The instrumentalization of migration by the radical right in Europe

Radical right-wing patriots gladly navigate the waves of migration. They are their favorite media shock, caused by the “invasion” of the external enemy, they allow heavy-handed solutions and, for their leaders, to appear as the necessary saviors of the homeland in troubled times. They are an opportunity to show strength in the national imagination, but not to promote better solutions.

Freedom of movement based on Schengen is widely accepted and generates numerous benefits for European economies. The tightening of the European Union's migration policy is a constant, and agreements are promoted with third countries (Morocco among them) for the repatriation of migrants, while tight control is exercised over the external borders of the Union – Fortress Europe. It is the recipe resulting from the consensus between conservatives (for example, Merz in Germany), certain social democrats (such as Frederiksen in Denmark) and the radical right (led by Meloni).

Each migration crisis is a test for European solidarity, but not for freedom of movement or European migration policy, which continue to be based on the same precepts. Ceuta has been the perfect opportunity to blame Spain for the recent extraordinary regularization, when other countries often do them, and for laxity in border control, when most of the irregular entries into the Mediterranean happen in Italy.

Seen in perspective, the card of 22 borders on the ridiculous. Citizens of Ceuta and Melilla undergo specific controls for entry into mainland Spain. There have been no crossings of migrants to other European countries that justify the temporary restrictions on mobility, nor the proposed expulsion of Spain from the Schengen area, something not provided for in the Treaties. The crisis has been short, manufactured like other hybrid threats and without risk for all EU member states. Schengen remains standing and works, despite the fireworks promoted by the Europe of the patriots.

The only immigration-related proposal from the radical right has been made by Vox for years. It calls for a permanent office of the European border agency, Frontex, to be established in Ceuta and Melilla, in an attempt to Europeanise a national problem. Other patriotic forces, however, only emit signals of opportunism in a national key every time an irregular migration crisis arises. Any effort to strengthen joint mechanisms at the European level is met with skepticism.

The external dimension of the borders allows us to show national muscle, so its European harmonization will not happen in the Union of Patriots. This Europe, which could be consolidated in 2027 with the French presidential elections, would result in constant patriotic clashes: Le Pen has proposed repatriating European nationals of migrant origin, and this would bother Meloni if ​​they were Italian citizens.

In the north and in the east, solidarity is expressed when Russia is the hand that rocks the cradle. In 2021, the EU member states showed their solidarity with Poland in the face of the hybrid attack that instrumentalized migrants on its border with Belarus. Lukashenko then acted as a special envoy of the Kremlin, the main actor in European destabilization. However, this solidarity has not been expressed in the same way when those putting pressure are partners such as Türkiye, Tunisia or Morocco. Geopolitical Europe has its brakes on multiple national divisions.

The recent EU Justice and Home Affairs Council downgraded criticism of Spain's extraordinary regularization and blurred its link with the Ceuta crisis. But the displays of solidarity between Europeans came late, and only when the patriots had already set the tone of the debate. The best antidote for the next migration crisis will be to have learned the lesson of Ceuta: European solidarity must not give way to opportunism at a national level.