Mainland Affairs Council: The CCP uses AI and MCN to deepen the digital united front against Taiwan’s youth and operate “China’s maximization”
Scholars point out that Taiwan is the CCP’s highest level of cognitive warfare and a field for testing new methods, which spreads to influence young people through commercial inducements and algorithms.
Quick Look
- The Mainland Affairs Council held an advisory committee meeting and pointed out that the CCP has used AI technology, MCN and algorithms to launch digital united front and cognitive operations against Taiwanese youth in recent years, using the "China maximization" narrative to reduce trust.
- Scholars recommend deepening democratic education and public-private collaboration to respond.
AI-generated summary
Why It Matters
The Mainland Affairs Council held an advisory committee meeting and invited scholars and members to discuss the impact and observations of the Chinese Communist Party’s digital media era on Taiwan’s youth united front propaganda.
The Mainland Affairs Council recently held an advisory committee meeting to discuss the theme of "The Impact and Observation of the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Propaganda on Taiwan's Youth in the Digital Media Era." The Advisory Committee of the Mainland Affairs Council warned that in recent years, with the development of AI technology, false information has evolved into more detailed emotional manipulation and headline washing. By creating the impression that China's development is positive and Western democracies are declining, they manipulate the "China-Maxxing" narrative in an attempt to reduce the satisfaction and trust of Taiwanese youth in the government.
Scholars introduced the report and pointed out that the CCP’s digital united front is no longer limited to traditional propaganda, but has formed a complete content supply chain through commercial outsourcing, multi-channel network (MCN) cooperation, traffic profit sharing and algorithm promotion. The CCP’s digital united front against Taiwan is a standard production line for its cognitive operations against democratic countries. Taiwan is not a special case. Taiwan is the field where the CCP has invested the most in this production line, has the highest standards, and is also responsible for the verification of new methods.
Scholars believe that the CCP’s digital cognitive operations against Taiwanese youth are based on its Taiwan-related and propaganda departments setting strategic topics, delivering content and scripts developed by different private platforms, and spreading them through incentives such as tourism reception, free accommodation, advertising, and business cooperation, using the algorithms of online social platforms. The creators involved may not be based on ideological identity, but may also be driven by network traffic and commercial interests. Such operations may affect Taiwan's youth's attitudes toward national social and public issues and make them less alert to external threats.
Some participating members analyzed that in addition to traditional summer forums and physical exchanges, the CCP’s youth work in Taiwan has shifted significantly to online media platforms to reach young people through customized focus operations. Its information war is centered on "telling Chinese stories well" and is promoted in an asymmetric manner. In recent years, with the development of AI technology, false information has evolved from content that was easily identifiable in the past to more detailed emotional manipulation and headline washing. By creating the impression that mainland China is developing positively and Western democracies are declining, it manipulates the narrative of "China's maximization" in an attempt to reduce Taiwanese youth's satisfaction and trust in the government.
The committee members observed that relevant false information and cognitive operations have caused troubles to the daily lives of the public, for example, they may aggravate negative tendencies such as comparison, anxiety and depression among young people. Taiwan’s experience is not a special case. Many countries are also facing the penetration of Chinese information. It is recommended that relevant government units can remind the risks of using short video platforms, and establish an online platform management mechanism with reference to the European Union, Southeast Asia and other foreign countries, strengthen cooperation with relevant countries, and share experiences in dealing with the CCP’s cognitive operations.
Members participating in the meeting suggested that Taiwan is a democratic and open society. In the face of the CCP’s information manipulation, it should continue to deepen education on democracy, the rule of law and the value of freedom. In addition to reminding the relevant risks, young people should also be allowed to see a more complete and true picture of China’s internal social situation, so that young people can understand its institutional environment and the risks they may face when participating in exchanges.
He suggested that we should continue to combine academic institutions, third-party fact-checking centers and other private resources, quickly disclose relevant information through public-private collaboration, and continue to promote media literacy education to cultivate students' independent thinking skills.
Open Questions
- How will the government specifically establish an online platform management mechanism?
- How to effectively prevent information risks on short video platforms in the future?







