Germany accuses Russia of explosive drone attack on Ukrainian plane in Leipzig

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For months, European intelligence services had been repeating, almost in chorus, that Russia was testing the continent's borders with sabotage, drones and cyberattacks. It was a widely shared hypothesis, but a hypothesis. On Tuesday (1st), the German government took the matter out of this field: it nominally accused Moscow of having sent a drone loaded with explosives against a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig airport, in the early hours of August 4th to 5th, without the explosive detonating. The reaction in Berlin and other capitals, even among those who were already expecting confirmation, was one of shock. It's one thing to fear something in the abstract. Another thing is to see it, suddenly, with the name, date and responsible person appointed by a G7 government.

An escalation in numbers

The German case is the most recent chapter in an escalation that the numbers have been showing for months. A survey by the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), in partnership with the Slovak think tank Globsec, counted 151 cases of sabotage, arson and other actions attributed to Russia in Europe between February 2022 and February this year. Almost half happened in the first half of 2024 alone. Poland leads the list, with 31 cases, followed by France, Lithuania, Germany, the United Kingdom and Estonia. Drones aside, the British International Institute for Strategic Studies has recorded 144 incidents of this specific type in Europe in the last two years, all linked to Moscow.

The fear of the side door

This space already registered, in July, the same alert coming from Vilnius and Warsaw. The difference now is that it came from Berlin, on German soil, from the mouth of the federal government itself. It is this change of address that consolidates, in European capitals, a specific fear: not that of a direct confrontation with NATO, considered unlikely in the short term, but that of an escalation through this side door, made up of provocations small enough to go unpunished, until one of them forces a response that no one planned to give. For analyst Maksym Beznosiuk, from the Carnegie Endowment, this logic should only deepen. Russia's economic and military strain in the fourth year of war, he wrote in July, does not make the Kremlin more cautious: "these pressures are likely to deepen Moscow's dependence on low-cost hybrid warfare," particularly along NATO's eastern flank.

What Europe can do

The practical question is what Europe can do about it. The most lucid response of the week comes from a report by the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations, signed by researcher Ulrike Franke, from the institution's Paris office. It exposes uncomfortable arithmetic: a drone like the one used in Leipzig costs, on average, ten thousand euros; taking it down with a fighter and a guided missile could cost up to a million. In the incursion of around 20 drones that led Poland to invoke NATO Article 4 in September last year, Russia spent less than 250,000 euros. The Western response, between fighter flights and missiles fired, consumed millions.

The problem, writes Franke, is not a lack of initiative. It's a disorganized excess: NATO, the European Commission and national governments move in parallel, sometimes duplicating efforts, without a common system that crosses detection data along the entire eastern border. Poland, more exposed than any other country to the direct border with Russia and Belarus, is also the most vocal about the risk and the quickest to arm itself against it: in January it launched an anti-drone system costing 3.8 billion euros, the largest in Europe, in partnership with the Norwegian Kongsberg, a manufacturer of defense systems. Baltic countries and Finland advance more slowly; Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, even slower, despite Romania already making dozens of incursions this year. Even so, Franke considers, the solution is not just technical: "no reinforcement of European defenses replaces diplomatic, political and military efforts" to end the war and the hybrid actions that accompany it.

The EU's response

It was in this climate that the European Union's foreign ministers met this Wednesday (2) in Wicklow, Ireland, in an informal format known as Gymnich. The bloc's head of foreign policy, Kaja Kallas, said that the Leipzig episode has "all the characteristics of state-sponsored terrorism" and that the issue is part of the discussion on a new package of sanctions, which could hit more than 1,600 targets, including companies and individuals.

The proposal to use the approximately 193 billion euros in Russian assets frozen in the Belgian clearing house Euroclear also returned to the table. This time the request is led by Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain: previously, Belgium's own resistance alone was enough to stop the idea. Informal meetings do not produce decisions — sanctions still require unanimity in the European Council — but the tone of the conversation, like the rest of the week, has changed since Leipzig.

While foreign ministers discussed sanctions, the escalation continued in real time. In Germany, two energy facilities suffered a second act of sabotage within 24 hours, in Bergheim in the west and in Turnow-Preilack in the east, days before the election in Saxony-Anhalt.

In Denmark, the counterintelligence service (PET) warned that Russia recruits 'ordinary Danes' to map access to defense industry facilities. Sanctions take months to come to fruition. Incidents, as this week showed, don't wait that long.

Quote of the week

The gas bill

The war between the United States and Iran, which has heated up again in recent days, accentuates the nervousness that has already been building up in European public bond markets in recent weeks. Natural gas traded on the Dutch reference market (TTF) broke the barrier of 75 euros per megawatt-hour this Wednesday (2), the highest level since the beginning of 2023, before retreating slightly. European stocks remain below the target for winter, and Germany, the continent's largest storager, is at risk of not reaching its own target.

The yield on the ten-year German paper (Bund) reached 3.4% this Wednesday, the highest level since 2011, a direct reflection of the pressure that more expensive energy imposes on central banks.

Behind it all is the impasse in the Gulf. The United States resumed attacks on Iran on Tuesday, and the two parties dispute control of the Strait of Hormuz, the route through which part of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) that reaches Europe passes. With no sign of respite, energy companies are hesitant to buy expensive gas to reinforce stocks, which could be costly in the middle of winter.

On Radar

What to monitor until next Wednesday (9)

September 4 — The United States releases the August jobs report at 8:30 am (New York time). The market was coming off a weak July (a drop of 23 thousand jobs) and the result should weigh on bets on the Federal Reserve's next steps, already under pressure from President Kevin Warsh.

September 6 — Saxony-Anhalt, in eastern Germany, goes to the polls in a regional election. Polls show the AfD (far right) as the favorite, with around 40% of voting intentions — if confirmed, the party could form its first state government since its founding in 2013.

September 8th to 10th — Two conferences mark space week in Europe. In Geneva, UNIDIR, the UN's research arm on disarmament, brings together diplomats and military personnel to discuss preventing an orbital arms race (8-9/9). In Paris, the French government receives around 120 foreign delegations — including heads of state — at the first International Space Summit, with security and defense as one of the four thematic axes (9-10/9).

Off the Agenda