Is the conflict between the countryside and the city a breeding ground for votes for the extreme right? Some data would support rural unrest: an aging and masculinized world, with a large demographic gap in which one in five children under 13 years of age is of foreign origin.
However, the diagnosis is not conclusive. And, furthermore, it shows a certain divorce between Catalonia and the rest of Spain in relation to the potential growth of ultra suffrage. For example, in 2023 the vote in Spanish towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants gave priority to the PP or the PSOE, while placing Vox below or at its state average. On the other hand, in Catalonia, Aliança Catalana achieved its best result in 2024 (like its main nutrient, Junts) in towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants. And although that support waned as the size of the habitat increased, it was compensated by the rise of the ultra-Spanish, but also anti-immigration, vote of Vox.
Even so, positions on immigration do not reveal excessive contrasts between the rural and urban worlds: support for limiting the entry of foreigners into Spain (around 38%) is similar in all towns with less than one million inhabitants, and only falls (up to 28%) in two large capitals such as Madrid or Barcelona. What's more, in the Catalan case the perception of an excess of foreigners does not reach 50% among those who live in towns with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, although it is close to 73% in towns with up to 10,000 residents and rises to 80% in the range between 150,000 and less than one million.
The impact on the rural world of the new demographic realities can be seen more clearly in the type of society chosen: only 56% of those who live in towns of less than 2,000 inhabitants prefer a society “with citizens of different origin, culture and religion” (10 points less than among residents of towns with more than 10,000 souls). Now, the lines of rupture appear even more clearly when topics that affect the direct interest of those who live in habitats of different sizes are addressed. For example, almost 60% of those who reside in towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants believe that “Spain should limit the import of foreign products to protect the national economy” (the burdensome tariffs exhibited by the extreme right). In contrast, this percentage falls below 44% among citizens of large capitals. And in the Catalan case, this identity with local production is seen in the support for secession (64% in areas with up to 2,000 residents and less than 40% in those with more than 50,000).
The other major nutrient of rural discontent affects public services, especially transportation, but also health and education. In Madrid or Barcelona, up to 54% are very or quite satisfied with the functioning of public services. On the other hand, this rate falls below 43% among those who live in towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants (although the satisfaction percentage barely exceeds 45% among those who live in towns with up to one million inhabitants). That is to say, if rural unrest arises from scarcity or difficulty in accessing public services, urban unrest would be attributable to overcrowding.
Perhaps that explains why the extreme right is not yet overrepresented electorally in the rural world. Of course, if a more recent experience is studied (the regional elections of Aragon and the case of Teruel) the data do reflect a vote for Vox above the average in around a third of the many small rural centers of that emptied Spain. But this also happens in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants (such as Teruel capital, where the ultras were the second force) or Alcañiz.
