The recent explosion in the city of Sarmada in the northern countryside of Idlib highlights the dilemma of weapons depots and the remnants of war that are affecting areas of northwestern Syria.
These explosions have begun to threaten the lives of civilians and undermine stability, amid rising popular and local voices demanding the dismantling of these warehouses, which are disturbing the population, and their transfer outside residential areas.
The number of victims of the explosion that occurred in the city of Sarmada, near the Syrian-Turkish border, north of Idlib, on Wednesday, reached 14 people, and 11 others were injured, according to the Idlib Media Directorate, “which is an infinite toll, as civil defense teams continue to work on researching and dealing with the repercussions of the explosion.”
Civil Defense teams in the Directorate of Emergency and Disaster Management had gone to the site following the explosion, “which according to preliminary data is believed to be linked to munitions in the Burj Al-Nimra area near Sarmada, and began assessing and securing the place, searching for the victims and injured,” according to Civil Defense, “and taking the necessary measures to deal with any possible repercussions.”
While the Syrian Ministry of Defense explained in its comment on the incident that it “resulted from the explosion of a temporary warehouse designated for collecting weapons and war remnants before they were transported,” adding that “the explosion led to the injury of a number of workers in the ministry, and our units are working, in coordination with the competent authorities, to secure the site of the incident.”
According to sources in the Ministry of Defense, the exploded warehouse is a temporary warehouse for collecting unexploded ordnance, mines, and remnants of war collected from the areas of the northern Idlib countryside, in preparation for transporting them to the designated places of explosion or destruction,” noting that “the Ministry began investigations directly, to ensure the absence of outside hands or those involved in the incident, and to leave no room for doubt before taking its legal measures against those responsible for the storage place, which are sanctions and sanctions linked to the results of the investigation.”
However, sources in the Ministry of Defense believe that the explosion “was caused by the explosion of a mine, or ammunition stored inside the warehouse, especially since the waste remained stagnant for years.”
However, the ministry’s justifications and the subsequent steps it takes do not absolve it of responsibility and criticism, according to military experts contacted by Asharq Al-Awsat, in terms of weak safety and storage facilities, and its delay in the process of relocating warehouses and removing weapons and ammunition depots outside civilian areas.
Idlib Governorate in northwestern Syria, which has become a source of weapons and warehouse explosion incidents in northern Syria, witnessed during the last period a series of explosions related to weapons and ammunition depots and their transport operations, including the explosion of a car loaded with ammunition in the center of the city of Binnish, at the beginning of this September, which claimed the lives of five people.
This was preceded by an explosion that occurred in the northern side of the town of Kafr Takharim in the Idlib countryside of a warehouse containing missiles and ammunition, resulting in five casualties and the injury of a number of civilians. Its occurrence was also linked to work being carried out by a workshop near the site.
Last year, a series of similar incidents were also recorded, the most prominent of which was near the western entrance to the city of Idlib, on August 14, 2025, with the explosion of a weapons depot, followed by successive explosions of rocket and shell remnants, which led to four victims and the injury of civilians, according to the Civil Defense.
Additional explosions occurred in the town of Maarat Misrin, which claimed the lives of 11 civilians and injured dozens, in addition to severe damage to property. The town of Al-Foua also witnessed a series of explosions that deepened civilians’ fears about the continued presence of warehouses that were established during the war against Bashar al-Assad’s regime near residential areas.
Military expert, Dhia Qaddour, suggests that the reasons for the recurrence of explosion incidents are that “after 14 years of war and the fall of the regime at the end of 2024, large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and war remnants remained spread out, some from the old regime’s warehouses, and some from former factions, foreign groups, and spoils of battle.”
He emphasizes the attempts of the Syrian government and the Ministry of Defense to address this file and secure these weapons, but “they are still slow and complicated, due to the huge size of the stockpile, the need for a comprehensive survey, and the presence of temporary sites close to residential areas,” suggesting that the reason for the delay in transporting them from civilian areas is “the lack of specialized personnel and equipment.”
Kaddour considers that “the absence of safety components has a major role in the recurrence of explosion incidents, because storage is often in unprotected locations, or near populated areas, without sufficient insulation from heat or sources of ignition, a lack of appropriate equipment, and sometimes non-specialists deal with it, in addition to the high heat in the summer.”
He also refers to locally made weapons, which are ammunition that are not capable of long-term storage, do not have the ability to resist changes, cannot withstand transportation, and are poorly stored, especially since they are “less stable, of varying quality, and heat and humidity accelerate their deterioration, and over time make them more vulnerable to problems.”
In turn, the military expert, Brigadier General Imad Shahoud, did not rule out that Israel had a role in the recent explosion that occurred in Sarmada, “despite the weakness of the evidence and proof, and the occupation government’s failure to adopt the targeting process until now.”
