Questions are increasing within Libyan political circles about the future of the “American initiative” to resolve the country’s crisis, after insulting statements made by President Donald Trump to Libya, before he hastened to retract them.
At a time when Massad Boulos, President Trump’s senior advisor for Arab and African affairs, is working on activating an initiative aimed at ending the political and military division in Libya, questions are being raised within political circles about the mechanisms and contexts of his reception in a country that Trump had described as “filthy.”
A member of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, Zahraa Lenqi, asked about the basis for an envoy receiving a president who “insults those who mediate between them, and with what prestige is a peace initiative proposed that does not respect the dignity of the peoples concerned with it?”
“No mediation with contempt.”
Lenqi said through her Facebook post that “respect for peoples is a moral and political condition for any mediation, and it is not possible to separate the mediator’s speech from his approach,” adding: “There is no peace built on insult, and no mediation can be achieved with contempt.”
Although political voices considered Trump's "blog" an implicit apology, it was not enough to end the anger towards the US administration and its policies in the country. Former Libyan diplomat Faraj Zarrouk described it as a “political apology and a tactical retreat.”
In this context, the head of the National Council on US-Libyan Relations, Dr. Hani Shanib, ruled out that the American initiative would be affected by Trump’s statement, which he described as “random,” and which came in the midst of the enthusiasm of the election campaign.
Schneib told Asharq Al-Awsat, “The street’s anger is just a temporary reaction, and the strategic paths and interests are much deeper than a racist statement issued by the American president.”
Libya is experiencing a political division between two competing governments: the first is the interim “National Unity”, headed by Abdel Hamid Al-Dabaiba in Tripoli, and a government appointed by Parliament, headed by Osama Hammad, and enjoys the support of the commander of the “National Army”, Khalifa Haftar.
At the end of last August, the UN mission announced the “4 + 4” mini-committee agreement, which stipulates the formation of a new executive authority, which includes a presidential council and a unified government for the country, paving the way for elections within two years.
Condemning Trump's "offensive" statements
Several voices, especially in the Libyan West, doubt that the “4+4” agreement is a front for implementing the “American Initiative,” which is said to grant Saddam Haftar, Vice President of the Presidential Council, the presidency of the Presidential Council, with Dabaiba remaining head of the unified government, while it is still met with opposition from various circles in the west of the country.
Schneib accused opponents of the United Nations and American initiatives of “trying to obstruct them by inciting the street and using statements to preserve their current gains in light of the state of division.”
For his part, the Libyan political analyst, Hossam al-Din al-Abdali, highlighted “the rush of Al-Dabaiba and Saddam Haftar, the two parties concerned with the international initiative and the international track, to denounce Trump’s offensive statements,” adding that this step “blocked the way for any attempts to question their orientations and talk about them being subjected to pressure, despite what everyone knows of widespread American interference in the Libyan arena.”
Al-Dabaiba said on Facebook: “Libya is a sovereign state, and we reject any insult to it or its people, who have made great sacrifices in the fight against terrorism,” while Saddam Haftar considered that what Trump issued was “denounced and rejected.”
Al-Abdali pointed out, in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, that the Libyan elites are aware of “the multiplicity of decision-making circles in Washington, and the matter is not limited to the statements of a president known for his recklessness.” He explained that “Libya is an important country in the region, and the president’s advisors are aware of this, and so they persuaded him to back down to avoid negative effects that might prolong the oil deals and Paul’s settlement initiative, or create a state of tension between the people and the American diplomatic presence.”
Al-Abdali believes that “the holding of the (4 + 4) committee meeting in Britain last Wednesday, in the presence of international officials and diplomats and perhaps Americans, in the context of supporting the international path,” is the greatest evidence that the political paths are not affected by these statements.
Political analyst, Hisham Salem Al-Harati, did not deviate from previous opinions, and promised that Trump’s statements would not affect the initiative. He told Asharq Al-Awsat, “Opposition voices are not part of the ongoing negotiations to resolve the country’s political crisis. They cannot obstruct them, and they also cannot create a broad public opinion to impose this.”
