At a time when the Yemeni armed forces are making progress on various fronts, the latest of which is the Al-Jawf front, the Presidential Command Council and the government are intensifying their political and administrative movements in support of the “Yemen Dawn” operation, by appointing two governors for Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda, and carrying out a limited ministerial reshuffle.
A military expert believes that these decisions go beyond changing office holders; It prepares a local leadership capable of supporting the battle and mobilizing popular support in two important governorates towards Sana’a.
The Presidential Command Council renewed the move forward with Operation “Yemen Dawn” until it achieves all its goals of ending the coup, restoring institutions, and extending state authority over its entire territory, according to the official news agency (Saba).
In this context, a decision was issued to appoint Major General Hussein Al-Aji Al-Awadi as Governor of Al-Bayda, while Major General Amin Ali Al-Okaimi was appointed Governor of Al-Jawf and commander of its military axis.
In parallel with the local changes, the Presidential Leadership Council carried out a limited ministerial reshuffle, which included the appointment of Salem Thabet Al-Awlaki as Minister of Information, Judge Akram Nasib Al-Amiri as Minister of Civil Service and Insurance, and Ahmed Saleh Al-Awlaki as Minister of Local Administration.
Brigadier General Yasser Saleh, a military and strategic expert, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the two appointments represent “a military necessity in the first place, and a tribal necessity in the second place,” given the importance of the two governorates in the course of operations towards the capital, Sana’a.
He added that Al-Okaimi and Al-Awadi enjoy - according to his estimation - wide respect and tribal weight in their governorates, considering that the selection of the two leaders reflects a reading of the mood of the population, which may help strengthen the popular incubator for the military operation.
He said that this incubator is “a fundamental pillar of military decision-making that takes into account the population,” and that its absorption may facilitate mobilizing support for the operation.
Saleh pointed to the strategic importance of Al-Bayda Governorate, and what he described as the presence of a population incubator that rejects the Houthi project, considering that the timing of appointing a governor for it enhances preparation for the next stage.
Al-Bayda Governorate stands out as one of the most important geographical nodes in the conflict, and a point where the movement of battle lines may have an impact that extends beyond its borders to 8 Yemeni governorates.
A strategic study prepared by the “Advant Center for Research and Study of Transformations” indicated that the importance of Al-Bayda does not stem from its exceptional economic or demographic weight, but rather from its location, which makes it an “operational and social node” between the regions of northern, eastern and southern Yemen.
Brigadier General Saleh believed that the impact of these decisions will appear in their ability to support the forces on the ground, and create the conditions for launching a broader operation in Al-Bayda, in addition to supporting the ongoing battles in Al-Jawf.
The Presidential Command Council renewed its call on residents of areas under the control of the Houthis not to throw their children into fighting, to refuse to cooperate with the group’s military and security activities, and not to respond to mobilization campaigns, stressing that “the door to safe return is open” to those who abandon their weapons and stop fighting, in accordance with the announced procedures.
The Houthi group has expanded the scope of its recruitment campaigns to compensate for its increasing human losses on the battle fronts, this time targeting members of the security services, prisoners and detainees in the kidnapped Yemeni capital, Sanaa, and other governorates, in an indication of the expanding crisis of fighters within its ranks and the faltering of its attempts to attract new elements from society.
In the most recent of these movements, the group pushed hundreds of officers and individuals from the traffic police and road security in Sanaa and Dhamar and Ibb governorates to the fighting fronts in Taiz, Lahj and the western coast, after withdrawing them from their work sites, assembling them in the capital and distributing weapons to them, in preparation for transferring them in batches to the front lines.
In a parallel path, the group tried to attract hundreds of prisoners and detainees in the Central Correctional Facility in Sana'a, by exchanging their release for joining its ranks and fighting on the Taiz, Al-Jawf, and Western Coast fronts, but it only obtained, according to local and human rights sources, the approval of about 42 prisoners out of the total targeted, with the vast majority rejecting the offers and the pressures accompanying them.
