An investigation has revealed that Russian satellites are assisting the Iran-aligned Houthis to strike Saudi Arabia’s military and energy infrastructure, further upending global energy markets amid the US war on Iran.
Hostilities between the internationally recognised Yemeni government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis have been ongoing since July and escalated in September when the rebel group seized full control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast.
Last month, the Houthis also carried out a precision strike on pumping stations on Saudi Arabia’s most important oil pipeline, the East-West pipeline. An investigation by Geneva-based private firm AURORAH GeoSignal Intelligence revealed that Russian satellites had been surveying the region days in advance to gather intelligence about the pipeline.
With fighting for control of Yemen between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government continuing, how significant is Russia’s support to the Houthis? Why can’t Saudi Arabia, the most powerful of the Gulf states that is backed by the US, hold back a group of rebel fighters?
Here’s what we know:
What did the investigation into the use of Russian satellites show?
As revealed by The Associated Press news agency this week, between July 1 and October 19, AURORAH Geosignal Intelligence examined 40 missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia by Yemen’s Houthis and, in every case, found a pattern of Russian government and military satellites observing the targeted areas both before and after the attacks.
Nawaf Obaid, founder of the geosignal intelligence firm, told Al Jazeera that by reconstructing Russia’s military reconnaissance architecture, the group had identified individual satellites, calculated their orbital trajectories and then established observation opportunities and correlated their activity with military developments across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Yemen.
He said the satellites they identified include Russia’s Bars-M military mapping satellites, Persona optical reconnaissance satellites, Lotos-S1 electronic intelligence satellites, Pion-NKS maritime reconnaissance systems and Kondor-FKA radar-imaging satellites. They also examined the EKS/Tundra infrared early-warning constellation.
“The critical finding was not the presence of individual Russian satellites, but the sequencing and integration of their complementary intelligence capabilities,” he said.
Obaid also confirmed to Al Jazeera that based on the findings, “Russian military geospatial and signals intelligence has supported the Iranian-led intelligence architecture assisting Houthi operations in Yemen.”
He said the strongest operational example of this has been the Houthi offensive along Yemen’s western coast towards Bab al-Mandeb, where Russian-derived intelligence, Iranian command integration and local human intelligence all contributed to “the rapid deterioration of opposing Yemeni forces’ battlefield coordination”.
“We assess that this intelligence relationship is also relevant to Houthi missile and drone targeting against Saudi Arabia. Russian military reconnaissance provides capabilities far beyond ordinary commercial satellite imagery, particularly when optical, radar and electronic intelligence are integrated,” he said.
“The September attacks against Saudi Arabia’s East-West Petroline illustrate the sophistication of the targeting problem,” he said. That was when three pumping stations – PS8 at Afif, PS9 at Al-Dhekra and PS11 at Al-Mesba’ah – were struck within the pipeline’s “critical high-elevation western section”.
“Their selection reflected an understanding of the infrastructure’s engineering vulnerabilities and strategic importance,” he explained.
How significant are these findings?
Brussels-based military analyst Elijah Magnier said AURORA’s findings don’t necessarily show the whole picture.
“Inability to intercept an intelligence transmission doesn’t establish who had access to the Russian satellite information, whether Russia deliberately shared it, or whether Iran obtained it independently,” he said, adding that for this, there are four possible scenarios.
“First, Russia could have deliberately shared information with Iran,” he said.
“The second is Iran obtained Russian satellite imagery through commercial channels… However, the Russian military’s reconnaissance imagery is generally not publicly accessible, so the commercial Russian imagery would not necessarily establish Russian government involvement,” he noted.
“The third is Iran obtained information through another intermediary, so a third party could theoretically have supplied the intelligence originated from the Russian system, and there is no currently publicly verified evidence establishing such an arrangement,” he added.
But Obaid highlighted that distinguishing a Russian-supported intelligence architecture from proof that a particular Russian satellite supplied the targeting data for an individual Houthi strike is essential.
“Our assessment establishes the wider intelligence relationship; attribution of specific satellite-derived intelligence to individual missile launches requires additional corroboration,” he said.
Three officials, including one from Saudi Arabia and another in the top ranks of the Houthis, as well as a private intelligence analyst, confirmed to The Associated Press that the Houthis and other Iranian allies have benefitted from Russian intelligence, as well as Chinese capabilities.
Last week, the Saudi Foreign Ministry’s deputy minister for public diplomacy, Rayed Krimly, told reporters that the Houthis receive intelligence from Russia and China.
“We do discuss these matters regularly with China and Russia, and we will continue to do so,” he had said.
How important is access to Russian satellites for Iran and the Houthis?
Russian officials have not yet commented on AURORAH’s findings, but in recent years, technological and military ties between Russia and Iran have deepened significantly, anchored by joint strategic agreements, space cooperation, and the exchange of defence technology.
Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst on Yemen at the International Crisis Group, said Moscow reportedly supporting Tehran’s allies like the Houthis is particularly significant because it would mean a shift in the trajectory of the Yemeni conflict.
“It is increasingly moving beyond its domestic dimensions and becoming intertwined with wider regional dynamics. Supporting the Houthis is no longer a matter of interest to Iran alone. We are now seeing other actors, particularly Russia, providing Iran with intelligence support and sophisticated weaponry, from which the Houthis are also benefitting,” he told Al Jazeera.
“The question is whether this support is being channelled directly to the Houthis or indirectly through Iran. I don’t think that distinction is important. The bottom line is that the Houthis are benefitting from increasingly diversified external support involving several countries,” he added.
But Nagi warned that Russian support to the Houthis has implications for both the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia.
“Russia’s role also extends into the diplomatic arena, where Moscow has taken positions at the United Nations Security Council opposing stronger international action against the Houthis. Taken together, these developments point to a broader expansion of Russian engagement with the group,” he added.
