Iran may have found a weapon in the American electoral calendar. With the midterm elections two weeks away, Tehran is intensifying attacks on shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz, calculating that higher energy prices will deepen President Donald Trump’s political troubles and make another U.S. military campaign too costly to contemplate.
The wager is seductive: an American president anxious about diesel prices and his party’s prospects in the midterms, Iran seems to believe, will have little appetite for another major war.
Trump’s declaration that he will refrain from striking Iran before the Nov. 3 vote appears to vindicate this view, even as he periodically threatens to use force again. Having survived two rounds of war and absorbed punishing economic losses, Iran’s leaders believe they can endure a little longer. By disrupting Gulf commerce, they gain leverage their conventional forces cannot provide. They also hope to make that leverage permanent and compel Washington to accept Tehran’s authority over passage through the world’s most important energy chokepoint.
Yet the past nine months of war against Iran have made it clear that renewed military conflict before the midterms or after the elections is unlikely to resolve the disputes between the U.S. and Iran. The two countries will eventually have to sit across the negotiating table to resolve their long-running disputes.
Tehran may be misreading how political peril shapes an adversary’s decisions. Trump could decide that appearing powerless as Iranian attacks push up prices is more damaging than another round of military strikes. Reports that his administration has considered fresh strikes suggest the military option remains in play. A serious attack on American forces could turn Trump’s promise of restraint into a political liability overnight.
The political situation in Israel adds a combustible variable. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces an Oct. 27 election with his bloc struggling to secure a majority. He has staked his political reputation on the claim that only he can neutralize the Iranian threat.
With Tehran rebuilding its missile and drone capabilities and uncertainty surrounding its nuclear program, Netanyahu may see renewed strikes as both a strategic opportunity and a means of restoring his standing at home. Such a gamble could deepen Israel’s insecurity, but electoral desperation seldom improves anyone’s judgment.
The convergence of these calculations makes the coming weeks particularly perilous. Iran thinks Trump’s electoral weakness will constrain him. Trump and Netanyahu might each conclude that a show of force could rescue their political fortunes. Each side imagines it can calibrate the violence and manage the aftermath. The experience of this year’s conflict, in which successive rounds of fighting outran diplomatic efforts to contain them, offers little reason for that confidence.
Even if October passes without another conflagration, November brings its own hazards. After the midterm elections, the political constraints Trump has publicly imposed on himself will disappear. With substantial American forces already positioned in the region, Washington may be tempted to break the deadlock through another round of attacks. Tehran, fearing another surprise attack, might choose to strike Israel or U.S. military assets in the region first. What might seem like prudent preparation in Washington or Tehran could help bring about the war it is meant to deter.
The underlying impasse is as stubborn as ever. Washington wants a nuclear agreement and believes its blockade will ultimately compel Iran to negotiate. Tehran insists on upfront economic relief and an end to the war before substantive talks on the nuclear issue can begin.
America can point to tankers still transiting Hormuz, but shipping that depends on costly military protection and remains under threat is a poor substitute for normal trade. Iran can inflict considerable damage on the oil exports of its Gulf neighbors, but it has so far failed to turn that leverage into meaningful American concessions.
Another surge in hostilities would widen this gulf rather than bridge it. American and Israeli aircraft can destroy missile launchers, production facilities, and infrastructure, but Iran has repeatedly demonstrated that it can retaliate and survive. Iran’s response could extend further to target Gulf energy infrastructure, maritime commerce, data centers, and other critical networks.
The Houthi confrontation with Saudi Arabia already offers a grim illustration of how quickly the costs can spread. The war in Yemen has been reignited with devastating consequences, including deadly attacks on civilian airports and a spiraling cycle of retaliation. The fighting now threatens to draw in Turkey and Pakistan to support Saudi Arabia, as the three countries recently signed a mutual security pact known as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.
A new campaign could leave Iran poorer, Israel more exposed, and the U.S. burdened with an even more expensive regional commitment, while markets around the world absorb another shock.
The outlines of a diplomatic bargain have been visible for months: reciprocal steps to reopen Hormuz, calibrated sanctions relief, and a resumption of nuclear negotiations. The difficulty lies in sequencing and trust. Tehran fears that surrendering its maritime leverage first would invite fresh demands; Washington worries that easing pressure would reward coercion without securing lasting constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. Addressing those fears will require reciprocal steps and credible verification. More bombing won’t help.
