Donald Trump suffered a major defeat in the American legislative elections. Democrats won control of the House and Senate, advanced on historic Republican strongholds and imposed on the president two years of coexistence with an opposition Congress. But will this change reduce its offensive on Latin America? The answer is far from clear.
The results of the polls express a rejection of the government's conduct, fueled by the cost of living and the war with Iran. It does not mean, however, that voters have specifically condemned Trump's actions on the continent. Cuba and Venezuela, for example, rarely occupy the center of the national electorate's concerns, although they mobilize politically influential sectors, especially in Florida.
The new Congress may impose obstacles on the White House. Democrats will be able to investigate military operations in the Caribbean, oil agreements with Venezuela, deportations and financial support for Javier Milei's Argentina. They may question spending, hinder diplomatic appointments and try to recover legislative responsibilities in trade policy.
But monitoring is not the same as preventing. Trump will retain broad autonomy in foreign policy, in addition to veto power. And the new Democratic majority will only take office in January.
There is a paradox in this situation. As analyst James Bosworth notes, American presidents who lose control of Congress can turn their attention to foreign policy, where they find greater freedom of action. Therefore, a weakened Trump within the United States will not necessarily be less interventionist outside it.
The consequences, however, will not be the same for all countries. Cuba constitutes a particular case. The pressure on Havana has deep roots in American politics and has the support of organized sectors of the Cuban-American community. The Republican defeat does not eliminate these interests nor Marco Rubio's influence in formulating regional policy.
In Venezuela, military operations and oil deals could face greater scrutiny. This does not guarantee, however, a change in guidance from the White House. The hypothesis of an intensification of pressure remains open, as does the possibility that legislative supervision will impose effective limits.
For Brazil and Argentina, the issues are different. The review of commercial tariffs could gain ground in Congress, while Washington's support for Milei will be more exposed to questioning. None of these moves, however, can be taken for granted.
Trump's defeat also coincides with difficulties faced by some of his Latin American allies. In Paraguay, Santiago Peña, close to the American president, announced his resignation amid a serious banking crisis and was impeached. The causes are internal, but the episode adds instability to the regional scenario.
There is also the time factor. Trump will remain in the White House until January 2029, and Latin American governments will already have to consider the approach of his succession. For allies and adversaries, the question will not just be how to deal with Washington today, but how much to bet on a policy that could change within two years.
The electoral defeat changed the correlation of forces in the USA, not American interests in Latin America. Congress will be able to increase the political cost of interventions, but not suppress them by decree. What remains to be seen is whether Trump, faced with a society concerned above all with its own problems, will choose to moderate his regional offensive or seek it as a show of force.
