The Scandinavian countries should focus more on the defense of Finland, believes Håkan Edström, professor of military strategy at the Norwegian Air Force Academy in Trondheim and associate professor of security policy and strategy at the Stockholm Defense Academy.
- We can do much, much more. But it also requires that Finland actually opens up, says Edström.
Finland's point of view has long been that its own forces are responsible for the defense of Finnish territory. Thus, they are also not available to support NATO abroad.
- It was later relaxed, but Finland must also show that it is prepared to accept help, says Edström.
Swedish Jas Gripen fighter jets are currently participating in monitoring the integrity of Finnish airspace, while the Swedish corvette HMS Helsingborg is patrolling the Gulf of Finland under the command of the Finnish Navy.
At the same time, Sweden has decided to send a Patriot anti-aircraft battery to Poland, to replace a Dutch anti-aircraft battery that protected materiel transports to Ukraine. Another 100 soldiers from Air Defense Regiment 6 participate in the operation.
Edström believes that Sweden's focus is partly in the wrong direction. The Baltic countries and Poland are under NATO operational headquarters Brunssum's area of responsibility, while Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are under NATO operational headquarters Norfolk's command.
- As small states, we cannot be everything. Sweden, which after all is a frontline state, chooses to send air defense systems to Poland. Why don't the member states under Brunssum do that?
Finland currently lacks air defense systems such as Patriot, which can combat ballistic robots of the type used by Russia to terrorize Ukraine.
Recently, Sweden completed another exercise to defend Gotland, this time together with German forces. Gotland is described by Major General Stefan Sandborg, deputy head of the Swedish Armed Forces' operations management, as "the key to the Baltic Sea" due to its strategic location.
- I think the focus on Gotland risks becoming a conceptual cuckoo. We should focus more on the Nordics. We should focus more on Finland, says Edström.
Gotland, Åland, the Suwalki corridor between Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, and Narva are often pointed out as potential targets for a limited Russian military attack. Edström believes that the discussion partly had the wrong focus.
The capabilities of the Russian military are limited due to the war in Ukraine, so the Kremlin would probably look for areas where Russia has a reasonable balance of power against NATO. The Baltics and Poland are relatively well prepared with advanced NATO forces, surveillance of the airspace and the ability to quickly send reinforcements.
- But Northern Finland is relatively undefended, says Edström.
NATO has recently established FLF Finland, a forward force in northern Finland. The battalion battle group is based in Boden, Sweden.
- They are not even grouped in Finland. They are in Sweden, says Edström.
Russia has a habit of inventing a pretext for a military attack, for example by claiming that it is a preventive attack. In Northern Finland, Russia could claim that it needs to protect the military bases on the Kola Peninsula.
- Of course, Russia knows about Finland's military capacity, so it is not so easy to do something against Finland either, says Edström.
Åland has often been pointed out as a potential target in the Baltic Sea. Demilitarization is a challenge for defense planning. According to Edström, Russia could absolutely see a unilateral suspension of demilitarization as a pretext for a conflict.
- It is said that we should not provoke Russia, but the question is how much Russia is allowed to provoke us. At some stage we have to stop pawing around this Russian bear, which is no longer a bear, but rather a squirrel, says Edström.
According to Edström, the timing would in principle be favorable to cancel demilitarization, as Russia is weakened by the war in Ukraine. If Russia were to come out of the war as a winner, stronger than before, it is definitely too late.
- If you are weak against Russia, you have already found yourself at a disadvantage, says Edström.
The discussion in Europe is often about the weak points, which Russia can exploit. It is emphasized, for example, how little operational depth there is in the Baltic countries.
Edström believes that it is not worth getting locked into different scenarios. He points out that, for example, it is only 20 miles between Russian Kandalaksha and Finnish Salla.
- Why do we constantly think defensive operations? Think offensively. What if we were to cut off the Kandalaksha corridor. It would be very difficult for Russia to reinforce the Kola Peninsula if the Murmansk line was cut off, says Edström.
Finland and Sweden could also, for example, block the Gulf of Finland with naval mines, naval targeting robots and submarines so that Russian ships do not reach the port of Saint Petersburg. Sea traffic to the city is absolutely irreplaceable for Russia.
- We must be able to show that we not only have the ability to defend ourselves, but the ability to counterattack and carry out offensive countermeasures. That's part of the deterrent.