Despite the absence of evidence, “the possibility that the Israeli aircraft squadron entered Syrian airspace in a ‘stealth’ mode and carried out its operation remains present, despite the Israeli government not making a statement yet, but monitoring the flights of Israeli aircraft in the airspace of southern Syria puts it within the possibilities.”
To clarify, he says that the bombing incident coincided with an “intelligence report” of the presence of a large reconnaissance flight of the Israeli 122nd Squadron, consisting of the Nahshon Shavit, the Nahshon Oren and the Gulfstream 550, over the entire Syrian and Lebanese territory, during the hours preceding the explosion.
The joy of Lebanese prisoners and their families was not complete with the adoption of the general amnesty law, as the hopes that thousands of them had placed on the law quickly collided with the decision of the Constitutional Council, which took a decision to suspend its implementation, until the appeal submitted by the representatives of the “Free Patriotic Movement” headed by Representative Gebran Bassil was decided. He reopened the debate on the constitutionality of the law and the soundness of its wording, amid fears that the process would end with it being invalidated and returned to the House of Representatives.
The adoption of the law and its signing by President Joseph Aoun created an atmosphere of relief inside prisons and among the families of detainees and convicts, after those who benefited from it saw in it an opportunity to return to freedom and end years of suffering. However, the suspension of the implementation of the decision dashed this optimism, and placed the fate of the law and those subject to its provisions before a new phase of legal and judicial waiting.
The suspension of the law comes within the framework of considering the appeal submitted before the Constitutional Council, provided that its implementation remains frozen until the final decision is issued. Although the suspension of implementation does not mean that the revocation has been decided, it has reinforced the concern that there are serious constitutional problems in the text that would invalidate it completely, or invalidate articles and clauses whose amendment would require long months before the Lebanese Parliament before it is approved and republished.
There is widespread belief that the Constitutional Council can resort to introducing amendments to the law that will return it to the arena of political conflict again, but a judicial source explained that the Constitutional Council “does not have the authority to amend the law or introduce new articles into it.” He stressed to Asharq Al-Awsat that “it is not permissible for the Constitutional Council to amend the contested law, because its function is limited to monitoring the constitutionality of the laws and approving the invalidation of texts that violate the constitution, in whole or in part, or rejecting the appeal in its entirety.” The judicial source stressed that “it is impossible for the Constitutional Council to replace the legislative authority in drafting or amending laws.”
The suspension of the law is linked to “a defect in the approach adopted by the legislator in determining the scope of the amnesty and the crimes excluded from it,” according to the assessment of legal authorities, which consider this defect to be one of the reasons for suspending the implementation of the law. Legal and constitutional expert, former MP Salah Moukheiber, believes that the Constitutional Council’s decision “constitutes a step that may lead to the invalidation of the law.” While he stressed that the comment “is not considered a final indication of the result that will be issued,” he considered, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that it “contains a negative indication of the possibility of the Council being convinced of the existence of a constitutional violation that requires intervention.”
Mokheiber said, “The main problem is that the law reversed the rule that was adopted in previous amnesty laws, as it made general amnesty the principle, while criminalization or the exception to benefiting from it became the exception.” He pointed out that “previous legislative experiences were based on clearly and explicitly defining the crimes included in the amnesty, and not on granting a broad amnesty and then drawing up a list of crimes excluded from it.”
Suspending the law does not constitute a precedent in the course of the Constitutional Council, which had previously taken such measures before issuing its final decision to accept or reject appeals. However, there is concern among those interested in the general amnesty law about the inconsistency and lack of clarity in many of its clauses and provisions. In Mokheiber’s opinion, the House of Representatives “committed a serious error that led to a defect in the legal structure of the text, which had not been previously adopted in previous amnesty laws,” expecting that the Constitutional Council will tend to “nullify the law and return it to Parliament.” This allows representatives to reformulate it and correct the gaps in it.”
Waiting for the final decision, the prisoners remain in a state of anticipation and anxiety, after the law that seemed for a few moments to be a gateway to freedom has turned into a pending constitutional file. The spokesman for the Lebanese prisoners, Sheikh Omar al-Atrash, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We did not expect the Constitutional Council to seriously consider the appeal submitted by Gebran Bassil’s movement, due to the absence of legal justification to consider it.” He believed that the decision taken by the Constitutional Council to suspend the implementation of the amnesty law until the appeal is decided “raises our fears regarding taking and approving this appeal, especially since the appeal is legally empty and difficult to accept if it is approached with a legal, not a political, background.”
Scattering rice to members of the Lebanese army, distributing sweets to them, and receiving them warmly in the southern city of Nabatieh, after the army intensified its presence and deployment there in the past days, began as scenes that had always seemed far from the traditional scene, in one of Hezbollah’s most prominent strongholds in the south. Does this enthusiasm reflect a change in the general mood within the party environment? Does the deployment of the army represent an opportunity to reconnect the people of the region with the state and its institutions, after years of the party’s dominance over security and military decisions in large areas of the south?
