The Kremlin presents figures as evidence of Europe's continued dependence on Russian energy sources. However, a closer look shows why the calculation doesn't add up and why the problem is still by no means solved.
Russia charges the EU for its energy imports worth billions. At the end of Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Nowak's statements there is a number: despite the sanctions, EU countries have paid around 286 billion euros to Moscow for oil and natural gas since 2022. The impressive-sounding number leaves out many factors and backgrounds, probably deliberately.
The first missing classification is the statement “since 2022”. This does not automatically mean since the start of the war, February 24, 2022. There was no EU oil embargo in the first months of the war. The embargo on Russian crude oil by sea only came into force on December 5, 2022, and that on refined oil products on February 5, 2023. The bill therefore includes significant purchases that took place before these import bans.
There were several EU countries such as Germany and Poland that had previously declared their intention to be independent of Russian oil and gas before the EU embargo. Oil contracts were not renewed and Russian supplies were gradually replaced.
The figures from the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (Crea) show how much of the EU's energy imports the first year of the war still represents. From February 24, 2022 to the beginning of January 2023, around 134 billion euros flowed to Russia for oil, oil products, pipeline gas, LNG and coal. To date, according to Crea, EU countries have paid around 238 billion euros to the Kremlin. This means that a significant portion was collected between the start of the war and the beginning of January 2023, while the smaller portion was spread over the following four years. The cumulative total obscures how much annual payments have declined.
There are several reasons why the numbers differ. Crea counts from the start of the war and estimates revenue based on delivery quantities and pricing models, while Russia does not disclose the exact period and its calculation. A possible earlier start to the Russian census as well as differences in prices and recorded energy sources could explain the deviation. This has not yet been proven.
Regardless of the divergence, it remains an enormous sum that EU countries continue to pay to Russia despite war and sanctions. Countries like Hungary and Slovakia continue to receive Russian crude oil through the Druzhba pipeline. An exception to the oil embargo applies to these deliveries, which was created because of the special dependence of the two landlocked countries and the difficult transition to alternative delivery routes.
For natural gas, there are still approved pipeline supply contracts in Hungary, Slovakia and Greece. Russian liquefied natural gas mainly reaches France, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands. These deliveries are possible due to transition periods for existing long-term contracts: For LNG, the complete import ban applies from January 1, 2027, for pipeline gas in principle from September 30, 2027, and from November 1, 2027 at the latest. The deadlines are intended to prevent interruptions in supply. However, Russian LNG can ultimately also end up in other EU countries because it can be resold within Europe.
Energy imports worth billions remain a source of income for Moscow's war. The large total quoted by Russia obscures how much the business has changed. Whether Europe's complete exit will be successful will depend on whether the last exceptions and transition periods actually expire.
