The accident occurred near Toledo, on the Madrid-Seville high-speed line. A Renfe train collided with an Iryo convoy that was stopped on the tracks. The toll at the moment is at least 68 dead and 100 injured. Three Italians are missing, one compatriot is hospitalized but out of danger, 5 others are in good condition. The cause of the tragedy would be human error after a failure in the signaling system
Rescue operations continued throughout the night following the train disaster that occurred yesterday in Spain, in which at least 68 people lost their lives and dozens were injured. Illuminated by powerful spotlights, teams worked to cut through the metal carriages in search of victims and the missing, while many of those who died in the accident have yet to be identified. Three Italian women are currently missing. According to the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, hundreds of operators were sent to the site of the disaster for rescue and recovery operations, which also included the use of drones and helicopters to locate the victims and remove the rubble. Meanwhile, the Semaf train drivers' union began a 24-hour strike starting at midnight, demanding structural improvements to safety and compliance with previously undertaken commitments.
What happened yesterday
At kilometer 118 near Urda, not far from Toledo, a collision between two high-speed trains on the Madrid-Seville line caused at least 68 deaths and more than 100 injuries, of which 18 were in serious conditions. Dozens of people are still missing. An Ave train of the public company Renfe and an Iryo - a company owned by Fs Internacional - were involved, with 397 and 147 people on board respectively, including a newborn. The first convoy, traveling at around 200 kilometers per hour, hit the second directly, which was stopped due to a fault in the control system of the Urda station.
Farnesina: three Italians missing in the accident
The Farnesina communicates that the Spanish authorities have indicated three Italian citizens missing due to the accident. The situation of the compatriots involved, explains the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is as follows: 5 Italian passengers were recovered in stable conditions from the 2 trains involved. A sixth is hospitalized in a Toledo hospital; 3 others are considered "missing". The Spanish authorities have begun operations to identify the bodies.
Failure in communications
In the minutes preceding the clash, a failure in the communications of three computers on the network would have put the LZB security system out of service in a stretch of approximately 63 kilometres. The anomaly would have caused the automatic stopping of the trains in circulation: six, including the two involved in the collision. With the main system out of service, the Adif control center in Madrid's Atocha station would take over management of rail traffic. It is in this phase that, according to reconstructions, the decisive human error occurred.
Audio points the finger at Atocha control center
"Resume normal travel": this is the order given by the Atocha railway control center in Madrid to the driver of the Ave high-speed train and that of the other train involved, of the Iryo company, before the collision. Three audio recordings, published by El Pais and the public broadcaster TVE, document the communications between the drivers and the control center in the minutes preceding the tragedy, highlighting alleged errors by the center itself. According to the reconstruction, at 8.36 the Ave train, which was approximately 25 km away behind the Iryo, on the same track heading south, after the stop caused by the failure of the Lzb automatic control system, received authorization to restart at normal speed, instead of proceeding in "visual" mode, i.e. with a maximum speed limit of 40 kilometers per hour, as required by the safety protocol. And even though the Iryo was still stopped ahead. At 8:41 it was the Iryo driver who reported the connection problem with the automatic system. Nonetheless, he received the same instruction to leave at normal speed. Seven minutes later, at 8.48, the driver announced again that she was stopped: "The train doesn't allow me to start the Lzb system. This is why I'm still stopped in front of the entrance sign to Urda". An interlocutory response comes from the controller: "Okay, as soon as you can. And if you have any problems, call us." It does not appear from the recorded conversations that at that moment the control center gave the order to the Ave, which in the meantime had resumed circulation at normal speed, reaching 200 km/h, to stop, due to the Iryo blocking the road. The reconstruction, the media reports, highlights a sequence of errors in authorizations and in the management of reports.
