In order to prevent and resolve the "involution" competition risks that may be caused by concentrated online promotions during the "6·18" period, and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and the fair and orderly online transaction market order, on June 11, 2026, the Beijing Municipal Administration for Market Regulation interviewed Taobao (Tmall) and JD.com Five e-commerce platforms, including Pinduoduo, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu, reported the second batch of typical problems found in the platform's "involution" comprehensive competition rectification, which mainly include false publicity of promotional activities, irregular formulation and disclosure of promotional rules, and failure to disclose product operator information, and put forward rectification requirements.
1 Taobao (Tmall) platform:
Starting from May 2026, the platform has widely promoted the "6·18 Ten Billion Subsidy" activity in the media and on the application side. However, the regulatory authorities learned from the platform that the tens of billions of subsidies were not the tens of billions invested by the platform to subsidize consumers during the "6·18" period. It was actually a long-term marketing activity. The platform repeatedly refused to provide the actual subsidy amount invested during this "6·18" event and the investment ratio between the platform and merchants. The platform did not disclose the relevant activity rules of the "Ten Billion Subsidy" in a prominent position, and the actual seller qualification information was not disclosed for some products in the "Ten Billion Subsidy" channel.
2 Pinduoduo platform:
The platform launched a "10 billion subsidy" campaign, but the actual amount of subsidy invested and the investment ratio between the platform and merchants were not specified in the rules, and relevant supporting materials were unable to be provided. In the promotion rules, "For any disputes related to goods, Pinduoduo, as a platform party, can provide necessary assistance within the legal scope, but will not assume any liability related to the goods." This unilaterally exempts the platform from legal liability.
3 JD.com platform:
The platform launched the "Ten Billion Subsidy" and "Ten Billion Agricultural Subsidy" activities, but the promotion period was not announced in the rules, the actual amount of subsidy invested and the investment ratio between the platform and merchants were not specified, and supporting materials were not provided. "Ten Billion Supermarket" has not announced the event rules.
4 Douyin platform:
Activities such as the "6·18 Good Things Festival" and "Ten Billions of Consumer Vouchers" were launched, but the promotion rules were not announced to consumers; the event investment rules stipulated that if the platform made adjustments to the event rules, merchants would be notified directly, and there was no public solicitation of opinions.
5 Xiaohongshu platform:
The information disclosure of the "Points to Draw Good Gifts" prize sales activity is incomplete. Only the total amount of prizes is marked, and core information such as the probability of winning and the rules for discarding prizes are not clearly disclosed. The event rules stipulate that the platform can change and adjust the event rules, and consumers’ “continued participation is deemed to be consent,” excluding consumers’ right to negotiate.
Liu Xiaochun, director of the Internet Legal Research Center of the University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, pointed out: Platforms competing to carry out "tens of billions of subsidies" may trigger the risk of "involution" competition, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the industry. In particular, irrational large-scale subsidies not only distort the market price mechanism, but some platforms even stipulate that all subsidies are borne by merchants. Merchants are caught in the dilemma of losing traffic if they don’t lower prices, and losing money if they lower prices. Profit margins are severely squeezed, and it is difficult for merchants to survive, hindering industry innovation and upgrading. Many platforms unilaterally exempt platform responsibilities in non-force majeure situations in their rules, increasing the risks for consumers.
The Beijing Municipal Administration for Market Regulation emphasized:
➡ First, each platform must have a deep understanding of the harm of "involution" competition, shift subsidies and prices to innovation and services, and promote win-win development between the platform and operators and workers within the platform.
➡ Second, the platform must immediately organize a comprehensive self-examination, systematically sort out and review the "6·18" promotion rules in accordance with relevant regulations, and quickly rectify non-compliance issues.
➡ Third, the Beijing Municipal Administration for Market Regulation will continue to use the platform's "involutionary" competition comprehensive rectification working mechanism to carry out dynamic monitoring, respond in a timely manner, and maintain normal market order.