Where have the Houthis struck in Saudi Arabia?
Yemen’s Houthis have attacked multiple locations across Saudi Arabia, spanning from the eastern and western coasts to the capital and southern regions, since fighting escalated over the summer.
In a statement on X on Friday, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed attacks have hit vital commercial and military infrastructure, which spanned Saudi Arabia from its east and west coasts to Riyadh and the southern region of Najran.
Saree said the Houthis targeted the Ras Tanura oil refinery with a ballistic missile, an Aramco facility in Abqaiq with a missile, King Khalid International airport in Riyadh with multiple missiles, King Fahd International airport in Dammam with a drone, the Rabigh oil refinery with a ballistic missile and a Saudi military headquarters in the Najran region.
There has, however, been no independent corroboration of these specific claims.
However, Houthi attacks generally have resulted in multiple deaths and injuries in Saudi Arabia. A severe strike on King Khalid International airport in Riyadh earlier this month killed at least 12 people and injured 300, according to Saudi officials. The attacks led to the airport’s temporary closure, forcing the postponement of Saudi Arabia’s flagship investment conference until 2027 and disrupting travel plans for thousands of passengers.
The airport has since reopened, and flights resumed on Sunday with the Houthis warning travellers to avoid the facility, calling it a “military target”.
An October 21 attack on King Fahd International airport in Dammam also killed two people and wounded eight.
Why are the Houthis so well-armed?
Since seizing Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and swaths of northwest Yemen in 2014, the Houthis have demanded to be recognised as the legitimate governing authority in Yemen.
After taking the capital and state institutions, the Houthis gained access to large arsenals belonging to the Yemeni military and formed an alliance with forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The internationally recognised government decamped to Aden.
Once regarded as an armed group without many resources, analysts say this has changed since the Houthis seized Yemen state arsenals, received external backing from Iran, and evolved their military capabilities.
Saj Ahmad, chief analyst at StrategicAero Research, told Al Jazeera that besides learning the art of weapons assembly, the Houthis have scoured international black markets for components and carried out many military engagements to unearth a clandestine, but robust, market for sales, too.
“So while the Houthis have been expending their cache of weapons, they have been developing and expanding too – and we have seen that with their long-range missile attacks as far away as Israel – so targeting high-value targets in Saudi Arabia in contrast is very easy pickings for them,” he said.
When a truce between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition took effect in 2022 and continued until earlier this year, many within the Yemeni government expected it to pave the way for a political settlement, Nagi said.
“The Houthis, meanwhile, were preparing for the possibility that the conflict would resume. They used the relative lull to strengthen their military position. The extent of that preparation has become evident over the past few weeks. Their forces have demonstrated considerable military readiness, enabling them to advance across several areas and inflict significant setbacks on Yemeni government forces,” he said.
According to Magnier, the Houthis’ sophisticated missile propulsion and guidance technology remains heavily dependent on foreign expertise, however.
The Houthis receive substantial backing, training and weaponry from Iran. This includes Iranian-origin and-derived ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones – such as the Palestine-2 and Toufan systems – although Iran officially denies supplying them.
Besides Iran, Magnier said Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah, has also contributed with military training and organisational experience. “All the experience gathered from fighting Israel was transformed and offered to Ansar Allah [the name the Houthis are also known by] in Yemen,” he said.
“The cooperation has also extended to Iraqi armed groups, with the exchange involving military personnel and again operational experience in a vast area,” he added.
“This combination [of domestic expansion and foreign dependence] helps explain why years of Saudi-led military operation, followed by American and Israeli strikes, have failed to eliminate its military capability,” he added.
How has Saudi Arabia struck back at the Houthis?
The Saudi-led coalition has retaliated against Houthi targets in Yemen through air attacks and military operations.
On Friday, the coalition in Yemen reported that it intercepted a drone launched by the Houthis towards Saudi Arabia’s Mecca region.
The drone was “intercepted and destroyed” on Friday morning, coalition spokesman Turki al-Malki said in a social media post. It was also reported that a missile aimed at western Saudi Arabia was earlier brought down, as hostilities between the Riyadh-backed Yemen government and Iran-backed Houthis continue to escalate.
On Thursday, the Saudi-led coalition said it destroyed a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis towards the kingdom’s eastern region. It later said two ballistic missiles launched towards the Saudi capital, Riyadh, were also intercepted and destroyed.
Al-Malki reported early on Friday that the coalition’s air defences intercepted and destroyed a Houthi cruise missile which had targeted western Saudi Arabia.
Al-Maliki said on Monday its forces also destroyed four ballistic missile launchers and five tunnels used by the Houthis to store missiles.
In a post on X, he had said coalition forces attacked a missile depot, adding that the operation “focused on cutting off Houthi militia supply lines between areas under their control”.
The operation also targeted Houthi “fortifications, gatherings of their members, and their military equipment along the front lines inside Yemen”.
Al-Maliki said on Monday that Saudi air defences “intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched by the terrorist Houthi militia towards Riyadh”.
This month, Yemen’s government forces launched the “Operation Yemen Dawn” counteroffensive, aimed at recapturing territory held by the Houthis.
On Sunday, the Saudi-led military coalition said air defences intercepted at least 10 ballistic missiles.
The kingdom’s civil defence agency said two people were injured in the south by falling debris, and reported damage to several buildings and vehicles.
Why are the Saudis struggling to contain the Houthis?
While high-level diplomatic talks such as recent meetings in Tehran involving Saudi and Iranian officials have aimed to de-escalate tensions, analysts say the Houthis are actively testing the limits of Saudi military restraint and air defence capabilities, transforming the Yemeni conflict into a wider national security test for Riyadh.
According to Magnier, the Saudis have been struggling because “nobody wins a war by air bombing."
