A widespread controversy has erupted in Palestinian circles in recent hours after statements made by a member of the Fatah Central Committee, Majed Faraj, who called on Hamas, during a public meeting in preparation for the legislative elections, to apologize to the Palestinian people for what happened to them following what he described as a “disaster” on October 7, 2023.
Faraj said, in front of activists from the Fatah movement, that “Hamas, before it returns to participating in political life as a Palestinian faction like all other factions, must apologize to the Palestinian people for the catastrophe that has befallen them since October 7th.” Faraj added: “This position represents a personal opinion and not an official position.”
Supporters of the Fatah movement and some of its leaders, including Zakaria al-Zubaidi, the prisoner who was recently liberated from Israeli prisons during the war as part of a prisoner exchange deal concluded by Hamas with Israel, which put him under criticism from activists from the Islamic movement and its freed prisoners.
These statements prompted a member of the Hamas political bureau, Basem Naim, to criticize Faraj, the Palestinian Authority, and Fatah, considering that the October 7 attack had strategic consequences not only for Palestine, but for the region and the world.
Naim said in a tweet on his account on the Telegram application: “If (Hamas) has to apologise, Majid Faraj must demand that (Fatah) and the late President Yasser Arafat, apologize for the (disasters) - according to Majid Faraj’s standard, not my standard - that they caused to the Palestinians over the course of decades, the last of which was (Al-Aqsa Intifada), which caused the reoccupation of the West Bank in Operation Defensive Shield, and before that in Jordan, Lebanon, the First Gulf War, and others.”
Naim stressed that “any Palestinian has the right to evaluate any stage in the history of the Palestinian struggle, and he has the right to demand amendment or accountability, but this right should not be used capriciously or selectively or to serve external agendas, especially since the alternative project (Oslo) proves every day that it was a major sin, and its catastrophic failure.” Naim also considered that “the Zionist entity is accelerating after (the Al-Aqsa flood) towards the abyss and extinction.”
The Hamas leader said that his movement often called for a meeting at one table for dialogue under a purely national roof to evaluate all paths, including the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” on the basis of full partnership in peace and war, but Fatah refused, the most recent of which was the two meetings in Ankara and El Alamein, considering that insisting on a state of exclusivity and exclusion will not save anyone from the catastrophic Palestinian situation, indicating that his movement is still ready for a comprehensive dialogue to save the Palestinian people.
Munther Al-Hayek, a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, came out in defense of his movement’s position after what Naeem wrote. He said that the only thing his movement can apologize for is that it has not yet been able to achieve an independent Palestinian state. He pointed out that Fatah had built a national authority, and the Palestinians had an entity, an identity, and a passport. It had achieved a large part of the dream of a state until Palestine became an “observer state” in the United Nations.
Al-Hayek directed a question to Bassem Naeem, saying: “If all of this was a disaster in your view, then tell us clearly, what alternative did you offer to our people?” And what did you achieve for him?” He pointed out that “Hamas” bears responsibility as it stood in the way of the path of the national liberation process and weakened the political path, and created the conditions that brought the Israeli extreme right to power.
Al-Hayek listed many questions about what Hamas did and the results it achieved throughout the war and elsewhere, considering review, evaluation, and apology to be a normal condition for any responsibility.
The Revolutionary Council and the National List
This comes in the midst of mutual accusations between the two movements about each party’s intention to disrupt the elections and work to postpone them, at a time when “Hamas” sought to form a broad electoral coalition consisting of several factions, something that “Fatah” worked to try to thwart, and convinced factions of the “Palestinian Liberation Organization”, such as the “Popular Front”, not to join it, at a time when it seeks to unify its ranks internally.
In this regard, the “Fatah Revolutionary Council” announced the movement’s intention to run in the legislative elections scheduled for the end of next November, within an official national list in consultation with the organization’s factions, in a way that protects the national project, expands the basis of partnership, and returns recourse to the will of the Palestinian people as the source of legitimacy and decision maker, stressing at the end of its first session after its recent election that the legislative elections are a national and legal entitlement and demand to strengthen Palestinian legitimacy and embody the right to self-determination in a fully sovereign Palestinian state on borders. June 4, 1967.
