This is not a market crash, but a carefully prepared profiteering design. The return was produced virtually, grown with public money, and the earnings were taken out of the fund. The profiteering was not secret. It was committed in front of everyone at the stock exchange, KAP and TEFAS.
Although the supervisory boards at CMB and Borsa Istanbul saw the coming danger, they neither activated the supervisory boards nor activated the Volatility Based Measure System (VBTS). It was not questioned who put Tera's owner, Emre Tezmen, into Borsa Istanbul's Central Registry Board. Rumors that he was stung by a high-ranking friend with whom he went to the movies wearing hoodies are on everyone's lips in the stock market.
In September 2026, some investment funds became unable to repay investors' money. The Capital Markets Board (CMB) closed 131 funds belonging to seven companies and put them into liquidation. 455 thousand investors have more than 800 billion lira in these funds.
More than 800 billion lira of money of 455 thousand investors was lost in the fund raid. The state obtained 17 percent withholding income from 131 funds. It raises the question of whether this is why the state, which obtained a total of 140 billion liras of withholding income, watched the obvious fund robbery. Will the state refund the 140 billion withholding tax income while asking those who made extraordinary profits from the funds to return the money?
IN FRONT OF EVERYONE'S EYES
Tera, Pusula and Target took the lead, and Atlas was also in the same group. When Tera, Pusula and Hedef funds were at their peak, the total size reached approximately 35-40 billion dollars. The contraction had started weeks before the collapse, and the 800 billion lira on the liquidation list is what is left of this peak.
This is not a market accident, it is a design... The return was produced virtually, it was increased with public money, the profit was taken out of the fund. The profiteering was not secret, it was committed in front of everyone in the stock market, KAP and TEFAS.
That's why the real question turns not to the funds, but to the people inside the institutions: Why didn't those who were responsible for seeing it see it, and if they did, why didn't they stop it? Trust in this market cannot be re-established without these people being weeded out.
INFLATED VIRTUAL VALUE
Closed fund, virtual return. First, a fund closed to the public was established for a few people. Low-traded shares were purchased for little money and their prices were increased. The fund's return looked extraordinary on paper. This return was not a real gain but a virtual value inflated by his own purchases.
Public opening, virtual return reference. The fund was opened to TEFAS, that is, to the public. The virtual return generated during the closed period was shown as "past performance", a fuss was made saying "The return champion fund is going public", and money was collected from the public through social media and the press. Hundreds of thousands of people invested.
PROFITS ARE PEOPLE'S MONEY
They made their own profits with public money. Those who founded the fund took their profits with the public's money in the first round as soon as the public entered. Then they repeated the same game, changing the names, with different people: They took the people's money into the funds, pocketed their profits of up to 100 to 1, and took the money out of the fund.
COMPANY ACQUISITIONS IN VIRTUAL VALUE
With the money collected, shares of companies with virtual value, which had nothing to do with their real value, were purchased en masse from the main shareholders. The fund paid 100 lira for a share that was not worth 10 lira.
BREAK FROM REALITY
Buying the same stock over and over again. The funds pushed the same stocks higher with a continuous, buy-only transaction. Price is disconnected from reality; the value of the fund has inflated; The inflated value was again marketed as “return”. That's how the cycle closed.
Collapse. Profitability survives only as long as new money comes in. The funds were forced to sell when the CMB limited the shares that the funds could hold in lightly traded stocks on August 28; Prices fell, the exit brought the sale, the sale brought the new exit. Defaults occurred on September 15-16, and CMB closed the funds on September 17.
GRAY AREA: UNREGISTERED MONEY
Allegedly, when the main shareholders sold their shares to the fund at virtual value, they gave some of the money they received back to the profiteers. Representative example: 70 of the 100 lira went back to the profiteers, 30 was left to the boss, only the fund investor bore the loss.
For the company owner, the calculation is simple: He knows that his company is sold at a virtual price, far above its real value, and he agrees to a large "discount". But the discount goes not to the fund, but to the profiteers.
This step does not appear on the fund's books. The money must be traced outside the fund, in the accounts of the company owners and those who manage the profiteering.
CITIZENS' MONEY BECAME THE BOSS'S LUXURY
Within the scope of the FON investigation, five luxury vehicles with a market value of 200-220 million TL belonging to Pusula Portföy Yönetimi AŞ Chairman Muhammed Yarız were seized. It was revealed that Yarız transferred the cars for 26 thousand 280 TL two weeks before the operation.
Among those confiscated were two private jets determined to belong to Yarız and Emre Tezmen, and a luxury yacht determined to belong to Pusula Holding Chairman Serdar Turhan. The total market value of two private jets and a luxury yacht is estimated to be approximately 1 billion 8 million TL.
THE STORY OF A FUND: TLY
Tera's TLY fund was established in March 2021 as a closed fund to TEFAS. It remained closed for four years with 12 investors, during which time it produced a virtual return history on paper using the above method: 524 times from 2021 to August 2026.
In the summer of 2025, the fund was opened to TEFAS and was marketed as "The return champion fund is going public." The prospectus change in KAP was announced on 12 August 2025 and was based on a CMB permission letter dated 6 August 2025.
It was not disclosed on what basis a fund that had been closed for five years and recorded a 500-fold return with 12 investors was allowed to go public. This decision deserves to be examined on its own.
When it was opened, the size of the fund was around 20-30 billion lira. Thirteen months later, on August 17, 2026, it reached 282 billion lira; The number of investors increased from 46 thousand in October 2025 to 111 thousand in September 2026; Its return in the last year was 668 percent. All Tera's funds together reached 700-800 billion lira. This growth was visible every day in TEFAS's daily charts; no one stopped it.
SILENTLY REMOVED
The owner of the fund, Emre Tezmen, was a board member of the Central Registry Board (MKK) as of August 3, 2023. MKK is the institution that keeps records of every account in the market. CMB requested MKK's opinion on February 18, 2026 for the draft guide. At that time, Tezmen was sitting at the table. His name was quietly removed from MKK's website in September 2026, after the crisis broke out. Who suggested him to that board, who placed him? Rumors that he was stung by a high-ranking friend with whom he went to the movies in hoodies are on everyone's lips in the stock market.
How did a shady fund grow while being under the eyes of the authority at every step, from the permission to open to the public to the summit, and who turned a blind eye? That's the real question of this note.
WHO SHOULD BE EXAMINED: THREE LINE
Those who bought the same shares from outside the fund. Which stocks the funds would buy was known in advance by a narrow circle of people. During the relevant periods, only personal accounts that made high amounts of purchases in these shares, other than funds, should be examined. Which share each account bought and when is registered with MKK, the data is available, all you have to do is ask.
COMPANY OWNERS SELLING BLOCKS
Bank accounts, crypto accounts and post-sale cash outflows of the main shareholders of companies selling bulk shares to funds should be examined. Where the money from the sale went is the only trace that will shed light on the gray area.
THOSE WHO MANAGE THE PROFIT
Personal accounts and subsidiary accounts of fund managers and associated persons; the fund's individual positions in the stocks it buys and the timing of those positions.
On September 17, the prosecutor's office asked MASAK for the money and crypto movements of executives and their relatives. A similar step has not yet been heard for the first two lines.
