Losing a professional licence does not necessarily mean losing the right to payment for work already completed. That question became central to a legal dispute involving a former Texas attorney who sought fees and expenses from other law firms for seven client cases he had referred to them while he was still licensed. The firms argued that paying him after his disbarment would violate professional conduct rules and a Texas Supreme Court order. A lower court accepted their position, dismissing his claims, but an appeals court has now found that the evidence did not establish the firms' defence. In its November 5, 2026, opinion in R Kent Livesay and The Law Office of R Kent Livesay, PC v. Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball, LLP, the Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment in favour of the law firms and sent the case back for further proceedings. The ruling, available on Justia under docket number 14-25-00393-CV, did not establish that Livesay was entitled to the disputed money. Instead, the court concluded that the firms had not produced sufficient evidence to prove that his recovery was legally barred or that he had failed to complete his responsibilities before his licence was suspended.
How the fee dispute began
The dispute involved R Kent Livesay and his professional corporation, the Law Office of R Kent Livesay, PC. Before losing his licence, Livesay had referred personal injury cases to Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball, LLP and Farrar & Ball, LLP. Under the arrangements, he said he had agreed to share responsibility for representing the clients alongside the firms. Livesay sent letters to the firms on December 30, 2016, stating that he could no longer represent the affected clients. His licence was suspended in January 2017 and later revoked by the Texas Supreme Court on July 6, 2018. The firms subsequently entered into new representation agreements directly with those clients, removing Livesay from their representation. In 2022, Livesay filed a lawsuit seeking payment for seven client matters. His claims included breach of contract, quantum meruit, money had and received, unjust enrichment, constructive trust and breach of fiduciary duty. He also sought a declaratory judgment concerning his right to collect fees and expenses, as well as reimbursement of expenses he said he had incurred while working on the cases. The firms denied that he was entitled to the money. They argued that he had not completed his responsibilities before losing his licence and that paying him would violate professional conduct rules and the Texas Supreme Court's revocation order.
Why the lower court dismissed his claims
In October 2024, the firms filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Livesay's claims. They relied partly on an affidavit from Kyle Farrar, a founding partner, stating that settlement checks for the disputed cases had not been issued until after Livesay's suspension or disbarment. The trial court granted the motion in April 2025 and issued a final judgment in December 2025 in favour of the firms. Livesay appealed, arguing that the firms had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that he was legally barred from receiving the fees and expenses. A central issue was whether a disbarred attorney could still receive payment for work completed while legally practising. The appeals court referred to earlier Texas decisions, including Lee v. Cherry, which recognised that an attorney who completed the required legal work before being suspended or disbarred could still recover an agreed referral fee. However, the court also considered Royden v. Ardoin, which established that disbarment before completing a contingent-fee agreement could amount to voluntary abandonment, preventing the attorney from recovering payment for unfinished work. Texas's fee-sharing rules also require lawyers to provide proportional professional services or assume joint responsibility for the representation, along with obtaining the client's written consent. Livesay maintained that he had accepted joint responsibility for the cases, making the question of whether he completed his obligations before his licence was suspended important to the dispute.
Why the appeals court reopened the case
The appellate judges found a significant problem with the evidence submitted by the firms. Livesay had objected to Farrar's affidavit, arguing that it did not explain how he personally knew when the settlement checks were issued. Although Farrar identified himself as a founding partner, the affidavit did not establish that he handled the firms' client accounts, signed the settlement checks or otherwise had direct knowledge of the relevant transactions. The appeals court concluded that his position alone was insufficient to establish personal knowledge. It therefore ruled that the affidavit could not serve as competent summary-judgment evidence. Without that affidavit, the remaining evidence did not conclusively establish when the clients received their settlement payments. This date mattered because the firms needed to demonstrate that the client matters had concluded after Livesay could no longer continue his joint responsibilities. The court also rejected the argument that the Texas Supreme Court's revocation order automatically prevented Livesay from receiving any payment. It explained that the order did not override existing Texas law allowing disbarred attorneys to recover fees earned on matters completed while they were licensed. The November 5 decision reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the appeals court did not rule that Livesay had completed all his responsibilities or that the firms owed him the disputed fees. His entitlement to reimbursement of expenses also remains unresolved. The ruling therefore gives Livesay another opportunity to pursue his claims, but it does not guarantee that he will recover the fees or expenses he is seeking.