The Revolutionary Council said: “The state of national emergency requires the seriousness of comprehensive national dialogue to achieve national unity, including all components of the Palestinian people and its factions, and work to restore unity within the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in a way that serves the supreme national interest,” stressing the political and geographical unity between Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and that protecting the citizen and confronting settlement is a movement and national responsibility.
In his opening speech, President Mahmoud Abbas stressed his commitment to “the democratic process, holding legislative elections on November 28, 2026, and completing the formation of the National Council,” and called on “the international community to put pressure on Israel and prevent it from obstructing the holding of elections in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.”
Seven inmates at Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) prison in the Aleppo countryside, which has a Kurdish majority, died, and a number of others suffered from suffocation, as a result of a fire that broke out inside the prison on Saturday, “during a state of chaos sparked by a number of inmates, against the backdrop of the riots that the city witnessed on Friday,” according to the official SANA agency.
According to a security source, the prison is still managed by its former cadres, the “Asayish,” and the Internal Security Forces have not yet taken over it, while local sources indicated that the issue of “revenge” is one of “the most serious obstacles facing the ongoing integration process in the east and north of the country.”
The fire broke out at dawn on Saturday in the prison following reports of prisoners being transferred to Aleppo. Local sources said that the prisoners set fires because they refused to be transferred, but the Asayish prison officials delayed opening the doors, which led to deaths and injuries, amid accusations that the Revolutionary Youth Organization had started the fire and caused chaos.
Despite the Syrian government’s announcement of handing over the prisons from the SDF last April, some prisons were not handed over due to the delay in field procedures for handing over and taking over, and the accompanying protests of rejection, as happened previously with the handover of the “Palace of Justice” in Al-Hasakah and Qamishli.
Large security reinforcements arrived on the night of Friday and Saturday in the city of Ain al-Arab to control the security chaos there, according to a statement by the Internal Security Directorate, in which it explained that security force patrols were deployed in the city to secure a protest against the killing of the young man, Sami Sheikhmous Hasso (a former leader in the SDF), at the hands of those involved, whom the Internal Security Forces continue to pursue.
The statement added, “During the protest, a number of participants threw stones at security personnel, coinciding with shooting and setting fire to a number of security headquarters in the city, which led to casualties among the Internal Security Forces, who then intervened to control the situation and arrested a number of those involved in the attacks, while search and prosecution operations continue to arrest the rest of those involved.”
The Security Directorate called on the people of Ain al-Arab “to exercise calm and restraint and not to be drawn into any attempts to destabilize or disturb civil peace.”
Protests also erupted in the Kurdish-majority areas of Al-Hasakah and Aleppo governorates, after the killing of Sheikhmous Hasso following his kidnapping on the tenth of this month, in an incident considered the third of its kind.
Protesters in Qamishli issued a statement in which they indicated the presence of “forces seeking to thwart the integration process and prevent the Kurdish people from obtaining their rights and legal status within the Syrian state, by standing behind these incidents, planning and implementing them.”
The statement called on the Syrian government to “clarify the circumstances of the crime, open a transparent investigation, and hold its perpetrators accountable and punish them according to the law,” calling on the people to “be vigilant, unite, preserve their unity, and not allow any party to exploit them to serve its political agendas.”
A tedious task
Local local sources described the incident as a “revenge” crime. She stressed that the presidential team is making “arduous” efforts to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of integration, “however, the issue of revenge cannot be reduced unless the perpetrators of crimes and violations among the elements who were affiliated with the SDF forces during the past years are held accountable, or at least isolated from the integration process, and the door is opened for them to be held accountable before the judiciary.”
The Al-Hasakah Media Center had announced, earlier on Friday, that the killing of Sheikhmous Hasso “was motivated by revenge for two brothers from the region who were killed about two years ago at a checkpoint in Al-Hasakah Governorate.”