The deployment was also officially welcomed; Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said at the beginning of the Council of Ministers on Thursday: “The calls of our people in Nabatieh, Tire and Arabsalim have reached us. I want to say to them: We have listened to your calls, we are by your side, and we absolutely cannot be far from you. We can only make every effort to remain by your side, help you, and secure all the elements of your steadfastness as much as possible. It is time for the country to return to the South. This is the responsibility of all of us, and this is our duty towards our people. The south is the main part of Lebanon, and every ministry must provide what it has, to confirm that we stand by our people without any negligence.”
The picture of welcoming the army, according to the readings of observers and residents of the region, does not seem that simple. The welcome to the army may be, in large part, an expression of an increasing need for safety and protection, in light of a war that has exhausted the south, rather than an explicit declaration of political transformation or disengagement from Hezbollah. But the mere fact that the army has moved to a position where it is seen as the body capable of providing protection, and receiving its members with this degree of welcome, “may constitute an indicator worth considering in an environment that has long been emotionally and politically linked to the party.”
One of the fruit and vegetable merchants in the city says that the deployment of the army “made us feel a kind of reassurance, because the presence of the army gives us a feeling that Israel may not continue to target us in the same way.” But, at the same time, he expresses fear of repeating a scenario witnessed in other towns in the south, where the army deploys for a period and then withdraws, leaving residents facing an unknown fate.
Al-Tajer said in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, “What we want is not only for him to join the army, but for him to stay.” What is required, in his opinion, is to constantly prove the state’s existence and role, because the population wants an entity “that we know is there by our side, and that we can take refuge in.” He considers that the state today “is facing an actual test to establish its presence and consolidate its role, until people give up other options,” adding: “It is true that many have returned to Nabatieh, but the majority here are not completely reassured, and are still waiting for the state, represented by the army, to prove its ability to protect them.”
For his part, university professor and lawyer Dr. Ali Murad considers that “the situation that the south and the city of Nabatiyeh have reached, and the blockage of the horizon, whether as a result of Hezbollah’s performance or Israeli criminality; What made the city greatly threatened with destruction is what practically led the people there to receive the army warmly, with a sincere expression of their desire to get out of the deadly and destructive stagnation.”
According to Murad, the continuation of the current equation puts the residents of the south in constant danger, especially since “every time (Hezbollah) refuses to withdraw from an area and hand it over to the army and insists on remaining there, this gives the Israeli enemy a justification to destroy it.” Therefore, Murad does not read the people of Nabatieh’s reception of the army as “just a passing position,” but rather sees it as an expression of a desire to strengthen the state’s presence. He added to Asharq Al-Awsat: “People want the army’s presence to be strengthened and to be better than it was before.” “They are looking for a salvation network represented by the state and its institutions.”
Murad places a great responsibility on the state in the next stage, considering that it is required to “strengthen its presence at all levels, especially at the security and military levels within the city of Nabatieh, and all the regions and towns of the south where the Israeli army is not present.” He believes that what is required is for the army to enter these areas “and extend its authority there, by ensuring that they are devoid of weapons.” Otherwise, the south, according to his assessment, will remain “prisoner of the equation of destruction imposed by the Israelis in light of the massive imbalance in the military balance.”
As for the political activist and doctor of psychology at the Lebanese University in Beirut, Mona Fayyad, she believes that the enthusiasm that appeared in Nabatieh does not necessarily mean that the people of the region have decided on their political position on “Hezbollah,” considering that “the warmth that we saw is an attempt to reassure themselves that the presence of the army may prevent Israel from completing the demolition of their homes and occupying their land.” She added: “It seems that the people of the region have reached the conviction that the absence of a state represented by the army, and the presence of Hezbollah alone, which is now withdrawing and not confronting itself because it is unable to defend itself, is a reality that is no longer in their interest at all.”
In a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, Fayyad believes that there is a “change in position,” but adds that it is “not to the level of them frankly declaring that Hezbollah does not represent them.” According to her reading, the residents’ primary concern is “stopping Israeli attacks,” while their political position on the party remains “secondary” at the current stage.
Fayyad points out that the people of the region first want to make sure that the army that has deployed in their areas is “truly capable of protecting them,” and that it will actually carry out the most sensitive mission, which is disarming Hezbollah. She concludes that “completely changing their position requires time, reassurance, and effective performance by the army.”
Hence, the sweets distributed to the soldiers or the rice sprinkled on their vehicles may not be merely passing celebratory scenes. In one of its aspects, it is a message to the state: We want you here, but we want you to stay here as well.
