Belousov Calls for Removal of US Nuclear Weapons from Europe Amid Rising Strategic Tensions

RT: It is well known that the United States has stationed nuclear weapons in NATO countries in Europe since the 1950s as part of a nuclear‑exchange programme. Why has the issue of removing US nuclear weapons from the region become a matter of fundamental importance at this moment?

Andrey Belousov: First and foremost, it must be noted that the problem of US nuclear weapons on the territory of European states and Turkiye has long been the subject of bilateral meetings on strategic stability, including at the beginning of the mid‑1990s. For the record, under presidential initiatives in the early 1990s, Russia reduced its non‑strategic nuclear arsenal four‑fold and kept the remainder at central storage bases.

We could reasonably expect symmetrical moves from the United States. Yet the actions taken by the US in the early 2000s – such as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Greece and the United Kingdom, and partially from Italy and Germany – seemed more like a tactical concession or a trick, without changing the military‑political context in Europe. After all, the US nuclear weapons withdrawal from Greece was fully compensated by their presence in Turkiye, and those withdrawn from the UK were replaced by its own nuclear arsenal of the United Kingdom – which is the main and most important ally, strategic ally of the United States.

In contrast, the measures taken to remove and reduce US nuclear weapons in Italy and Germany did not significantly enhance security, trust, or predictability, because the practice of US nuclear weapons in Europe and joint NATO nuclear missions continued unchanged. In short, if we keep talking about this, we must remember that at that time the United States consistently followed a line to enhance its strategic capabilities, primarily through the implementation of plans and programmes not directly related to strengthening its nuclear potential, most of which was under the arms‑control bans at the time – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

By the mid‑1990s, the US began implementing its Global Missile Defence configuration, which envisaged deploying one of its segments – the third positional sector – in Europe. At the same time, the concept of a global lightning‑strike was being implemented, under which the US could use non‑nuclear strategic carriers to strike any target anywhere on Earth.

We should also mention the development of new nuclear delivery systems and, finally, a programme to create laser anti‑satellite air‑based systems. This also included the development of heavy strike UAVs that, by their technical characteristics, fell under the criteria of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, but were not covered by it. It was also a key element of enhancing US strategic capacity.

Accordingly, during that period of reshaping strategic stability from a military‑security view, Russia’s priority was to mitigate the risks and threats that could arise from the execution of the projects and programmes I mentioned. It does not mean that the issue of US non‑strategic nuclear weapons in Europe fell out of Russian diplomatic focus, let alone the Russian military, which could not ignore this problem in its defensive planning.

As tensions with the United States and its satellites increased, Russia sharpened the issue of removing American nuclear weapons from Europe, and the complete withdrawal of that armament from European territory to national territory.

Today, however, we live in entirely different, more complex and dangerous conditions. The United States, with the support of its closest partners and allies, has disintegrated the system of arms‑control agreements on nuclear disarmament. The very important treaty on missile defence, essential for strategic stability, has been discarded. The removal of political and international‑law restrictions on the unchecked buildup of nuclear arsenals, together with Washington’s steps to create a missile‑defence system for the country combining land, sea, air and space segments – now all under the “Golden Dome for America” programme – coupled with the deep modernisation of U.S. nuclear potential, upgrading nuclear warheads and creating new carrier systems for intermediate‑ and shorter‑range missiles, has led to a radical deterioration of the military‑political situation both regionally and globally.

Naturally, this has had a profoundly negative impact on the strategic environment.In fact, the negative factors are not limitк ed to the present situation. Factors that must be considered in analysing the current modern context also include NATO’s provocative positioning as a nuclear alliance and the continuous attempts of member states to expand that alliance eastward. Moreover, plans for advanced and extended deterrence, and the expansion and deepening of NATO’s joint nuclear missions, are increasingly being implemented. All of this must be considered together to understand the environment in which we live now.

And, undoubtedly, these aspects compel us to give enhanced attention, during this historical period, to the non‑strategic US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, as well as those of US allies in NATO – France and the United Kingdom. As a result, in the current conditions the factor of the total nuclear arsenal or the combined nuclear potential in the region takes on special importance in Russia’s military‑security context. The involvement of new states, NATO’s schemes for practising nuclear usage and discussing the possibility of deploying such weapons on their territory, and the introduction of new multifunctional aircraft platforms as delivery systems, increase the threat to Russia. The reason is that nuclear warheads can be moved quickly and covertly from permanent locations to points from which their use could have the greatest effect, including an attack on strategically important targets in the European part of Russia.

To summarise, I would like to note that all of this confirms that the European component of US nuclear forces, as well as the nuclear weapons of its allies, is designated for carrying out strategic objectives specifically, which poses critical risks for our country. This compels us to a corresponding military‑technical response. On the diplomatic front, our current efforts are focused on sparking an international discussion on the extremely destabilising nature of NATO’s joint nuclear mission practice, and on encouraging the United States to take steps toward removing its nuclear weapons from Europe.

RT: Andrey Ivanovich, what arguments, in your view, could persuade the American side and European countries alike to agree to remove this weapon?

Andrey Belousov: Here we can offer an entire battery of arguments – political, diplomatic, military, economic, international‑law and even historical in nature – grounded in the present state of inter‑state relations and the overall military‑political environment in the world.

