Critical Alliance in Ethiopia: The Collapse of the Pretoria Peace Agreement and its Regional Repercussions

SETA Foreign Policy Researcher Dr. Tunç Demirtaş wrote about the joint alliance formed by seven armed and opposition groups in Ethiopia against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed for AA Analysis.

The process that attracted attention with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) seizure of airports in Ethiopia does not only mean the re-ignition of a civil war. This process is the new frontier of the sharpening regional bloc in the Horn of Africa.

What happened on the morning of September 23 in northern Ethiopia showed that the Pretoria Peace Agreement, signed in November 2022, effectively collapsed. TPLF forces took control of Mekelle, Axum and Shirah airports from the federal police and detained federal personnel there. Ethiopian Airlines suspended all flights to the region. The clashes soon spilled over into Abala and Erebti in Afar, and around Alamata and Kobo on the border with Southern Tigray and Amhara. The Tigray administration also declared that it was entering a "defense war". However, airports are only the visible side of the story... To read the process correctly, it is necessary to look at five separate headings.

The real break: The Alliance for Survival

On September 20, seven armed and opposition structures announced that they had established a common front called the "Alliance for the Survival of the Ethiopian Peoples". The alliance includes TPLF, Amhara Fano National Movement, Oromo Liberation Front (OLA), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Afar, Benishangul and Gumuz movements. The goal is seen as overthrowing the administration of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and establishing an inclusive transitional government. Alliance members operate in half of the country's twelve regional states.

The founding declaration of the alliance was read by Fano leader Zemene Kassie on Tigray television. This detail is perhaps the most striking aspect of the alliance. Fano was one of Abiy Ahmed's most important allies in the 2020-2022 war; Together with Amhara forces, he fought alongside the federal army against the TPLF and took control of Western Tigray. However, in 2023, the federal government's decision to disband regional special forces severed this alliance, and Fano began an armed rebellion against Abiy. Today, yesterday's ally is on the same front with yesterday's enemy. This transformation is critical in two respects. First, a key pillar of the coalition that carried Abiy to victory in 2020 is now on the opposing side. When Eritrea, which the Addis Ababa government sees as behind the opposition, is taken into account, yesterday's allies are now on the opposing front. Second, the deep animosity between Amhara and Tigray appears to have been put on hold, at least for now, in the face of a common enemy. This means that the federal army faces pressure from both the north and south on the Tigray-Amhara line. A fundamental truth of Ethiopian politics becomes apparent once again; Alliances are formed based on a common enemy rather than a common vision of the future.

Who started the war?

There are two stark narratives about who started the war. The Addis Ababa government says the TPLF has launched an all-out attack on federal positions in Afar and Amhara. Mekelle, on the other hand, argues that federal forces launched a ground operation after UAV, warplane and artillery bombardment. Neither narrative has been confirmed yet. Claims of losses and territorial control coming from the field should also be approached with the same caution.

On the other hand, this war did not start overnight. The background to the rupture had been building for months. TPLF deactivated the interim administration established by the peace agreement in May. On August 1, clashes took place in Shererina, on the Sudanese border, in which heavy weapons were used. Then, UAV attacks occurred, extending to the area around Mekelle. The June elections, boycotted by the opposition, also deepened the legitimacy debate.

The two lines on the field are also important. It is among the information coming from the field that Fano is trying to cut off the Dessie-Woldiya highway in Amhara, which connects the capital to the north. It is reported that Tigray forces are fighting together with a local armed group in Afar. Due to Addis Ababa's goal of accessing Assab, Afar is also a transit corridor for a possible war with Eritrea.

Regional dimension: from Sudan to the Nile to the Red Sea

There are indications that Ethiopia hosts a training camp in Benishangul-Gumuz for Rapid Support Forces (HDK) militias operating to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state in Sudan. Yale University's satellite analyzes also support these findings. Although the Addis Ababa government and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reject the findings, the picture has now exceeded the level of allegations. As a matter of fact, the country that opened space for its neighbor's war also increased its own fragility.

The timing of the events is also noteworthy. The United States (US) lifted sanctions against the Eritrean military and ruling party on September 18. An alliance was formed two days later, and clashes began five days later. Addis Ababa sees Eritrean financing behind the alliance, which Eritrea denies. However, it is clear that this situation expands Asmara's field of action.

Another critical actor in the equation is Egypt. The opening of the Renaissance Dam, built by the Ethiopian government on the Blue Nile near the Sudanese border, and Addis Ababa's plans for new dams on the Nile have turned the issue into an existential water problem for Cairo. Egypt deepened its alliance with Eritrea, signed a security agreement with Somalia in 2024, and facilitated the Eritrea-Saudi Arabia rapprochement. A weakened Addis Ababa strengthens Cairo's hand in Nile negotiations. However, the uncontrolled disintegration of Ethiopia; It also directly affects Egypt through refugee flows and dam security. Therefore, this process proceeds in a very sensitive equation that may add new ones to existing humanitarian crises.

On the other hand, the general picture points to a sharp blockade. On the one hand, there is the UAE-Ethiopia cooperation and the destabilization of the region by Israel, which recognized Somaliland in December 2025. On the other hand, there are the Red Sea accounts of Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia.

The future of Abiy's government

It is too early to tell the fate of Abiy Ahmed's administration. TPLF lost most of its heavy weapons in 2022. Federal air power is decisive in the field. The alliance remains unresolved territorial disputes such as Western Tigray. It is also unclear to what extent OLA will step into the field.

Three indicators will be decisive in the coming weeks: First, the course of the conflicts on the Raya-Alamata-Kobo line and the Dessie-Woldiya highway, secondly, whether the OLA will open a new front in Oromia, and thirdly, whether Eritrea will make an open military intervention.

If the third option comes true, conflicts may gain a regional dimension rather than a civil war. However, the real issue is how armed conflicts within the country will interact with the security policies of neighboring states and whether regional diplomatic mechanisms can limit this escalation.