Preparatory discussions in the EU are focusing on the question of how to respond in the event of a major hybrid attack that kills more than one person.
Activating emergency response teams, providing support from EU funds to the affected country and coordinating the crisis communication of institutions are among the tools that can be used in such a scenario.
These preparations also bring about a debate about the limits of the EU's role in the security field. The reservations of some capitals about the possibility of the Union's initiatives duplicating NATO's duties highlight the need to clarify which institution will undertake which responsibility during the crisis.
It is important that military deterrence and intelligence sharing complement each other with civilian intervention, infrastructure protection and financial support. Ambiguous tasks or duplication of mechanisms are among the factors that can make intervention difficult after an attack that requires quick decisions.
The coordinated response framework adopted by the EU in 2022 envisages the use of diplomatic, political and economic tools against hybrid campaigns. The Union also approved the framework for the creation of hybrid rapid response teams in 2024.
GMF Southern and Broad Europe Program researcher Soula, in his statement, evaluated the changing nature of hybrid threats, difficulties in protecting critical infrastructure and Türkiye's position.
Soula said, "I think the first thing that comes to mind today is actual sabotage against critical infrastructure in NATO countries and sabotage activities that resemble terrorist acts." he said.
Citing the drone attack attempt on Leipzig-Halle Airport in Germany on August 4 as an example, Soula said:
"This summer's planned drone attack on Leipzig Airport, which Germany publicly attributed to Russia, is one of them. So from more digital and slightly more remote activities, such as information campaigns, you can see that Russia is constantly escalating and becoming more and more aggressive. In doing so, it always tries to stay below the actual war threshold that would trigger NATO's response under Article 5. This is the situation where all NATO countries come together to counter an attack."
Soula stated that the fact that a significant part of the critical infrastructure is operated by private companies creates difficulties in the implementation of protection measures.
Emphasizing that companies and security institutions should develop a common understanding, Soula said:
"I think one of the things that's a little challenging is that a lot of this critical infrastructure is operated by private actors. So companies that don't always have that security perspective. They've been operating in peace for decades. Now we're seeing governments and the military approaching these private actors and saying, 'Actually, the system you're operating is under threat of attack.' It's hard to say. Therefore, there is a need to establish dialogue between people in the government who have a stronger military security perspective and those in the private sector. "So everyone can have the same understanding of how to protect these systems, or at least how they should be protected."
Soula emphasized that hybrid threats should not be seen as a phenomenon independent of war and continued as follows:
"People should not understand hybrid threats as something different, because it is essentially the extension of war to other areas of life, such as the information domain, critical infrastructure, cyberspace. Hybrid war is not a new or completely different war; it is a preparation for something more serious. The Prime Minister of Poland a year or two ago described the current situation as 'We are in a pre-war period.' He defined it as: I think this is the right way to understand this. I think this is another reason why Europe is very worried, especially the Baltic and Northern European countries that directly border Russia. Because they see these hybrid campaigns as a slow, step-by-step escalation with the ultimate destination of conventional war.”
