China-US stability pact: What it means for Southeast Asia

Asian AngleWhat the China-US stability pact means for Southeast Asia

The real test of Beijing and Washington’s adoption of ‘constructive strategic stability’ will be how words translate into action

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Published: 11:00am, 23 May 2026

When Xi Jinping and Donald Trump concluded their Beijing summit, the most consequential outcome – for China at least – may prove not material, but conceptual: the adoption of “constructive strategic stability” (CSS) as the guiding framework for managing their intensifying competition.

For Southeast Asia, a region often caught in the rivalry between the two powers, understanding what this means will matter in the years ahead.

The framework reflects a long-held Chinese strategic aspiration. Beijing has sought for years to anchor its relationship with Washington within an overarching paradigm – one that would codify, at the highest level, a set of principles governing how the two powers relate to each other.

When Xi visited Washington during the Obama administration in 2015, Beijing floated the concept of a “new type of major power relations”. Washington was cool. The balance of power then still favoured the US and American policymakers were wary of any formulation that smacked of a G2 condominium, with its implicit endorsement of Chinese co-primacy.

A decade later, the arithmetic has changed. Trump’s instinct for leader-to-leader deal making, his desire to reset relations after a bruising 2025 and China’s growing self-assurance as a peer competitor have together created the space for Beijing to update its proposal.

The resulting CSS framework carries significant symbolic and strategic weight for China. For the first time, observers say Beijing officially acknowledges “competition” as a feature of the bilateral relationship – a departure from its long-held preference for “win-win cooperation”. This signals a posture of confidence: a China no longer defensive about its standing as a rising power, now willing to compete with the status quo power on its own terms. From Beijing’s perspective, the framework also reflects Washington’s implicit recognition of China as a near-peer – if not already a coequal – in the global system.

What does Beijing mean by “constructive strategic stability”? Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s post-summit briefing and commentary in a column associated with China’s official foreign policy positions laid out four dimensions:

Positive stability envisions cooperation as the mainstay of US-China relations.

Healthy stability frames competition as bounded and conducted on an equal footing – a “track-and-field contest” in which either side wins by outperforming the other rather than by tripping up its rival.

Constant stability refers to maintaining bilateral mechanisms and communication channels for managing differences, including through the US-China boards of trade and investment that are set to be established soon.

Enduring stability signals that Taiwan remains Beijing’s “core of core interests” and the ultimate test of whether the framework can hold.