Al-Harati expected that the matter would be limited to “trying to restore momentum to the movement rejecting the initiative in the media.” He expressed his belief that “the Libyan parties concerned with the American initiative and the international track have not stopped their communication and meetings recently, even if they take place behind the scenes for fear of raising criticism and having opponents exploit the matter.”
The Criminal Chamber responsible for examining terrorism cases at the Tunisian Court of Appeal decided today, Thursday, to set a hearing for next November 19 to consider what is known as the file of the secret apparatus of the Ennahdha Movement.
The Criminal Division had issued its rulings in this case, which ranged from life imprisonment to 10 years in prison, as the court ruled that the accused were guilty of committing “crimes of forming a terrorist alliance,” “joining a terrorist alliance related to terrorist crimes, placing competencies and expertise at the disposal of a terrorist alliance, and at the responsibility of persons related to terrorist crimes,” and other terrorist crimes stipulated in the Anti-Terrorism Law.
The sentences in this case ranged from life imprisonment with 96 years in prison for Mustafa Khader, to life imprisonment with 76 years in prison for Reda Al-Baroni, Al-Taher Bou Bahri, Kamal Al-Aifi, and seven other defendants. The court also ruled life imprisonment with 50 years in prison for Fathi Al-Baladi, life imprisonment with 37 years in prison for Abdelaziz Al-Daghasni, life imprisonment with 32 years in prison for Kamal Al-Badawi, life imprisonment with 30 years in prison for Samir Al-Hanashi, and life imprisonment with 30 years in prison for Rashed Ghannouchi.
This case, classified as “terrorist,” included 35 defendants, including the head of the Ennahdha movement, Rached Ghannouchi (detained), and his deputy, Ali Al-Arayedh (detained). In addition to a number of former security officials, as well as Mustafa Khader, who is accused in what is known as the “Black Room” case.
The file of this case was raised in early 2022, following a complaint submitted by the Public Prosecution and the defense team on behalf of the two martyred politicians, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, who were assassinated in 2013.
Meanwhile, yesterday, Wednesday, the movement criticized the rulings issued against its vice president, Munther Al-Ounissi, and other leaders in it, the day after the Tunisian Court of First Instance issued, on Tuesday evening, a preliminary ruling of 9 years in prison against the vice president of the Ennahda Movement, Munther Al-Ounissi, on charges related to “terrorism,” according to the official Tunisian News Agency.
The court also sentenced to 25 years in prison, with immediate effect, the defendants who were on the run: Tahar Bou Bahri (an Ennahda leader), Rafik Bouchlaka (former Foreign Minister), Sheherazade Okasha (a journalist), Fathi Al-Ayadi (an Ennahdha leader), Moaz Al-Kheriji (son of Ennahda leader Rached Ghannouchi), Maher Zaid (a journalist), Mohamed Al-Samti (a blogger), and Ahmed Gaaloul and Reda Idriss (leaders). “By the Renaissance.”
The rulings came after the court accused them, according to the agency, of “forming an organization linked to terrorist crimes, and establishing contacts with agents of a foreign country, the purpose of which is to harm the country’s situation.”
The movement said that the court “issued unjust and shocking rulings in what was known as the fabricated leak case” against Al-Wanissi, Qaloul, Al-Ayadi, Bou Bahri, Idriss, Al-Khariji, Al-Hani and others, including journalist Ziad Al-Hani. She added that she "strongly condemns these harsh sentences against everyone involved in this fabricated case."
The movement stressed that “these rulings of a political nature will only contribute to further deteriorating political and economic conditions and increasing rates of social tension.” The human rights organizations called for “urgent action to release all imprisoned political leaders... especially in light of the deteriorating health conditions of many of them due to advanced age and the chronic diseases they suffer from, including Munther Al-Wanissi, who lost the ability to hear due to the harsh sentences he was subjected to.”