The Center quoted local sources as reporting that a number of members of the dissolved SDF forces had set up flying checkpoints at the southern entrance to the city of Qamishli, arresting passers-by and searching them. This is in light of the escalating tension taking place in the governorate.
In an effort to contain the tension, the Deputy Governor of Al-Hasakah, Ahmed Al-Hilali, chaired a meeting on Saturday with notables and tribal figures in the governorate building, to discuss the latest developments. The “Al-Hasakah Media Directorate” reported that the meeting addressed the importance of “strengthening communication and coordination between social and tribal activities, and their role in supporting stability and civil peace and consolidating community cohesion,” in addition to unifying efforts and enhancing cooperation between various activities in a way that serves the security and stability of the governorate.
The Syrian government took over the administration of the city of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) in May 2026 from the SDF forces, which had controlled it since 2019, in implementation of the January 29 agreement with the Syrian government.
The Kurdish majority is concentrated in the city of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), while members of the Arab tribes are concentrated in the region’s countryside, in addition to minorities of Armenians, Turkmens, and Syriacs.
The leader of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, from Damascus, officially announced the dissolution of the SDF forces on August 25, 2026. He will then assume his duties as an advisor in the presidential palace.
On Saturday, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior announced the seizure of 47 drones and 46 projectiles in an abandoned site west of the governorate, likely belonging to one of the armed factions that enjoy broad military influence in those areas.
The security development in Anbar coincides with attacks carried out by armed factions against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which observers believe, with a degree of cautious optimism, that the authorities are serious about putting an end to these attacks.
The Ministry of Interior said, in a statement, “Based on accurate intelligence information, detachments of the Anbar Governorate Police Command were able to seize an abandoned site in the 35th area, which was previously used as a tire repair shop, and found inside it quantities of drones, projectiles, and equipment related to their operation.”
The ministry added, "The inspection resulted in the seizure of 47 drones and 46 projectiles prepared for connection and use with these aircraft, as well as control devices, batteries, equipment, and other related materials in the 35th area in Anbar."
The site was secured and all seized items were seized, while the competent authorities began their investigative and technical procedures to find out the source of these materials and the parties associated with them, and to take the necessary legal measures in accordance with the rules and regulations, according to the statement.
Security sources in the governorate believe that the seized aircraft and materials belong to one of the armed factions loyal to Iran and operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces.
The sources confirm that “the security leaders are seeking to prevent Anbar Governorate from turning into a platform for launching missiles at neighboring countries.”
Anbar Governorate, with its vast area and borders, is linked to three Arab countries: Jordan, Syria, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the sources confirm that it “represents a strategic priority for the armed factions and Iran, as it was the main corridor for transferring weapons to the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to the Lebanese Hezbollah.”
According to security information, many parties operate within the governorate. In addition to the official army and police forces, there are forces from local groups and clans, some of which are under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Factions known for their ties to Iran also operate, such as the Hezbollah Brigades, which have three brigades in the Popular Mobilization Forces and are considered the most influential in western Anbar.
The Al-Nujaba Movement, as well as the Sayyid Al-Shuhada Brigades, are also active in Anbar, and sources indicate that they are present in areas near the Iraqi-Syrian border in coordination with other security formations. There is a presence of fighters affiliated with Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization in various areas in the governorate, but they are relatively far from the border with Syria, according to the sources.
The geographic nature of the governorate, represented by extended deserts, rugged valleys, and abandoned military sites, provides an ideal environment for the factions to establish weapons depots and bases for launching and storing drones and missile projectiles, away from the direct control of the state center.
During the Iranian-American war last March, local reports said that forces affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces and the factions left their positions and redeployed away from the border areas.
On August 31, the Anbar Sector Operations Commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Qasim Musleh, denied evacuating the Mobilization Forces’ headquarters in Anbar, stressing that the units would continue to perform their security duties normally.
Musleh said, in a statement, that the units of the Anbar Sector Operations Command continue to carry out their duties within the areas of responsibility, with high levels of readiness and preparedness, noting that all headquarters and units are working in accordance with the approved security plans.
