Four years after Pretoria Agreement, TPLF regroups as peace unravels in Tigray

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – When Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022, it was meant to end two years of devastating war.

The agreement called for a permanent cessation of hostilities, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Tigrayan forces, political dialogue and the return of displaced people. Article 7 also required the TPLF to refrain from conscription, training, deployment and mobilisation of military forces, as well as preparations for renewed conflict.

Nearly four years later, the large-scale war has ended, but many of the disputes that fuelled it remain unresolved.

More significantly, the period since 2024 has seen the TPLF reposition itself politically and organisationally while retaining military leverage and developing new relationships.

The sequence is striking: TPLF contacts with Eritrean officials, including reported meetings in Dubai and Zalambessa; a renewed struggle over political control in Tigray; reports of recruitment and mobilisation; new clashes involving Tigrayan forces; and the emergence of Tsimdo, a loose convergence of groups opposed to the federal government.

Taken together, the developments raise a question over whether Pretoria became less a completed transition to peace than a period in which the TPLF could regroup and reposition itself while the underlying conflict remained unresolved.

There is no evidence that the TPLF entered the agreement with a predetermined plan to use it as a tactical pause. But the events since 2024 suggest that the movement has retained an organisational and security role that Pretoria was supposed to diminish.

What happened to disarmament?

Article 6 established the process for disarming, demobilising and reintegrating TPLF fighters. Tigrayan forces handed over heavy weapons after the agreement, and thousands of former combatants have entered demobilisation programmes.

But the process did not fully dismantle the region’s military structures.

In 2026, reports emerged of renewed recruitment and forced mobilisation in Tigray. If confirmed, such activity would go beyond the incomplete implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process and directly challenge Article 7’s ban on conscription and mobilisation.

The distinction between organised mobilisation and the views of Tigray’s civilian population is important.

There is no basis for assuming that Tigrayans as a whole support a return to war. Many are still living with the consequences of the last conflict.

A civilian source in Tigray, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said: “The people of Tigray want peace; we don’t want a second war.”

For those civilians, reports of recruitment carry a simple implication: the possibility of being pulled back into a conflict they believed had ended.

How did the TPLF reposition itself?

The change was not only in the military.

From 2024, the TPLF was increasingly consumed by an internal struggle over its direction after the war. The internal meetings and political manoeuvring formed part of a wider contest over the movement’s future.

The struggle eventually reached Tigray’s political institutions.

Getachew Reda was removed as head of the interim administration in 2025 and replaced by Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede.

Then, in May 2026, the Tigray regional council was reinstated and elected Debretsion Gebremichael as president, strengthening the position of the faction around him.

The developments showed that the TPLF remained a powerful political force in Tigray. Instead of a settled post-war political order emerging, the region was again caught in a struggle over authority while the security question remained unresolved.

When did politics turn back into fighting?

By early 2026, political tensions were accompanied by military developments.

Tigray Defence Forces-aligned troops crossed the Tekeze River into the disputed Tselemt district in January and clashed with Ethiopian federal forces. Later, TDF-aligned fighters took control of Alamata and Korem after a federal command post withdrew.

By August, fighting had again broken out in western Tigray near the Sudanese border, in another serious breach of the peace agreement.

The federal government and the TPLF blamed each other for the escalation, while responsibility for initiating the clashes remained disputed.

But the renewed fighting demonstrated that organised armed forces were still capable of mobilising and contesting territory.

The incomplete disarmament has therefore become more consequential as the political disputes left unresolved by Pretoria have begun to coincide with renewed military activity.

Why are former enemies finding common ground?

The repositioning has extended beyond Tigray.

Eritrea and the TPLF fought a devastating border war from 1998 to 2000. Eritrean forces later fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal government against the TPLF during the 2020-22 Tigray war.

Yet the post-Pretoria period has brought reports of closer contacts between Eritrea and elements of the TPLF.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting the TPLF and using it as a proxy. Eritrea rejects that characterisation.

A broader realignment is reflected in the emergence of Tsimdo, a loose convergence of groups opposed to the federal government.

Recent reporting has identified cooperation involving the TPLF, Fano, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and other armed groups. Fano leader Zemene Kassie has confirmed the existence of such a coalition while saying Eritrea is not currently part of it.

The significance of Tsimdo lies not simply in whether its members share the same political programme, but in what they appear willing to put aside to cooperate.

Major disputes remain unresolved: displaced people have yet to return to some contested areas, including Welkait, while territorial claims continue to divide Tigray and Amhara actors.

Yet groups that once fought on opposing sides now appear willing to set aside some of those differences when cooperation can increase pressure on the federal government.

That raises a further question about the TPLF’s post-Pretoria strategy. The organisation appears to be rebuilding its political influence while retaining links to armed structures, even as many Tigrayans remain displaced and fear renewed mobilisation.

The emerging convergence points to a potentially widening gap between the strategic calculations of political and armed actors and the immediate interests of civilians still dealing with the consequences of war.

The groups have different histories and political ambitions, and their cooperation may not last. But their willingness to find common ground against Addis Ababa matters.

For the TPLF, Tsimdo offers another arena in which to build political and strategic relationships beyond Tigray.

What did Pretoria leave unresolved?

The war displaced about 1.9 million people. Many remain unable to return, particularly to disputed areas including Welkait, Tsegede, Humera and Raya.

Those territorial disputes remain closely tied to the return of displaced Tigrayans, while the political relationship between Tigray and the federal government remains unsettled.

The federal government has also failed to deliver on important elements of the post-war settlement. But those failures do not erase the TPLF’s commitments under Pretoria.

Article 6 envisaged the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of its fighters. Article 7 banned conscription, mobilisation and preparations for renewed conflict.

The record since 2024 does not prove that Pretoria was deliberately used by the TPLF to buy time.

It does, however, show a movement that has remained politically organised, fought to regain control of Tigray’s institutions, retained links to armed structures and found new potential partners as the settlement stalled.

Pretoria ended the large-scale war. It did not settle the struggle over power, territory and security that lay beneath it.

For Tigrayans, however, the calculations are simpler.

A young man from Tigray, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said: “The fear of being drafted is what’s making many youth lose hope.”