Local sources reported to Asharq Al-Awsat that Houthi security leaders supervised recruitment operations among members of the General Traffic Department in Sanaa and its offices in the Dhamar and Ibb governorates, led by the leader Bakil Al-Barashi, who is impersonating the Director-General of the Traffic Police, and Najib Al-Asadi, appointed as the General Director of Traffic in the kidnapped capital.
Trying to fill the gap
In light of this polarization, informed sources in Sanaa said that the Houthi group withdrew hundreds of members from their work sites in the streets and roads, before assembling them in one of Sanaa’s squares and distributing weapons to them, in preparation for transferring them to the fronts of Taiz, Lahj, and the western coast, in an attempt to fill the growing shortage in the ranks of its fighters as a result of successive human losses.
These movements are not limited to the traffic police and road security, as the group had previously sent, over the past weeks, batches of members of the so-called “traffic control units,” a new security faction run by the leader Abdul Karim al-Houthi, appointed Minister of the Interior in the unrecognized government, to the fronts of Al-Dhalea, Ma’rib, Taiz, Al-Jawf, and the Western Coast.
According to the sources, the group had used these units to suppress and intimidate citizens and blackmail vehicle drivers and passers-by, before transferring its members from the streets to confrontation sites, in a move that reflects the widening circle of attrition, to include security sectors that were performing roles linked to tightening their grip on the areas under their control.
These developments coincide with the continuing human losses incurred by the group on the fighting fronts, especially in the governorates of Taiz and Lahj, where a source close to the Houthi ruling circle in Sanaa told Asharq Al-Awsat that the militias are facing unprecedented human exhaustion on various fronts, and that the extent of their losses in recent months has exceeded their ability to compensate fighters, despite ongoing recruitment and mobilization campaigns.
The sources added that the group began arranging to enroll those who agreed to intensive and rapid military courses, in preparation for their transfer in batches to the Taiz, Al-Jawf and Western Coast fronts, without taking into account their conditions or the extent of their eligibility to participate in the fighting.
In an attempt to expand the response circle, Houthi elements exerted pressure on those who refused, including threatening penalties, ill-treatment, and denial of visits, in addition to exploiting the living conditions of their families by providing limited financial aid in exchange for their acceptance to join the fronts, according to human rights activists in Sanaa.
Forced recruitment
Human rights activists considered these practices a form of forced recruitment, stressing that using detention and deprivation of basic rights as a means to force prisoners to fight represents a serious violation of legal and humanitarian rules.
A former prisoner in the Central Correctional Facility in Sanaa said that the detainees do not face real offers for their release, as much as they are exposed to a process of blackmail that has previously affected other prisoners during the past months.
He added, "The Houthi militias want them to go to the fronts in exchange for their release, and whoever refuses faces further restrictions and penalties," noting that those detained in connection with various cases do not want their judicial files to turn into a means to force them to fight.
For his part, a relative of a detainee in the same prison expressed his fear that the release of prisoners would turn into a gateway to throwing them into battles instead of returning them to their families. He said that families had become afraid of their children leaving prison to the front lines instead of returning to their homes.
A human rights activist from Sanaa considered that what is happening represents a dangerous form of forced recruitment, explaining that “these are not voluntary consents, but rather decisions extracted under duress and psychological and humanitarian pressure,” and that exchanging freedom for fighting turns prisons into tools for providing fighters and deprives detainees of their most basic legal and human rights.
The Houthi group is facing a worsening human crisis on the fronts of southwestern Yemen, which has prompted it to escalate forced recruitment operations and attract fighters from the people of the districts of southern Taiz Governorate and the Al-Hujariya area, trying to capitalize on a previous plan through which it recruited many of the people of these areas years before it took control of them.
The violent battles taking place in Lahj Governorate led to a massive influx of dead and wounded Houthis to local hospitals, amid a strict media blackout in the neighboring Al-Shamaytain District.
