Hudson Institute Senior Defense Analyst Dr. Can Kasapoğlu wrote about the Starlink crisis experienced by Ukraine and the technological dependencies of modern war for AA Analysis.
Imagine walking on a dark and dangerous road with your gun and tactical flashlight in your hand. There are enemies, predators and a deadly environment lurking around you. Suddenly your flashlight goes out. Yes, your gun is still in your hand, the magazine is loaded and the bullet is in the barrel. However, you can no longer predict where the danger will come from. Your mobile phone suddenly slowed down. This is exactly what happened to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The restrictions imposed on satellite communication services provided through Starlink and its military version Starshield in October 2026 also revealed a critical dependency of the modern warfare environment.
What was the Starlink outage?
Satellite networks in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), such as Starlink, constitute a significant part of the dependencies of modern military systems. Many satellites located relatively close to the earth provide low-latency and high-capacity communication. Starlink's ability to offer a round-trip delay of approximately 25-60 milliseconds in terrestrial use and a data transfer speed of 10-30 megabits per second in some service packages embodies the importance of this architecture.
Rapid transmission of data collected by reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence elements to command-control centers, combat units and fire support vehicles shortens the time from target detection to engagement. In areas where other networks are hit or suppressed by electronic warfare, satellite connectivity supports the joint operational capability of distributed units.
The critical technical nuance for the defense industry is that the limitation in question does not concern the data transfer rate of the satellite internet, but the speed at which the military platform carrying the Starlink/Starshield terminal can maintain the connection. While it was reported that the movement speed limit of approximately 160 kilometers per hour continued as of October 23, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense confirmed on October 24 that stable connectivity was restored at speeds above 400 kilometers per hour.
In particular, the category of operations defined by Ukraine as "medium-range attacks" has experienced problems. Assault UAVs, which have been used at distances of approximately 50-210 kilometers since the summer of 2026, have increased the pressure on Russian supply lines. It is understood that the military Starshield service was used in these operations instead of commercial Starlink. The connection restrictions introduced in October 2026 also disrupted the execution of these attacks.
Another critical development is the failure of interceptor drones (such as STING developed by Wild Hornets) designed to destroy Russian UAVs in the air. Connection limitations have also affected high-speed interceptor drones used against jet-powered Russian attack UAVs.
Starlink has not only supported the communication of troops since 2022; It also contributed to maintaining the communication of public institutions, emergency services and civilians. For this reason, the value of satellite connectivity in wartime Ukraine cannot be limited to the front line and the rear. Military strength and social resilience are fed by the same communication infrastructure.
Starlink's key
Starlink's arrival in Ukraine is as remarkable as its technical features and contains critical lessons. As you may remember, Kiev's demand gained visibility in 2022, right at the beginning of the Russian occupation, with the call made by the then Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, to Elon Musk on the social media platform X. However, the parties started negotiations weeks before the call was made public.
As of January 2023, the total number of terminals in the country reached 25 thousand. This infrastructure, which responds to urgent needs over time, has become an integral part of Ukraine's war architecture. During the 2022-2025 period, more than 50 thousand Starlink terminals were provided to Ukraine through official channels, especially in Poland.
Explanations regarding the responsibility for the restriction decision have differed. The confusion in the statements in question itself shows what military dependency, the subject of this article, can lead to. In his post on October 24, Elon Musk argued that Ukraine violated the terms of service by using the commercial Starlink service for offensive purposes, and stated that the decisions on Starshield belong to the American government.
The fact that the Starshield service is provided through American military cooperation mechanisms and the commercial Starlink service is provided through contracts, a significant part of which is financed by Poland, shows another complication of the issue. The problem is not only the continuity of military aid, but also the assurance of the use of a paid service without political pressure in situations of crisis and conflict.
However, it should not be forgotten that access control has also been operated in favor of Ukraine in the past. As a result of whitelisting only terminals that were verified and compatible with Ukraine's Delta combat management system at the beginning of 2026, Starlink connections that Russian forces used by commercial and covert means from third parties were disabled.
Another critical issue is the nature of the restriction decision applied. SpaceX and Musk did not completely deprive Ukraine of Starlink service, but imposed a limitation on the speed of the platforms carrying the terminals. However, the savings in question had consequences that directly affected military operational capabilities. Contractual provisions and technical malfunctions, as well as company decisions, can have similar consequences.
Military planning cannot guarantee that commercial infrastructure beyond its control will provide uninterrupted service. However, there is also a strategic dilemma that this lesson brings with it. As Low Earth Orbit-based satellite communication services become increasingly central to modern warfare architecture, an increasingly difficult balance must be struck between reducing dependence on these infrastructures and maintaining the operational advantages they provide.
Are technology companies the private military sector of the future?
Those who look at the Russia-Ukraine War from the perspective of private military structures have long seen the rise of the Russian private army Wagner and its fall with a failed rebellion. On the other hand, the development of the private sector in military matters arises from a very different ground. Throughout the conflict, dozens of technology companies have directly supported Ukraine's civilian, humanitarian or military needs. SpaceX provided communications service. Maxar, Planet Labs and BlackSky provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance services, while PrimerAI and Recorded Future have produced artificial intelligence-supported analysis. Companies like Palantir are bringing big data analysis into military processes. Ukraine also runs a Palantir-supported military big data processing and artificial intelligence model training program called Brave-1 Dataroom.
Of course, at this point it is necessary to ask a question from the middle of the book. If technology companies improve their ability to make decisions that determine the future of conflicts, what will be the political-military consequences of this trend? From what perspective do those who hold, or in some cases monopolize, such power see the world? Moreover, how might they want to shape it?
The lesson from the Starlink incident is access assurance in space-based capabilities. Another critical lesson is to diversify supply sources in the long term. But how?
Finnish ICEYE announced its agreement with Ukraine in January 2026, expanding access to radar satellite images. This capability supports reconnaissance in adverse weather conditions, but does not constitute a direct replacement for communications service. With the latest crisis, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense signed a letter of intent with ICEYE and Nokia stipulating the development of an independent satellite communications infrastructure. However, considering Starlink's large constellation of thousands of satellites, global coverage capacity and high bandwidth, it does not seem possible for the ICEYE-Nokia system, whose first satellites are planned to be launched in 2028, to replace Starlink in the short term.
The Ukrainian-Russian War, at its current stage, makes it difficult to explain military power solely through state-centered models. Because those who produce flashlights will, at some point, have or want to have a say in which way to go at night.
