when navigation through the strait faltered, but Abu Dhabi wants to double this capacity.
The UAE is accelerating the implementation of a new line that is scheduled to raise the capacity of transporting oil to the eastern coast to about 3.6 million barrels per day by 2027.
However, there remains a gap. The UAE targets a production capacity of about five million barrels per day. Even after the new line is completed, pipelines alone will not be able to transport all these quantities away from Hormuz.
Here the limits of the “zero dependence on Hormuz” slogan, which the UAE trade policy aspires to, appear.
The crisis also reveals another paradox: as Fujairah and Khor Fakkan become more important, their importance as potential targets also increases.
During the war, facilities in Fujairah were subjected to drone attacks, including an attack that led to a fire and the injury of three workers. Tehran also announced areas that it said were under its maritime control, extending towards the eastern coast of the UAE.
Thus, moving infrastructure out of the Strait of Hormuz does not necessarily mean removing it from danger. Concentrating a larger portion of oil, containers, and transportation networks at two points on the East Coast could even create new vulnerabilities.
The German newspaper "Die Zeit" summarizes this transformation by pointing out that what was considered an extra cost in the era of highly efficient globalization, such as alternative routes and spare capacities, has today become part of any supply chain that seeks to withstand crises.