Field sources in the region told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Houthi group launched intensive recruitment and recruitment campaigns targeting young people and families in the districts of Al-Mawasit, Al-Shamaytain, and Jabal Habashi in Taiz Governorate, trying to exploit the deteriorating living and economic conditions of the people as a tool for bargaining, and to pressure local notables to push the people of their regions to the battle lines to compensate for the severe shortage in its human stock.
Although this move is faced with widespread societal rejection from residents who refuse to send their children into the group’s battles, sources reported that they were able to attract dozens and transfer them to training camps in preparation for sending them to various fronts.
Information indicates that recruitment operations are still limited and confined to social circles loyal to the group, which seeks to expand it to include all residents who refuse to respond to its persistent attempts to normalize relations with them, including its efforts to resume the educational process.
The sources explain that the group has paved the way for these practices since long before its arrival in these areas, through cells that were active there to persuade dozens of young men to move to the areas under the group’s control and join training camps and battle fronts in exchange for many temptations.
Among these temptations, according to Asharq Al-Awsat sources, are obtaining sums of money to help them get married and arrange their family situations, in addition to salaries and bonuses.
What helped convince these young men to join the group in the previous period was the calm witnessed on the fronts due to the truce sponsored by the United Nations 4 years ago, which helped reassure them of the lack of risks to their lives and safety.
Recruitment strategy
According to the sources, the Houthi supervisors and cell leaders responsible for recruitment and recruitment from government-controlled areas worked to convince those who were recruited that joining the group would only cost them moving to the group’s areas of control, committing to combat training, and remaining on the battle fronts, in exchange for receiving salaries and helping them get married.
The sources show that the group was careful not to involve those it was able to recruit in the battles it fought to control their areas, out of concern for their loyalty and to use them to persuade their peers to join it later.
Observers believe that one of the reasons for the Houthi group to expand its control to the districts of southern Taiz Governorate is the population density of these areas, which allows it to transform them into a new human reservoir to supply the fronts with fighters.
The Houthis' failure to storm the city of Taiz and control Mount Sabr, adjacent to it, caused a change in the group's field plans and the redistribution of its fighters and their deployment on the fronts.
Recent reports recorded that the group resorted to withdrawing groups of its veteran fighters from the Taiz fronts (such as the Al Shaqab and Al Aqroud fronts in Jabal Sabr) in Taiz, after they suffered severe physical and psychological exhaustion as a result of the long stay on the contact lines, which doubled its need to recruit replacements from the southern regions of the governorate to compensate for this bleeding.
Human bleeding continues
The effects of accelerated recruitment and the introduction of untrained fighters were quickly reflected on the field. The areas of Souq Al-Rabu’ and the bottom of Aqbat Haijat Al-Abd in Al-Maqtara District, north of Lahj Governorate, and adjacent to Al-Shamaytain District, have been witnessing intense battles for days, causing heavy human losses among the group’s ranks.
Medical and local sources confirmed that Khalifa General Hospital in the city of Al-Turbah, the center of Al-Shamaytain District, received dozens of dead and wounded members and leaders of the Houthi militia, who fell as a result of concentrated strikes by government forces and local resistance.
The group imposed a tight security cordon and strict media secrecy around the hospital, and prevented filming crews or leaking any accurate statistics revealing the extent of the heavy human losses it suffered, which included prominent field commanders.
These developments reveal that the new Houthi recruitment strategy in the Al-Hujariya areas does not only target field control, but also attempts to create a sustainable local human fence to protect its supply lines, which threatens to explode the social situation in those areas as a result of the growing popular rejection of the policy of mobilization and forced involvement in the conflict.
The people in the various districts of Taiz, which the group recently took control of, refuse to allow their children to return to schools for fear of Houthi mobilization and recruitment activities.
Government educational authorities in the governorate have suspended the educational process with several decisions since the start of the Houthi escalation, warning school principals and educational offices against responding to the group and allowing it to use schools to recruit children.