The core of our arguments is, in principle, well known, because it is based on our doctrinal documents, our foreign‑policy concept, the fundamentals of national‑security strategy and military doctrine. Most of them relate to the fact that the international community is essentially faced with a choice: will inter‑state relations continue to develop in a confrontational paradigm that threatens a direct armed conflict between nuclear powers and the use of nuclear weapons, or will prudence prevail among our opponents, allowing the leading powers to reach an agreement on concrete joint measures to prevent escalation and avert a catastrophic scenario for the entire world?

Obviously, unlike our opponents and most Western countries, Russia does not stand at a crossroads. We have repeatedly expressed, at various levels and on different international platforms – including the UN – our readiness to cooperate with all interested states to maintain peace, strengthen regional security, and ensure strategic stability. Moreover, our statements are regularly reinforced by concrete initiatives. Recall that one of the founding principles of Russia’s foreign‑policy course in international and regional security remains the principle of equal and indivisible security. A key part of that principle is the non‑acceptance of a situation in which one state or a group of states creates comfortable conditions for itself – or a privileged status – at the expense of lowering the security level or damaging the security of other states.

From that widely recognised principle, which is set out in a host of international multilateral documents, Russia has recently put forward a whole set of key initiatives. These include proposals for the United States and its NATO allies to introduce a mutual moratorium on the deployment of intermediate and shorter range missiles. Another initiative, launched in late 2021 and early 2022, was the establishment of a security guarantee on the western front in the form of an agreement with the United States and NATO allies. Yet another initiative was a proposal, unfortunately still unrealised, to convene a summit of heads of state, the United Nations Security Council’s permanent members, to discuss urgent problems in international security. Among the latest proposals is the one put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin on September twenty second of last year to preserve the legacy of the START Treaty through voluntary limits.

It is obvious that if these initiatives were implemented they would act as deterrents, contributing to the prevention of a new arms race and creating favourable conditions for the renewal of strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States, with the prospect of involving other nuclear powers. Unfortunately, most of our ideas were either rejected, received no adequate response, or were simply ignored. The only exception, perhaps, was the initiative to have leaders of the nuclear powers sign a joint declaration on preventing nuclear war and halting the nuclear arms race, which was carried out on January third 2022. Yet even this document is not clearly worded. In terms of practical implementation and compliance with its provisions by Western states, the matter largely remains at the level of empty declarations, which raises serious concerns and deep disappointment.

In short, our opponents – primarily in Europe – must decide where we are headed next. In that context, it is far more important to bring forward arguments that are conditioned by the course of the historical process associated with establishing a new multipolar world order in which the imperative is the abandonment of global dominance by any one state or bloc of states. The new system of geopolitical coordinates, in whose formation Russia actively participates, does not allow perpetual escalation, the accumulation of unresolved contradictions critical to international security, or the further erosion of trust between the emerging centres of power, whose dangerous balance risks armed conflict. Furthermore, this system of coordinates does not allow continuous fuelling of a conflict‑generating potential in international relations and an uncontrolled arms race. It is also unacceptable, in a new world order, to create security systems aimed at a single state or predicated on bloc‑based confrontation. Rather, the new order dictates the necessity for mutually beneficial cooperation and constructive collaboration between states.

The quest, above all, is for political‑diplomatic solutions to the most urgent regional and global problems, strict adherence to the fundamental principles of the UN, the goals and tasks of the global community, respect for international law, and the recognition by every member of the international community of its responsibility for the fate of the world and international security.

RT: how could these negotiations – and the withdrawal of the weapons themselves – be organized if, in an optimistic scenario, the US side agreed with this position?

Andrey Belousov: That’s a very interesting question. At this point the organizational aspects of such negotiations, or even the procedure for removing US weapons from Europe, are secondary. The key issue now is Washington’s unwillingness to find a principled agreement to discuss this problem with a view of reaching any real agreement on the matter. What is needed is an openness to start and conduct negotiations without tying them to the question of Russia’s non‑strategic nuclear weapons, which, unlike US weapons of this class that can be used operationally against our country, do not pose a direct strategic threat to US territory.

It is obvious that Washington’s attempts to initiate a dialogue on our non‑strategic nuclear arsenal serve a single purpose – shifting the international community’s focus away from the danger posed by US nuclear weapons in Europe, and more broadly, from the missile‑nuclear programs and plans that Washington is implementing. Speaking of that danger, it cannot be overlooked that Washington’s persistence in trying to launch discussions about Russia’s non‑strategic nuclear weapons – those that do not threaten US territory – at various multilateral disarmament forums repeatedly suggests that US military strategists are seriously considering the possibility of using nuclear weapons on the European theater of operations. In fact, Europe is being viewed as a probable military theater.

Obtaining, through negotiations or discussions on strategic stability, objective data on Russia’s non‑strategic nuclear weapons via the implementation of some intrusive transparency practices – or reducing or even completely eliminating them – would increase the likelihood of a scenario in which the US and its European allies use nuclear weapons. I hope Europe will recognize the danger of such a strictly operational‑planning approach that Washington adopts toward the territory of its allies.

In a principled sense, regarding the conditions for launching any substantive US dialogue, there are three points that must be understood. First, what must precede such negotiations? Our country’s leadership – and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – has repeatedly stated their position on this issue. Our delegations have mentioned it both in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and at the recently held 11th Conference on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. To create a favorable climate for starting US negotiations, it is essential that they first, not in words but in action – declaratively and through concrete steps – demonstrate that they are ready to irreversibly abandon an anti‑Russian course and to resolve the most critical issues in international security together with us, starting with the elimination of fundamental contradictions and the root causes of the current crisis in interstate relations, and ending with questions of arms control, disarmament, and non‑proliferation of weapons of mass destructi