Algeria is trying to restore its position in the African Sahel region by sending military forces to Niger, in a precedent of its kind in more than half a century, after it gradually lost the great influence it had in this region.
But why the rapprochement with Niger? Niger, which along with Mali and Burkina Faso forms the Alliance of African Sahel countries, appears to be a gateway back to this region for Algeria, after its role there declined in recent years.
Algeria's relations with the countries of this coalition witnessed a significant deterioration after the Algerian army destroyed a Malian military march in April 2025, which caused a diplomatic crisis that was evident in the summoning of ambassadors.
At the same time, Mali initiated a rapprochement with Morocco by supporting Rabat's proposed autonomy plan to resolve the Sahara conflict, while until then it had supported the separatist Polisario Front.
However, since the beginning of the year, Algeria has launched several initiatives to overcome this crisis from the Niger gate, which were the delivery of an electricity production station, investments in the oil sector, the granting of military helicopters, as well as the revival of the desert pipeline project to transport gas between Nigeria and Europe via Niger and Algeria.
Critical convergence
This rapprochement is of commercial and geopolitical importance, according to several observers. Reda Al-Yamouri, a researcher at the Moroccan Institute (Policy Center for the New South), says, “Niger is an important country for Algeria in view of the trans-Saharan gas pipeline project, in exchange for the Nigeria-Morocco Atlantic gas pipeline.”
Meanwhile, Algeria is following with concern the growing influence of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, in its neighbor Libya, along Niger and Chad. Haftar recently played a role in the release of a number of Moroccan hostages, who were being held by ISIS in the Sahel region.
Charlie Warb, an analyst at the consultancy firm L'Edebaran Treat Consultants, says that the intense competition with influential parties in the region, such as Morocco and the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar, "contributed to pushing Algeria to seek to restore its previous position, and the desire to protect the strategic project of the trans-Saharan gas pipeline, and other investments in Niger."
* What is the purpose of sending soldiers to Niger?
In answer to this question, the Algerian Parliament, with both chambers, announced last Sunday its approval to send forces to Niger, with the aim of protecting energy facilities, paving the way for the first official deployment of the Algerian army outside the borders since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Until now, “it is not clear whether the Algerian military deployment aims to fight groups linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS,” which threaten Niger, according to Reda Al-Yamouri.
Algerian military units will be deployed at the Madama base, according to some media outlets, which is a desert area closer to Libya and Chad than to Algeria, and was a former stronghold of the French Armed Forces during the “Barkhane” operation to combat extremist groups between 2014 and 2022.
Here, Jeff Porter points out that this base is of “utmost importance for inquiries in the Sahel,” which will put Algeria “in a position that allows it to collect intelligence information about arms flows, and perhaps intercept them.”
For his part, Charlie Warb believes that the deployment of Algerian units in Niger may be important for Western partners, especially the United States, which has lost a large part of its ability to monitor what is happening in the Sahel region, since withdrawing its forces from this country in 2024.
In addition, the Algerian military deployment may contribute to “consolidating the stability” of the head of the ruling military junta in Niger, Abderrahmane Tiani, according to Warab. Algeria had previously sent four Sukhoi Su-30 fighters to Niamey to help the military junta contain an attempted mutiny within the army in late August.
The path to détente with Mali and the Sahel countries alliance
Algeria and Mali are working to turn the page on the crisis, which broke out after the downing of the drone in April 2025, as the head of the Malian Military Council, Assimi Goita, is expected to visit Algeria soon, after the exchange of visits between the prime ministers of the two countries.
In another indication of improved relations between them, Algeria played a role in the Malian army recovering the strategic city of Kidal on its southern border with northern Mali. This came through Algeria asking the rebels not to respond to the Malian army attack, in order to present itself as a mediator in the crisis, according to information provided by diplomatic sources and confirmed by analysts.
Liam Carr, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, says, “There are indications that Algeria (...) indirectly supported Mali’s efforts to restore Kidal, and increased military pressure on rebel strongholds in northern Mali near its borders.”
